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There is a widespread concern about values and values education at the present time,
which I explore in an introductory chapter. Whilst it is conceded that talk of 'crisis' is
perhaps excessive, there does seem to be genuine cause for concern. At the end ofthis
introduction, I make the claim which is at the heart of this work: that the teaching of
values requires a framework.
The term framework is widely used and I begin by exploring and clarifying my use of
this term further. I discuss frameworks and language drawing principally on the work
of Wittgenstein. I consider frameworks and tradition drawing on the work of
MacIntyre, and I consider frameworks and community, drawing on the work of
Charles Taylor. Finally, I synthesise these, to derive an understanding of frameworks
for values education.
Then I respond to the twin criticisms that either my claim is so general as to be
trivially true, or that insisting on a framework is tantamount to indoctrination. I argue
that this is a false dichotomy and that my framework constitutes a via media.
Recognising that a number of references have been made to the nature of the self I
draw these together, particularly in the light of the liberal / communitarian debate. I
argue that the self is both encumbered and autonomous and I go on to expand this
position, to justify my claim that values education requires a framework.
Then, I address the possibility that the classical liberal approach to education
constitutes a framework and argue that it does not. Finally I examine the debate about
faith schools and make comparisons between it and my own discussion, in an attempt
to show that my largely philosophical discussion and the conclusions I draw, are
indeed pertinent to current educational debate
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Preface
There is a widespread concern about values and values education at the present time which I
explore in an introductory chapter. Whilst it is conceded that talk of 'crisis' is perhaps
excessive, there does seem to be genuine cause for concern. I go on to explore the question
'what are values?' and I briefly consider a dichotomy posed by the teaching of values in
schools. At the end of this introduction, I make the claim central to this work, that the
teaching ofvalues requires a framework, and I briefly outline what kind of claim I take this
to be.
The term framework is widely used and in chapters two to five I explore these uses in order
to clarify my use ofthis term further. In chapter two I discuss frameworks and language
drawing principally on the work of Wittgenstein. In chapter three I consider frameworks and
tradition drawing on the work ofMacIntyre, and in chapter four I consider frameworks and
community, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. (Whilst Taylor does not claim to be a
communitarian himself others see him so, and either way, his development ofthe notion of
the self as situated within community is highly relevant to my discussion.) In a fifth chapter I
synthesise these, to derive an understanding offrameworks for values education based on
components oflanguage, tradition and community.
In chapter six I respond to the twin criticisms that either my claim is so general as to be
trivially true, or that insisting on a framework is tantamount to indoctrination. I argue that
this is a false dichotomy and that my framework constitutes a via media between two
extremes. In chapter seven I recognise that a number of references have been made to the
nature ofthe self and try to draw these together, particularly in the light ofthe liberal /
communitarian debate. I argue that the self is both encumbered and autonomous and drawing
on Raz I argue that the self is autonomous not contra the community but within it.
In chapter eight I offer an argument to show that values education requires a framework,
based on the situated nature ofthe self. This key argument at the heart ofthesis is dependent
upon a prior understanding ofboth frameworks and the nature of the self, and so although
there is some argument for placing it nearer the beginning I felt it could only be properly
articulated when the other pieces of the jigsaw were in place.
In chapter nine I address the possibility that the classical liberal approach to education itself
constitutes a framework and I examine this from the perspectives of language, tradition and
community which I have developed. I conclude that there can be no liberal education
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framework because considerations of community developed in chapters four and five are not
met.
In chapter ten I examine the recent political and academic debate in this area, centred around
Grace's Catholic Schools: Mission, Markets and Morality and the "Faith Schools Consensus
or Conflict" conference held at the Institute ofEducation, University of London in June
2002. I make comparisons between it and my own discussion, and show that my largely
philosophical discussion, and the conclusions I draw from it, are indeed pertinent to current
educational debate.
A balance ofanalytic and speculative philosophy applied to theoretical and related practical
problems as exemplified by the work of Peters and Hirst is the stance adopted in this
enquiry. The method is to draw on "established branches ofphilosophy and bring together
those segments that are relevant to the solution of educational problems" (Hirst and Peters
1970 p13). This entails both the analysis of concepts and the application of them to
educational situations, in our case the analysis of the concept of a framework for teaching
values, and reasons to justify its application in a real school setting. Shortcomings in
providing an absolutely water-tight definition ofa framework for values education may also
be viewed in the light ofPeters' own remarks that the inability to produce a "neat set of
logically necessary conditions for the use ofa word like knowledge or education is not
necessarily a hall-mark of failure" (ibid.). The process of analysis clarifies our concepts and
reveals their links with other concepts, thus increasing our understanding and prompting a
more informed and balanced reaction to the social situation in which we find ourselves. I do
not see my own inability to define framework categorically as a failure, for the aim here is to
draw out conceptual links, advance understanding and make connections where they did not
previously exist.
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I Inuuduction
Is there a crisis about values and values education?
Speaking to serving teachers, considering the national press and reading specialist
educational publications, gives the impression that there is a problem with values and values
education at the present time. There is a sense that values and values education are at worst
in crisis, and at the very least in decline. In this section, this suggestion will be examined,
and we shall seek to establish that there is indeed a legitimate cause for concern about values
and values education. The historical and social events that have or may have caused any
decline are inevitably highly complex, and the aim at this stage is to describe rather than
explain the situation.
Before we begin one possible objection about the concept of decline needs to be met. In
1993 Graham Haydon published, Education and the Crisis in Values. In this short
monograph he makes several important points, but in particular he says that any talk of
decline assumes some standard against which a decline can be measured. Whilst he concedes
that for example crime rates may have increased and there may be higher levels of truancy,
he also points out that there is an increased awareness of green issues, and a concern for
justice, particularly for animal rights. This is seen as a counter trend, in a sense a moral
advance and Haydon says in the face of this plurality, there is an absence ofa unified scale to
which appeal can be made. In the light ofthis he suggests that talk of decline does not make
sense. This is certainly plausible, but not water tight for it is not clear that a single measure is
essential. If there were a recognisable decline by some standards and an advance by others it
is possible that some overall trend or balance could be recognised. There may be dispute
about the overall balance, but the idea ofa balance or an overall measure ofdecline is not
itself incoherent.
In 1994 Lord Hailsham published Values: Collapse and Cure. Before the content ofthis
work is considered it must be said that it is quite remarkable that a man ofLord Hailsham's
stature should publish a book with such a title. It must be conceded that it would be a fallacy
ad hominem to say that if Lord Hailsham says there is a collapse in values then there is.
Equally well when the former Lord Privy Seal, and a fellow ofAll Souls College, bothers to
write a book with such a title at eighty-seven years of age, this is not insignificant.
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Lord Hailsham begins by admitting that he felt within himself a mood of deep depression
around the end of 1992. Initially he connected this with the state of the royal family, the
external political and economic situation at home or perhaps the problems in Bosnia or the
Middle East. Upon further reflection he comes to realise these are not the causes ofhis mood
but a "despondency about the failure ofbeliefin the things which had buoyed me up
throughout my life" (Hailsham 1994 p5). Hailsham says he does not mean religious beliefs
as such but values and value judgements: "the good, the right, the beautiful, the honourable
and even the true" (ibid. p8). He says the vision ofour life has become confused and
uncertain and is in danger of signifying nothing.
Hailsham suggests that this confusion stems from a widespread acceptance of Logical
Positivism, either consciously, or at least "because that belief is an accurate description of
the actual code ofbehaviour by which an increasing number ofpeople live" (ibid. p165-6).
When he talks ofpositivism he is thinking of the version proposed by A. J. Ayer in
Language, Truth and Logic and he forcibly puts forward the familiar criticism that
positivism fails because it is self-contradictory. He does little more to argue that there has
actually been a collapse in values, and indeed he does not assert this beyond describing his
own mood and feelings, but the suggestion is implicit.
The book continues by asserting that there are definite, objective values and value
judgements which are not verifiable in Ayer's sense. He examines various kinds in tum:
aesthetic values, values in law etc. and although one may not want to endorse all that he says
(indeed he persistently muddles an emotive theory about values with a subjective theory
which is distinct) nevertheless the vigour and passion with which he argues cannot leave one
cold. The very fact that the question of a collapse in values has been raised in this way is a
significant first piece in a complex jigsaw.
Hailsham distinguishes values per se from religious values but many authors do not. Shortly
after being appointed Secretary of State for Education in 1992, John Patten published an
article in The Spectator entitled: "There is a Choice: Good or Evil." In this article Patten
maintains that there is a crisis in values and a moral decline and he explicitly linked this to a
decline in church attendance, the loss offaith and an absence of the fear ofdamnation. The
article aroused much debate and the explicit connection drawn between morals and faith
caused many to dismiss Patten's paper as political posturing, but ignoring the party political
issues, we are interested in whether indeed there is a crisis - what led Patten to this
conclusion?
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Patten noted the growth of 'Victorian values' in the nineteenth century and suggested that
these developed as the century progressed, reaching "their apogee in Edwardian times"
(Patten 1992). Following the Second World War, Patten maintains that there has been a
steady decline in the importance ofvalues in society and he points to three indicators of this.
Firstly there are now higher levels of crime. Secondly there is a higher incidence ofmarital
breakdown, divorce and abortion. And thirdly there is a growth of secularisation, and a
search for happiness centred on "cars, colour televisions and consumables" (ibid.).
It is proper that these assertions should be questioned. Is there really more crime, are there
really more abortions etc. or is it that we are now much better at recording and counting
these things? Can we ignore the increased interest in green issues, ecology and animal
rights, and even ifwe can rely on Patten's assertions, do they point to a crisis in values or to
a radical shift in values? Is it the nature of the change itself, or the rate of the change that is
causing alarm? I think Patten's short paper was designed to spark debate and that it certainly
did, but to draw too many definite conclusions from it without considering the wider picture
would, I think, be a mistake.
Professor John White links values to religion but in a slightly different way. In his inaugural
lecture as professor of the philosophy of education at the London Institute ofEducation
(1995), he begins by speaking ofBritain's "overwhelming unreligiousness" (White 1995 p3)
and finds it surprising that "in 1990 the proportion ofactive church members in the UK
population was 15%, the smallest for all West European countries" (ibid.). He goes on to
outline how children from a religious background are provided with frameworks ofmeaning,
but suggests that "with secular children it is more hit-and-miss" (ibid.). He suggests such
children lack clear bearings and in terms of their personal flourishing are disadvantaged.
The precise details ofWhite's subsequent discussion may be ignored at this stage, for the
crucial point is that there is no established tradition in to which non-religious children may
be initiated. There is no agreed framework ofvalues distinct from the religious framework in
this country and although there have been attempts to locate secular value systems (White
mentions Iris Murdoch's Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals) there is no general agreement.
Confusion and uncertainty concerning values and values education, are the prevailing trends
that Professor White identifies.
This idea of confusion about values is one which many authors develop. In 1992 R. M. Hare
published a collection of essays on religion and education. Some of these were re-workings
or copies of earlier essays but significantly in essay number nine Hare acknowledges the
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"bewildering choices ofvalues, principles, ideologies, ways of life etc. with which they
[people] are confronted" (Hare 1992 p137). The choice itself does not entail a crisis, but the
breadth of choice and its bewildering nature does suggest a cause for concern.
In 1996 Les Burwood published a paper: "How Should Schools Respond to the Plurality of
Values in a Multicultural Society." The content ofthis paper is a discussion about whether
values are objective or subjective, and in turn what this entails about the teaching ofvalues.
More importantly for us, the very fact that the question ofwhat to do about values in a
multicultural society needs to be raised in 1996, shows that there is confusion and
uncertainty. The paper does not set out to praise or criticise an established approach, but asks
more generally how should we respond, suggesting to me at least, that there is a profound
uncertainty about value systems, and how they might be transmitted.
In Education and the Crisis in Values Graham Haydon also suggests that confusion results
from the plurality ofvalue systems. He goes on to suggest this plurality of standards or
values in British Society, stems not so much from ethnic diversity but from religious
diversity, and a "diversity ofmoral traditions" (Haydon 1993 p2). Haydon says this is not
new, but the public recognition of it is, and with increased communications and the high
profile role of the media we have become particularly aware of the non-homogeneity of our
moral outlook. The recognition of this change does not necessarily indicate a decline but
there are those for whom change is equivalent to decline!
Furthermore, it has to be said that whilst a recognition of a plurality does not entail a decline
it is quite possible that the way that the plurality is perceived may lead to a decline. That is to
say that it is only a few short steps from a recognition of a plurality to embracing relativity
and subjectivism about values, and from there to the suggestion that ifvalue systems can not
be objectively distinguished then really they do not matter. If this is a widespread pattern of
thought then it is possible that "plurality of standards does contribute something to moral
decline" (ibid. p4) but note that this is a possibility not a certainty.
In 1997 Haydon developed some of these thoughts in a book: Teaching about Values.
Enlarging on a point made earlier that diversity ofvalues stems from religious diversity, he
insists again that values are closely tied to religion and religious culture for the majority,
even those who do not consider themselves religious. If the separate religions are in separate
social groups this is unproblematic, but when the separate religions are in the same social
group this can lead to problems. The reason for this is that religion is not simply about
(metaphysical) beliefs, but entails behaviour, belonging, tradition etc .. Therefore ifwe do not
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learn how to accommodate religious plurality, then religious conflict and with it conflict
about values is likely. The suggestion here is stronger than the suggestion above. Whereas
above; the plurality ofvalues and the way that this is perceived may lead to a decline, here
the suggestion is that plurality, ifnot appropriately accommodated will inevitably lead to
conflict of one kind or another (see Haydon 1997 Chap. 4).Talk of conflict in society
generally and in schools particularly, is a cause for concern by any standards.
Another point is also particularly relevant. Haydon says that his book was written as a
response to the public's demand that schools teach about values and also the fact that
''teachers in particular, who are in the front line in responding to these expectations, have
very little guidance on how to go about it" (Haydon 1997 pxi). From an author who works in
a major centre of teacher training (The Institute ofEducation, London), it is a significant
observation that teachers are not taught adequately how to deal with values issues. If this is
the case then it is no surprise that there is a cause for concern about values education!
In 1994 there was an education symposium at St Mary's College, Durham which resulted in
another collection of essays, entitled Society in Conflict: The Value ofEducation. In this text
R. P. Minney identifies "a confusion ofvalues because we live in a multicultural, multi-
religious and socially polyphonous society. As if that were not enough mass communications
present to us and our children, systems ofvalue, or rather fragments ofvalue systems, from
allover the world" (see Ashton 1994 p53). The interesting and relevant point here is that we
receive fragments ofvalue systems: both fragments which may be part of an incomplete
whole, and fragments from separate systems which may appear to contradict one another.
If fragmentation or disintegration ofvalue systems is the major trend which dominates or is
overlaid upon the problems associated with increased plurality in value systems, then this
could be considered a crisis. As society becomes more diverse and as communications
technology becomes better and faster, this fragmentation is likely to increase. It seems clear
that this is a real problem which will not just go away, and one which those who have a
interest in, or a responsibility for values education need to consider very carefully indeed.
Finally, in the last twenty years scientists have made huge technical advances in the fields of
human health care and genetics. Prematurely born babies have an ever increasing chance of
survival, raising questions ofviability and abortion. In 1978 Louise Brown, the first ever test
tube baby was born and since then there have been huge advances in genetic engineering and
screening. In 1997 the first cloned sheep (Dolly) was born in Scotland and in August 2000
the Chief Medical Officer, Prof. Liam Donaldson recommended to the government that the
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cloning of certain human tissues should be permitted (see The Independent 17 August 2000).
The health benefits, especially to those with degenerative diseases seem obvious, but with
the cloning ofhumans ever more likely there are serious concerns too.
Ifwe add to this the great advances in the Human Genome Project, the mapping ofthe
human DNA code, then the possibilities ofgenetic modification and genetic screening loom
larger and larger. The value responses to these possibilities are hugely varied. Roger Gosden
in his book Designer Babies cites (at one end ofthe scale) Pope John Paul II: "Genetic
screening is gravely opposed to the moral law when it is done with the thought ofpossibly
inducing an abortion depending on results. A diagnosis which shows the existence of a
malformation or a hereditary disease must not be the equivalent ofa death sentence"
(Gosden 1999 p86-7). At the other end of the scale some American health insurance
companies have tried to escape responsibility for care when they feel parents to have done
insufficient to prevent the birth of a 'defective child'. In an American court cases have even
been brought by children, against their parents on the grounds of 'wrongful birth' (ibid.
p87)!
In the light ofthese new technologies a number ofbodies have been established. A
committee was convened in 1982 to enquire into human fertility and embryology and this
committee published its report under Dame (now Baroness) Mary Warnock in 1984.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) was established in 1991.
The Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) existed from December 1996 to
December 1999 and produced reports on Insurance and Genetic Testing (Dec. '97), Cloning
(Dec. '98) and Employment and Genetic Testing (July '99). In December 1999 the HGAC
was replaced by the Human Genetic Commission (HGC).
The HGC is a government body whose purpose is to analyse developments in human
genetics and then to advise ministers on the likely impact upon health and healthcare, and
their social, ethical, legal and economic implications. So it cannot be said that scientific
research progresses unchecked but there are, I think, two principal problems.
The first is that these bodies do not speak with a single voice (indeed the 1984 Warnock
report has an appendix of "expressions of dissent" from the main findings), and that they are
only advisory. Whilst this is of course proper and to be expected, it creates something of a
difficulty for the teacher approaching the subject with a view to explaining some ofthis
material. The wealth of opinion is just as likely to confuse the issues as clarify them for the
pupil. Secondly, there is a difficulty in so far as the advisory bodies tend to produce their
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reports after the relevant scientific advance. There is a definite sense that the world ofvalues
is trying to keep up with the world of science, and this causes uneasiness at the very least. It
is significant I think that John Harriss opens his book, Clones, Genes and Immortality with
the words: "The rapidity of scientific advance and in particular advance in the field of
genetics and reproduction has left our moral categories in disarray" (Harriss 1992 pI).
In the light ofboth the educational literature and the difficulties surrounding the moral
evaluation of recent medical achievements I think there is genuine cause for concern about
values education. Again I emphasise that at this stage I have tried to describe the situation
rather than explain it, and before any explanation is sought it is fitting to consider the more
general and logically prior question: what do we mean by values?
What are values?
Unfortunately there is no simple answer to the question what are values and indeed there is a
great diversity of opinion in the field ofvalues: philosophers, sociologists, educationalists
etc. all seem to want to have their say! This however should not act as a deterrent, for if
progress is to be made we must begin somewhere, and an attempt to explain what values are
is surely as good a place as any.
Modern philosophers have tended to consider values as distinct from facts, and this
distinction is usually accredited to David Hume (1711-1776). In a Treatise ofHuman Nature
Hume protests that some writers ofmoral philosophy begin with statements joined by 'is'
and then change almost imperceptibly to statements joined by 'ought'. Although the
difference seems minor, Hume claims that this is a new relation and "a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction
from others which are entirely different from it" (Hume III i 1). This protest has become the
loosely expressed dictum that 'you cannot derive an ought from an is.' It may be noted that
to overplay this distinction is to detach value from the world entirely. To underplay it is to
suggest (implausibly) that an ought can be derived from an is without a problem. A
satisfactory account is likely to suggest that ought and is are somehow interrelated.
Naturally this has provided a rich source of discussion for moral philosophers, and there is a
considerable literature on the question ofwhether Hume's law is valid and ifnot what are the
reasons that Hume demands. In his book Ethics, J. L. Mackie discusses John Searle's
example of Smith who promises to pay Jones $5 and therefore ought to pay him. Mackie
argues that certain linguistic and social conventions do indeed warrant the transition from
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ought to is. Mackie considers the game of chess, whose rules and conventions certainly
legitimate an inference of the type: a bishop is attacking your queen therefore you ought to
protect your queen (cf. Mackie pp 64 - 72).
More importantly for us, Hume's dictum draws a sharp distinction between values and facts,
or to put it another way between evaluative and descriptive judgements. Just as this has
provoked debate in the moral arena, so it would be foolish to expect this semantic distinction
to be entirely clear cut.
Traditionally, a fact is the worldly correlate ofa true proposition, a state of affairs that
obtains making the proposition true. Facts are complexes of objects and properties which are
abstract, even though their constituents may not be. For example the fact that Brutus stabbed
Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing in the relationship of stabbing (in
that order). The actual obtaining of the state of affairs makes it true (properly makes the
descriptive judgement true) that Brutus stabbed Caesar. The problem with this approach is
that difficulties arise over negative, disjunctive and modal facts (cf. Honderich p267).
Values on the other hand express feelings and attitudes, which traditionally cannot be
discerned by the senses or scientific instruments. It may be that values are sui generis
properties, or relationships of a particular kind. Additionally, problems arise over the
questions ofwhether a single judgement could be both descriptive and evaluative and
whether this partition is exhaustive, and so it is to the twentieth century treatment of these
questions that we now turn.
In the 1920s and 1930s logical empiricism or logical positivism began to develop, centred on
the Vienna Circle founded in 1926 by Moritz Schlick. The members of the Circle were
philosophers, mathematicians and scientists who were united by a common interest in
scientific methodology and an opposition to traditional, metaphysical philosophy. The
manifesto of the Circle published in 1929 lists fourteen members and ten sympathisers (see
Ayer 1982 p129) and there were several distinguished visitors (e.g. Ayer and Quine). The
rise ofNazism, the German invasion of Austria in 1938 and the onset of the Second World
War eventually caused the decline and dispersal of the Circle and it met in a barely
recognisable shape for the last time in Cambridge in the summer of 1938.
Although not one of the founding members ofthe Circle, RudolfCarnap (1891-1970) was to
become one ofits leading exponents and his: The Logical Construction ofthe World (Die
Logische Aujbau der Welt) was published in 1928. In a similar way to Frege, Carnap was
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interested in semantics and formalised languages to describe the world. He aimed to solve
philosophical problems through logical analysis and he seemed to believe that philosophical
disagreement could be solved by linguistic clarification. The precise details ofCarnap's
position changed and developed over his long and prolific career, but his essential
philosophical outlook remained unchanged. Significantly for us, the earlier Carnap thought
that value statements could be defined within science, but he later came to sympathise with
Ayer and others that value statements have approximately the same status as statements of
metaphysics; and can therefore be dismissed a meaningless on the same sorts of grounds.
Sir Alfred Ayer (1910-1989) published his hugely influential Language, Troth and Logic in
1936, in which he outlines his verification principle which (loosely) asserts that a factual
statement is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified, otherwise it is meaningless -
nonsense. CAyer admitted that some a priori statements were meaningful, but said that these
were tautologies, not statements offact.) Metaphysics is the first and intended victim of
Ayer's analysis and considering the debates between monists and pluralists, and between
idealists and realists he asserts that since none oftheir positions is actually or even possibly
verifiable, each is nonsense. Metaphysical debate is not solved by linguistic analysis but is
shown to be meaningless -literally non-sense.
It may be asked: what of ethics? At the beginning of chapter six ofLanguage, Troth and
Logic, Ayer recognises what he calls a common distinction between facts and values. He
considers the thesis that statements ofvalue are genuine synthetic propositions that cannot be
verified. If true, this would undermine Ayer's whole enterprise, so he has to give an account
ofvalue statements, and ethics and aesthetics are principally what he has in mind.
Firstly he concedes that there could be genuine philosophical debate about the meaning of
ethical terms such as good or wrong, what would now be thought of as meta-ethics, but
argues that in fact normative ethical terms are unanalysable as they are pseudo concepts. He
says that the presence ofan ethical symbol adds nothing to the factual content of a
proposition. As for a statement such as "stealing money is wrong" CAyer 1936 pI42). Ayer
analyses this as "stealing money!!" where the exclamation marks, by convention denote
disapproval. Generalising this, ethical utterances are really utterances ofpersonal emotion, of
moral sentiment, which may arouse or stimulate action but are not actually factual
propositions.
It is important to distinguish the emotive theory from any subjective analysis. In a subjective
analysis qualities ofvarious kinds, moral in particular are not inherent in objects but depend
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on the judgement of subjects. There may be reasons and theories underlying these
judgements and a subject may be rationally persuaded to change his mind. For the emotivist,
moral utterances report feelings, likes and dislikes, not assertions, and they are not rationally
based, so there are no contradicting views about which one can meaningfully argue. This
argument about ethics applies mutatis mutandis to aesthetics and to all questions ofvalue. In
reply to the criticism ofAyer by Moore that we do in fact argue about questions ofvalue,
Ayer says that our arguments are actually clarifications offact or logic. Alternatively the
argument may not actually entail formal contradiction, and it is when this is not recognised
"that we finally resort to abuse" (ibid p147). In short then Ayer recognises a distinction
between facts that can be empirically verified, and value judgements which appear to be
genuine synthetic propositions, but upon closer inspection are emotive utterances about
which questions of truth and falsehood cannot arise.
This view was shared by the American Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979) who developed
the emotive theory of ethics, in two papers published in the late thirties and in his influential
book Ethics and Language published in 1944. Like Ayer before him, Stevenson argued that
ethical judgements and value judgements generally, are distinct from factual judgements and
only report the subject's emotions or attitudes and are really no more than utterances of
approval or disapproval.
R. M. Hare, was a member ofthe Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy dominated
by J. L. Austin which thought the key to philosophical understanding was an analysis of
'ordinary language'. Formal languages such as those sought by Frege and Carnap were at
best unhelpful and at worst irrelevant. Hare maintained that moral utterances were not facts,
but were in a special logical category because oftheir prescriptive nature. Ethical
judgements are logically independent of facts, and commend or prohibit certain actions.
Because of the universal nature of such judgements, that is to say they should apply to every
relevantly similar case, they are not simply emotive, but have a rational basis. A full
exposition ofHare's position is not appropriate here, but it is important to note that the
separation offacts from values does not necessarily entail emotivism.
A mention should be made ofC, 1. Lewis (1883-1964) whose early work focussed on logic,
but whose later work included epistemology, value theory and ethics. A full discussion of the
550 or so pages ofAn Analysis ofKnowledge and Valuation is not really possible, but Lewis
believed that values are an intrinsic part of experience, like sensory qualia. Our experience of
perceiving values is akin to our experience ofcolour or pitch, and as the experience of
perceiving colour is distinct from perceiving red, so values are not identified with a
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particular quality but a mode ofperception. In Lewis' theory of sense perception, sensory
qualia are an intrinsic part of a sensory experience and for Lewis, are infallible. Similarly
then, our experience ofvalues is infallible. Ofcourse, it is this that leads to problems, for an
infallible experience cannot lead to knowledge or a rational judgement, since these must
contain the possibility of error. Secondly, whereas our experience ofred, or heavy is justified
(on Lewis' view) by it looking red or feeling heavy, there are public criteria of light
wavelength, and weight to which we agree. For our experience ofvalue this is not the case
and values are pushed into a mystical realm. Furthermore, value judgements are then
completely subjective, for ifmy infallible perception is at odds with your infallible
perception, there is nothing we can do.
Lewis is also vague about the kind of objects that give rise to experience ofvalue, and takes
most ofhis examples from the field ofaesthetics. In the field of ethics his position is not
entirely clear. The precise clarity and coherence ofLewis' position is, however, not our
principal concern. What is important for us is the philosophical suggestion that valuation is
always a matter of empirical knowledge and that perception ofvalues is in some way akin to
our perception of other sensory qualia.
More recently James Griffin has explored the question ofvalue judgement. He rejects the
Humean notion that we value what we desire, and refutes any kind ofreductionist position.
That is he argues that values may not be reduced to natural facts. He suggests that values are
somehow embedded in facts and gives a lot of attention to the idea that values are
supervenient upon natural properties. He rejects a straightforward supervenience relation
because of contextual problems ofrelevance (c£ p44) and offers his theory of ascent, "one
ascends through the hierarchy because one cannot explain directly or economically, at the
lower level what one can at the higher" (Griffin 1996 p48). Having said this much, Griffin
also asserts the "fuzziness" of the boundaries ofthe empirical or the natural and concedes his
idea is "extremely rough" (P49), but he seems to see his task in this area as exploration or
preliminary investigation rather than asserting watertight theory.
Simon Blackburn is suspicious ofthe supervenience relationship and asks why does it
obtain? Further ifwe know everything about the natural state of an object, can we also know
without exception all its supervenient states? And if so, how? Blackburn suggests that these
are particularly difficult questions for the realist for whom, in particular, "supervenience then
becomes a mysterious fact and one which he will have no explanation of (or no right to rely
upon)" (Blackburn 1984 p185).
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Blackburn argues for a projective theory ofvalues. Based on our perceptions ofthe physical
world, we construct theories involving higher order concepts that we then project upon the
world. Things have values that we project upon them. As physicists construct theories ofthe
properties of light, or thermodynamics and so can then project properties of colour and
temperature on to a body, so similarly we can project values on to objects on account ofthe
theories we develop and the higher order concepts we construct. Blackburn argues for this
position mainly in grounds of economy and from metaphysical considerations, and in so
doing he embraces a quasi-realism that he describes as "the only progressive research
programme in moral philosophy" (ibid. p189).
As hinted above, it is not only philosophers who have wrestled with questions offact and
value. Early social philosophy sought to explain social phenomena by sole reference to the
individuals who constituted the society. By contrast Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) who is
considered to be one ofthe founding fathers ofmodem sociology, insisted that there are
social facts which are greater than the aggregate of individual facts and indeed cannot be
reduced to them. Social facts, he insisted, are "things" and may only be explained in terms of
other social facts.
Similarly, he understood values as a sort of collective conscience, shared by members ofa
society and the bonds that maintain order in that society. He maintained that social instability
is caused by a breakdown in the system ofshared values and that if an individual is adrift
from the society's value structure he becomes anxious and disaffected. These themes were
discussed in Durkheim's Suicide: a Study in Sociology (1897) which was highly original but
which has also attracted criticism because of the use (or abuse!) of anthropological data. Just
as Lewis attaches values to empirical knowledge, so Durkheim attaches values to social
groups, and insists that social phenomena cannot be reduced to a catalogue ofphenomena
about individuals.
Max Weber (1864-1920) insisted most strongly upon the distinction between facts and
values suggesting that facts indicate what exists and values indicate what should be. Facts
are the result of scientific enquiry, whereas values guide actions and give them meaning. He
argued that science generally and social science in particular must be conducted in a value
free environment. By this, he meant, that the scientist must take great care not to
inadvertently allow his own values to influence the conduct or the results of scientific
investigation. His particular example is that Calvinists must accurately report the sexual
practices of tribal peoples under investigation, despite their own repugnance to them.
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This however is a problematic thesis, for the question becomes is it actually possible to study
social science in a value free way? Many would argue not, for a social scientist's values
determine the way he frames his hypotheses and the methods he uses to investigate them. As
a compromise, Weber insisted that value neutrality should be sought. A scientist is to clarify
the values that he has and the way they may influence his work, rather than pretend he has no
values. Again the details of this position do not concern us, but the suggestion that the values
we hold are in some way a part ofus, are integral to our social make-up and cannot simply
be laid aside, is an important point to which we shall return.
John Dewey (1859-1952) was involved in both philosophy and social issues such as
education and politics. He was much influenced by Darwin and has been described as a
naturalist; but was also influenced by Hegel and has been described as a pragmatist - a term
which he disliked - and he wrote prolifically. The question which most occupied Dewey was
"How should life be lived?" and in trying to answer it he rejected classical philosophical
dichotomies such as mindlbody, means/ends, thoughts/actions and of course facts/values.
Dewey argued that all facts are value laden, that is to say they have a social context from
which they cannot be divorced. Values he said, are rooted in the psychic dispositions of
ordinary people. The way to approach philosophical and social questions is by intelligent
enquiry, testing hypotheses and correcting and refining them. Dewey did not believe in
absolute knowledge for the possibility of further revision was always there.
All the details of this do not concern us here, but it is worth noting that although Dewey
claims to reject the fact/value distinction, in fact he does not. He says facts are value laden,
which is surely to say that facts are distinct from values but cannot be separated frorn them?
This is a position that we have already seen. Furthermore, Dewey locates values in the
psyche of society, they are something shared and are a part of our human disposition.
R. S. Peters (1919- ) whose early work was very much in the style of the Oxford analytic
school, was driven by the search for a definition ofeducation. Peters came to revise his
earliest definition as time passed, but in his inaugural lecture as professor he said,
"Education involves, essentially, processes which intentionally transmit what is valuable in
an intelligible and voluntary manner" (Peters 1963 p102). The interesting point here is that
education involves the transmission of something ofvalue. What did Peters mean by this?
He said education had not taken place ifthe result was undesirable, or not worthwhile. Peters
employs a difficult Kantian argument to define the worthwhile which essentially says that to
genuinely seek the worthwhile entails that one has some concept ofwhat this means in
advance. Peters suggests that the worthwhile (that ofvalue) is a framework made up of
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synthetic a priori propositions, which we can somehow know independently of experience.
This is a very difficult position to defend, and the Kantian philosophy behind it is open to
debate, but the suggestion again is that values are somehow distinct from ordinary
experience, and are possibly even independent of it. Peters does not address the fact/value
distinction directly as far as I know.
In contemporary writing about values education one oftwo things seems to happen. Either
the authors omit any definition ofvalues, supposing, perhaps not unreasonably, that we all
know what values are. Alternatively one or more definitions are offered but there appears to
be no general consensus. Halstead and Taylor cite various possible definitions at the
beginning oftheir Values in Education and Education in Values. From Raths, Harmin and
Simon, values are "beliefs attitudes or feelings that an individual is proud of, is willing to
publicly affirm, has [sic] been chosen thoughtfully from alternatives without persuasion and
is [sic] acted upon repeatedly." From J. R. Fraenkel in How to Teach about Values: "both
emotional commitments and ideas about worth." Similarly but longer, from Shaver and
Strong, in Facing Value Decisions: "Values are standards and principles for judging worth.
They are criteria by which we judge 'things' (people, objects, ideas, notions and situations)
to be good worthwhile and desirable or on the other hand bad worthless and despicable."
Finally, Halstead and Taylor themselves offer "Principles, fundamental convictions, ideals,
standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as points ofreference in
decision making or the evaluation ofbeliefs or action and which are closely connected to
personal integrity and personal identity" (Halstead and Taylor pp5-6).
The time has come to try and draw some conclusions although I recognise that these remarks
may be criticised as raising more questions than they solve. In an absolute sense this is
undoubtedly a valid criticism. Nevertheless in so far as the aim of an opening chapter is to
begin to establish a working context, and as this is not a thesis about the ontology or
semantics ofvalues I think it suffices to recognise the difficulties involved and to work from
a position ofbroad consensus whilst acknowledging alternate positions.
The broad consensus is that values are distinct from facts as they cannot be measured by
scientists, and value judgements cannot be proved to be true in the same way that factual
assertions can be. Additionally there seems to be general agreement that whilst values are
distinct from facts they may not be entirely divorced from them, and either through linguistic
conventions, modes ofperception, a projective theory like Blackburn's or Griffin's
supervenient relationships values and facts are connected. However the precise nature ofthis
connection need not concern us.
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What is relevant however, is that it seems to be widely held that values, whatever they are,
are given to objects by humans and do not exist independently ofhumans. Talk ofvalues per
se or the value an object has is really a shorthand for the values we give to objects, or the
value a particular object has been invested with by an individual or individuals. Values in
this thesis are to be understood in this way, as human constructions. Values are intimately
connected with beliefs, attitudes or dispositions that a person holds or recognises, and it
seems these cannot be held in private. Values must be shared to some extent, within an
appropriate community and indeed I will suggest that the communities ofwhich we are a
part to some extent determine the values we hold.
Finally, just as our values have an essential social dimension, there is a broad consensus that
they cannot be private in the sense nobody else knows about them. Values are the sorts of
things that we will stand up to defend, and which provoke and to some extent determine our
actions; they have some causal influence. Blackburn points out that we may not always be
aware ofwhat we value or how much we value it, but when things go wrong we may come
to realise, retrospectively as it were, that we have valued something. (cf Blackburn 1998
p67). If this is the case, then the way that values are formed and transmitted in schools is of
course ofgreat importance.
Teaching Values in Schools
People generally and children in particular are affected by a multitude of influences: family,
friends, the media, television, school and so on. My interest is in the school element and the
teaching ofvalues in schools. Much has been written about this and there are obvious
questions about the aims and objectives ofvalues education, questions about the curriculum
and assessment and so forth but I want to proceed directly to a fundamental theoretical
question: a basic dichotomy in values education.
B. V. Hill's 1991 book: Values Education in Australian Schools was acknowledged and
expanded in a more recent study by Stephenson, Burman, Ling and Cooper. The details of
these two works need not concern us, and their methodology and conclusions are indeed
open to question, but importantly here, two very broad approaches to values education may
be distinguished. Firstly, those that are based upon some framework, for example some
religious belief or the conviction that there are universal moral principles which should be
taught and adhered to.
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Secondly there is a broad approach to values education that denies the need for or the
existence of any such framework. Hill describes a consensus pluralism model which is
derivative from a secular democratic ideal based on both reasoning and conduct. Rather than
inculcating students they must be encouraged to make their own enquiries, recognise their
own autonomy and take responsibility for their own actions. This model is committed to
upholding democracy and seeking a consensus, but is neutral about what that consensus
should be (cf. Hill p 28-30). (For a discussion ofwhether such a neutral consensus itself
constitutes a framework see chapter nine.) Stephenson and co. also identify a moral vacuum
paradigm which they describe with words from Owens' Organisational Behaviour in
Education. The moral vacuum paradigm is "a loose collection ofideas [rather than] a
coherent structure, preferences are discovered through action rather than on the basis of
values" (Owens 1981 p24 and Stephenson & co. 1998 pIS).
The contention at the core of this work is that values education requires a framework and
that values education without a framework does not or more strongly cannot succeed. Such
a statement immediately raises two questions. Firstly what precisely is meant by framework
here? This term is widely used and has a number of senses in contemporary discussion and
in chapters two to five I explore these and try to defme the meaning of 'framework' for
values education. Secondly, how can the assertion be justified? This is a more complex
matter and after a number ofpreliminary chapters I attempt to do this in chapter eight.
It must be clarified straight away what kind of questions these are supposed to be. The
investigation might be psychological, something along the lines that the brains of children
are such that they are not likely to successfully assimilate lessons about values if there is no
underlying framework. This may well be true, but it is not the concern ofthis thesis. The
questions above are not to be understood as questions about psychology.
The argument could assert that children have certain background influences and schools are
certain kinds of socially constructed places, providing a certain social context such that,
children are not likely to successfully assimilate lessons about values if there is no
underlying framework. I am not sure whether this is true or not, but either way that is not the
concern of this thesis. The questions above are not to be understood as questions about
sociology and sociological arguments will not be employed in this work.
The questions, although posed loosely are supposed to be philosophical and point to a
conceptual link between the success ofvalues education and the underlying philosophical
approach. The suggestion is that there is something illogical about expecting a successful
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outcome to values education if it is not underpinned by some kind offramework. Our
argument may be stated; it is a philosophical requirement that successful values education
needs a framework, and indeed not just any framework, but one with relevant suitability
conditions attached.
The Nature ofPhilosophy
Implicit in this approach is the notion that philosophy concerns itselfwith analysis. The so-
called analytic approach finds its roots in Aristotle and the British empiricist school of
philosophy (notably Hume) and blossomed in the early part of the twentieth century. As a
style, rather than a doctrine analytic philosophy investigates the function, style and
connections of the object under scrutiny. G. E. Moore was a leading proponent ofthis school
for whom to analyse a concept or proposition was to discern a number ofparts and see how
they are connected. The philosopher inspects the concept as an artist might inspect a
painting. Definition is not just a wordy or dictionary definition, but is the expression of a
concept in equivalent or simpler concepts. For example Moore analysed the single term
brother as 'male sibling' thus distinguishing constituent parts of the concept. Moore
famously applied his technique to establish the metaphysics of common sense, and also
asserted that there are some fundamental concepts that cannot be analysed, in particular the
ethical term 'good'.
Bertrand Russell's interest was principally in logic and mathematics and he used analysis to
clarify the meaning ofcertain expressions, and maintained that we are often mislead by the
surface form, or surface grammar of an expression. Contra to those who suggest the
proposition 'the present king ofFrance is bald' is meaningless because there is no present
king ofFrance, Russell analysed the proposition as a three part conjunction. 'There is a king
ofFrance, that there is only one such thing ('the' implies uniqueness) and that thing is bald.'
Now as the first conjunct is false, so is the whole proposition. Russell's analysis bears a
direction, that of reducing a proposition to its bare logical form; a feature which is not found
in Moore.
Wittgenstein worked with Russell in Cambridge between 1912 and 1913 and kept in touch
with him thereafter, and the Tractatus concerns itselfwith the picture theory ofmeaning.
That is (loosely) the theory that complex propositions can be expressed in terms of simpler
atomic propositions. The early Wittgenstein thought that the analysis of the atomic
propositions and their (sometimes hidden) structural form in complex propositions was the
key to solving or more frequently dissolving philosophical puzzles.
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The later Wittgenstein was also concerned with the analysis of language and the explication
ofmeaning but he came to reject all notions concerning the hidden or fundamental structure
oflanguage. In the Philosophical Investigations a word or expression is to be analysed in
terms of the way it is used or applied in ordinary speech. There can be no analysis of
expressions in terms of a basic logical structure because expressions have a different form
depending on how they are used: ofwhich language game they are a part. The essence of a
proposition is not "beneath the surface" but "already lies open to view" (Wittgenstein 1953
PI 92) and more generally "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment ofour intelligence
by means of language" (ibid. PI 109).
This preoccupation with the analysis of language developed in to an influential school of
linguistic analysis. Dummett believed the nature of thought could be elucidated by the
analysis oflanguage. Similar work was done by H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle in Oxford and
Ryle though that the sole task ofphilosophy is the detection oflinguistic idiom which gives
rise to repeated misconstructions and absurd theories. For P. F. Strawson "analysis is the
descriptive task oftracing connections between the concepts in our scheme of thought, with
a view among other things of seeing what order obtains among them, thereby helping us to
see why, for example, various forms of scepticism need not trouble us" (Honderich p28).
Much ofthis approach is resonant with Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy "leaves
everything as it is" (Wittgenstein 1953 PI 124) and "may in no way interfere with the actual
use oflanguage" (ibid.). The task ofthe philosopher is to describe and never to prescribe.
Wittgenstein would say that there are no facts ofphilosophy; "Ifone tried to advance theses
in philosophy it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to
them" (ibid. PI 128). All that philosophy can do is to clear the ground oflinguistic rubbish
and misunderstanding.
This view may be contrasted with a more speculative approach, which does seek to advance
theses about the nature of reality, which constructs theories and in the field of ethics not only
analyses ethical terms but lays down binding norms. We can imagine analytic and
speculative philosophy as opposite extremes of a continuous scale; extremes between which
most philosophers will be located. Paul Hirst and R. S. Peters were such philosophers.
They thought that conceptual analysis was at the heart ofphilosophy; and they sought
definitions ofterms like education and knowledge and conditions for the application of
concepts such as punishment and justice. Importantly, however, they did not see conceptual
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analysis as an end in itselfbut as a preparation to answering other philosophical questions.
"In our view there is little point in doing conceptual analysis unless some further
philosophical issue is thereby made more manageable" (Hirst and Peters 1970 p9).
Philosophy itselfwas characterised as a concern for "second order questions about science,
morality, religion and other such human concerns" (ibid. p10) which are often prompted by
worries at a first order level. In answering a first order question the subject is not doing
philosophy, but in so far as the second and first order questions are inter-related,
philosophical enquiry may help to illuminate and elucidate practical problems, like how to
teach values in schools! Peters also points put that the inability to produce a "neat set of
logically necessary conditions for the use of a word like knowledge or education is not
necessarily a hall-mark of failure" (ibid.). The process of analysis clarifies our concepts and
reveals their links with other concepts, thus increasing our understanding and prompting a
more informed and balanced reaction to the social situation in which we find ourselves.
A balance of analytic and speculative philosophy applied to theoretical and related practical
problems as exemplified by Peters and Hirst is the stance adopted in this enquiry. The
method is to draw on "established branches ofphilosophy and bring together those segments
that are relevant to the solution of educational problems" (ibid. p13). This entails both the
analysis of concepts and the application of them to educational situations, in our case the
analysis of the concept of a framework for teaching values, and reasons to justify its
application in a real school setting.
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II Language and Frameworks
In this chapter Wittgenstein's philosophy oflanguage as found in the Philosophical
Investigations will be examined and particular attention will be paid to the notion of a
language game embedded in a form of life as this is most pertinent to our exploration of the
concept of framework. This however cannot be neatly divorced from Wittgenstein's concept
ofmeaning so this will be considered too, Finally, in so far as the Investigations must be
seen, in part at least, as criticism ofempiricist theories of language and his own earlier
position in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus these must be briefly outlined. Scholarly debate
about whether Wittgenstein's later position was opposed to or rather enhanced and
complemented his earlier position is acknowledged, but is not directly relevant here.
Broadly speaking, Wittgenstein's concerns stem from an unhappiness about the notion that
words derive their meaning by standing for something else. On the one hand in Locke's
theory oflanguage, words stand for or signify (Locke did not have a concept ofmeaning in
the modem sense) ideas in the speaker's mind; common nouns and adjectives signifying
general ideas. Locke understands a one-to-one correspondence between a word and the idea
that it signifies and language does no more than report "the ideas in the mind ofhim that
uses them" (Locke II ii 2). Intersubjective language is made possible by Locke's theory of
abstraction which relates to problems concerning universals and would take us a long way
from our theme.
On the other hand Wittgenstein's early theory oflanguage as found in the Tractatus
expresses the so called picture theory oflanguage, at the heart ofwhich is the idea that words
stand for material objects. Wittgenstein says, "in a proposition a name is the representation
of an object" (TLP 3.22). The logical structure of a proposition made up ofwords reflects the
material structure of the objects which the words name. A proposition is true if it correlates
with a picture that really obtains and false if the picture does not obtain. Wittgenstein is said
to have conceived this scheme when he saw the representation of a car crash by toys and
dolls in a law court in Paris (see Wittgenstein's notebook entry for 29 September 1914 NB7).
Wittgenstein came to see that there are considerable philosophical difficulties with both of
these theories.
Briefly, the first is that many useful and meaningful words cannot be said to name anything.
In Philosophical Investigations he makes a list ofwords such as; away, ow, help, no etc.
which are not the "names of objects" (PI 27). He also spends some time discussing cardinal
numbers, and is concerned that "five" (say) does not mean five particular things but is an
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abstraction. He also suggests that if I try to defme two by pointing to a group oftwo nuts, the
person given the definition may think that "two is the name of this group ofnuts" (PI 28), or
I suppose even the name of the kind ofnuts. Wittgenstein says a little later that any ostensive
definition only makes sense if one knows the appropriate context for the definition - he will
say within an appropriate language game.
Similarly, the principal problem with the picture theory is that any picture has several
possible interpretations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a boxer in a
particular stance, and then he says "Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he
should stand, should hold himself, or how he should not hold himself, or how a particular
man did stand in such and such a place and so on" (pI bottom ofpl I). Similarly in the
Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein considers the possible ways of considering two people
sitting at an inn drinking wine and he observes: "if I say when I look at the picture, 'here two
people are sitting etc.' If the picture tells me something in this sense, then it tells me words"
(PG pI64). In other words a picture cannot be understood unless we know its sense, and the
several possible propositions that I may associate with a picture show that the meaning of the
words cannot simply reside in the picture. Wittgenstein concludes, words do not derive their
meaning by standing for objects.
Wittgenstein's attack against the Lockean theory of language is found in his private language
argument, and is a two pronged attack leading to a reductio ad absurdum argument. The first
prong of the attack is that words cannot acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition as
discussed above. The second prong ofthe attack concerns the possibility of defining some
suitable private sensation such as a mood or a pain. (Wittgenstein discusses the latter
possibility at some length.) It is important to understand what is meant by private here. A
person who keeps a secret diary that nobody else sees, and perhaps even employs secret
abbreviations is not using a private language in Wittgenstein' s sense for the contents of the
diary could be explained if the author wished.
Private in the appropriate sense here means ostensively defined by me for me and
incommunicable to another. Having a particular pain that cannot be communicated to
another is Wittgenstein's favourite example, and he spends much time discussing it, for
Locke's theory of language does allow for such private definitions. Wittgenstein's attack on
such private languages is a reductio ad absurdum argument. He imagines I record a certain
sensation - associated with the symbol S - in a diary each time it occurs. This sensation is
ostensively defined for me alone and S cannot be expressed in public language. We are to
imagine that "I speak or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention
26
on the sensation .,. in this way I impress upon myself the connection between the sign and
the sensation" (PI 258). But Wittgenstein goes on, "'I impress it upon myself' can only
mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in
the present case I have no criterion of correctness" (ibid.).
When the diarist comes to re-use the symbol S he must be sure that it stands for the same
sensation as it did before, and he must call up a memory sample ofS. "Now is it possible that
the wrong memory might come at this call? Ifnot, then S means whatever memory occurs to
him in connection with S, and again whatever seems right is right. If so, then he does not
know what he means" (Kenny p194). It must be emphasised that Wittgenstein is not
advancing some form of scepticism about the validity ofmemory here. He is arguing that if a
sensation is entirely private there can be no check upon it, even by the subject in question,
and so talk of correctness is out ofplace. Hence the notion of a private definition, and of a
private language generally, is incoherent. Wittgenstein concludes, words do not derive their
meaning by standing for ideas.
Overall Wittgenstein says, words do not get their meaning by standing for something else.
How then does language work, how do words get their meaning? As every student of
Wittgenstein knows the meaning of a word is its use. And crucially, its use within an
appropriate language game. So we must consider what does Wittgenstein mean by language
game, and what counts as use within the context?
Characteristically Wittgenstein nowhere gives a definition oflanguage game, and one has to
build an understanding ofwhat he means from a variety of examples. It is thought that he
first drew the analogy between language and a game in a discussion of formalism in
mathematics, in Schlick's house in 1930. Frege had suggested that arithmetic is either just
about signs (ink marks on paper) or it is about something that the signs represent.
Wittgenstein wishes to reject both ofthese positions and argues it is a false dichotomy, by
suggesting that the game of chess is either just about the pieces or something that the pieces
represent. "If! say 'Now I will make myself a queen with very frightening eyes, she will
drive everyone offthe board' you will laugh" (WWK p104). The queen does not stand for
anything, but derives her significance from the context ofthe game.
In the Blue and Brown Books and in the early part ofthe Investigations Wittgenstein talks of
simple or primitive language games, often in the context oflearning language. (See also PG
p62) "We can also think of the whole process oflearning words in (2) as one ofthose games
by means ofwhich children learn their native language. I will call these games language
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games" (PI 7). Later he comes to use the term in a much broader sense and identifies a wide
variety of different language games, even offering a list:
"Giving orders, and obeying them
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) .....
Guessing riddles" etc. (PI 23).
The chess model with its rigid calculus has given way to a much more flexible, less rule
. bound model; chess is increasingly seen as atypical and the multiplicity of different games is
a metaphor for the multiplicity of different types oflanguage game.
Wittgenstein anticipates and discusses at some length the challenge that language games in
particular, and games generally, must all have something in common or we would not call
them games. He says, "Don't say 'there must be something in common or they would not be
called games' but look and see whether there is something common to them all" (PI 66).
Wittgenstein offers various possible defining characteristics ofgames (e.g. winning and
losing) but rejects each one offering a counter example (e.g. throwing a ball against a wall
(ibid.)). He concludes there is nothing more than a "complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities and sometimes similarities of
detail" (ibid.). He describes this as family resemblance and says games (and hence language
games!) form a family (cf PI 67). He illustrates this further by comparison to the fibres that
make up a thread. "As in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the
thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the
overlapping ofmany fibres" (PI 67).
Having moved away from the understanding of language as a calculus to the understanding
of language as a game, Wittgenstein suggests that nonsense arises when a word or phrase is
used outside an appropriate language game. The problem that occurs here is that
Wittgenstein does not give any indication ofhow language games are to be individuated;
where does one end and the next begin? His reply to this is the warning that we must not be
mislead by the surface grammar of an expression, but must attend to the depth grammar (cf
Chomsky). For instance we cannot lump all assertions together in a single language game
because they are assertions, but we must look deeper and consider how we might use such
assertions, what doubts we might have about them, what would make them true etc..
Wittgenstein goes on to assert that meaning of a word or phrase is given by use. He writes
''The meaning ofa phrase is characterised for us by the use we make of it. The meaning is
not a mental accompaniment to the expression. Therefore the phrase 'I think I mean
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something by it' or 'I'm sure I mean something by it' which we so often hear in
philosophical discussions to justify the use ofan expression is for us no justification at all.
We ask, 'what do you mean?' i.e. 'How do you use this expression?'" (BB p65).
Wittgenstein is indeed fairly loose about whether his meaning is use dictum is to apply to
words or whole sentences, and in different parts ofhis writing he seems to suggest either. He
would probably say, that the unit ofmeaning is dependent on the complexity of the language
game.
An objection to the idea that meaning is use seems to be that I could use words or phrases
however I like and that would somehow confer meaning upon them. Ifwords do not stand
for objects or ideas then is their application arbitrary? "Why don't I call cookery rules
arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?" (Z 320)
Wittgenstein suggests that the difference is in part that there are ways ofjudging the outcome
of cookery - it is done for a purpose - whereas language is in a sense autonomous. However,
Wittgenstein is only tempted to call language arbitrary, for he says you may use language
differently but then you are playing a different game. "Ifyou follow other rules than those of
chess you are playing another game; and ifyou follow grammatical rules other than such-
and-such ones, that does not mean that you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of
something else" (ibid.). Elsewhere Wittgenstein says it would be perfectly satisfactory to
open a game of chess with a black move, but then the game would be a different game, not
chess.
The key thing is perhaps that a person is said to understand the meaning of a word or an
expression if others can recognise and respond to the person's use of it. We cannot compel a
person to use language in a particular way but ifwe cannot take certain things for granted,
then we have parted company before we have begun! Wittgenstein discusses this at some
length and says "Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question
whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come to blows over it for example.
That is part ofthe framework on which our language is based" (PI 240).
This underlying framework, the set of things we must take for granted, is referred to by
Wittgenstein as our form of life. He is adamant that linguistic and non-linguistic activities
cannot be separated; language is embedded in our communal activity: "The speaking of a
language is part of an activity, or of a form oflife" (PI 23). Language cannot function
unless there is some shared linguistic and non-linguistic machinery behind it to which we all
agree. This machinery is not in need of any justification but is simply given. "What has to be
accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life" (PI part II p226) and again "If I
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have exhausted justification, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am
inclined to say: ' this is simply what I do'" (PI 217).
Godfrey Vesey gives the example (P39) ofthe distinction between Europeans one the one
hand and African nomadic herdsmen on the other. The herdsmen own their cattle but have
no concept of owning land; they use the land to graze their cattle and then move on.
Europeans on the other hand have a well-developed sense of owning land, so the erection of
fences by the herdsmen would be seen as a challenge about land ownership to the Europeans,
when in fact it was no such thing. Wittgenstein would say there is not a disagreement about
meaning here, but a disagreement in form of life. In this context we can understand
Wittgenstein's rather peculiar remark that "If a lion could talk we could not understand him"
(PI part IT p223). This is not a remark about difficulties translating roars into English or
anything of that kind, but expresses the idea that we would have no common ground from
which we could begin. Similarly Wittgenstein suggests that the remark, "the sky is always
the hardest part" (ibid.) is perfectly coherent to those who do jigsaws, but to those who are
not familiar with jigsaws, it is nonsense!
Nevertheless, the concept of a form of life is not without its problems, and as with language
games no criteria for identification and individuation are given. Roger Trigg observes "We
only have to ask whether religion, Christianity or a particular Christian denomination such as
Catholicism should be regarded as a form of life. There is no clear way ofanswering such a
question... " (Trigg p72). Norman Malcolm seems to think Wittgenstein did understand
religion as a form oflife, and even ifWittgenstein did not, Malcolm does himself "Religion
is a form oflife, it is a language embedded in action - what Wittgenstein calls a language
game. Science is another" (Malcolm p212).
Fergus Kerr in his Theology after Wittgenstetn rejects this grandiose conception of a form of
life and returns to Wittgenstein's text. He suggests forms oflife are much simpler; and refers
to "facts of living" (Kerr p64), and he seems to suggest that we simultaneously participate in
a multiplicity offorms of life which make up a background weave. Philosophers have
suggested that this weave or form of life is on the one hand natural and fixed, and on the
other acculturated and in a state offlux.
Firstly, our form oflife is a natural (and historical) framework of agreements and shared
human practices, which is simply given. It is an unjustifiable pattern ofhuman behaviour,
which "rests upon but is not identical with, very general pervasive facts ofnature" (Baker
and Hacker p137). "That we do more or less share such forms rests upon nothing deeper;
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nothing ensures that we will, and there is no foundation, logical or philosophical, which
explains the fact that we do" (Cavell p223-4). There is clear agreement here that our form of
life cannot be justified and must be simply accepted.
On the other hand our form of life is not totally static. " ... the river-bed of thoughts may shift.
But I distinguish between the movement of the waters ofthe river bed and the shift ofthe
bed itself: though there is not a sharp division ofthe one from the other" (OC p97). Kenny
puts it that a form oflife is not a structure ofunchanging atoms, but is a shifting pattern
grafted on to basic human nature (cf Kenny p224). Baker and Hacker take up the point,
saying that as we grow and develop our form of life changes, or perhaps as Kerr and others
might say we participate in a richer weave. "Training in what counts as justification,
acceptance ofundoubted truths ofthe world-picture, is acculturation in the forms of life of a
community" (Baker and Hacker pI37).
Before turning to educational issues, and in the light ofthe above it is fitting to ask what
Wittgenstein said of ethics and in particular how his ethical theory fitted with this
understanding ofform of life. In some ways however, we are to be disappointed for
Wittgenstein said little of ethics and what he did say is not really related to forms of life at
all. A paper delivered to 'The Heretics' at Cambridge and published as "A Lecture on
Ethics" in the Philosophical Review (Vol. 74 no. 1 1968) was unusual in that it was "not
about ethics at all, as the tenn is usually understood" (Monk p278). Wittgenstein discussed
various examples of the misuse of language, including the idea that it is extraordinary that
the world should exist. (Not things in the world but the world itself) Wittgenstein says this is
a nonsensical idea since we cannot imagine the world not existing. More generally he argues
that all too often we deceive ourselves when we speak of entities beyond the factual as if
they were factual: we are confronted by the boundaries of language itself
Considering Wittgenstein's views on ethics as expressed in his diaries and notebooks we see
a continuation of this theme and discover that in ethics at least he did not really ever move
away from the position ofthe Tractatus. In the Tractatus the ethical and the religious are in
the realm of the mystical and may not be spoken of "It is clear that ethics cannot be put in to
words. Ethics is transcendental" (TLP 6.421). What can be communicated about ethics must
be shown. Ethics must be expressed in action, is a principle Wittgenstein held, and indeed
much ofhis life may be seen as trying to live this out. That is to say not talking about ethics
but living ethically is what really mattered to Wittgenstein.
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Even ifWittgenstein himself did not explicitly link concepts in ethics and religion with an
understanding ofform oflife his disciples certainly did. D. Z. Philips and H. O. Mounce
have argued that the capacity to make moral judgements entails belonging to, or being
related to certain moral practices. They expand this by saying that moral judgements are only
possible because of a shared form of life. "The agreement in the way of life forms the
background against which the particular judgement has its sense" (phillips and Mounce p70).
Furthermore without a shared form of life, not only agreement but also disagreement would
be impossible for there must be certain things which are not open to dispute. Agreement and
disagreement "can only occur when people share what Wittgenstein describes as a form of
life ofwhich what we have described as moral practices form a part" (ibid.).
It is worth noting the positions from which Phillips and Mounce distance themselves. On the
one hand they object to R. M. Hare's view that facts and value judgements are logically
distinct. and argue that certain practices do entail moral judgements. On the other hand they
object to the view which they attribute to Philippa Foot that "a moral conclusion can be
derived from a factual statement" (Phillips and Mounce p14) for they say that this must be
relative to the agent involved. " For everyone who is a moral agent certain facts will entail
that some things are right and wrong, but from this it by no means follows that the same facts
will entail that the same things are right or wrong for everyone who is a moral agent" (PIS).
Additionally Phillips and Mounce distance themselves from any form ofrelativism, for they
say that the notion of a form oflife explains the origin ofmeaning and the possibility of
value judgement. This does not mean, they say, that values can be reduced to observations
about institutions or ways of life (cf p71).
In a similar vein, R.W. Beardsmore tries to steer a middle way between the positions ofHare
and Foot. He quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that "If language is to be a means of
communication there must be agreement, not only in definition, but also (queer as this may
sound) in judgements" (PI 242 / Beardsmore pI21). Beardsmore elaborates this by denying
that this means that there is to be "a technique by which universal moral agreement can be
obtained" but that "it is within a particular moral code that we find the framework of
agreement" (ibid.). Beardsmore also emphasises he is not a conventionalist (morals are
freely chosen and agreed to by a group ofpeople and not forced by nature) and quotes
Wittgenstein again to the effect that the agreement ofwhich we speak is not agreement of
opinion, but of form oflife. The crucial function ofa framework is to give language its
sense.
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Finally, the Wittgensteinian Peter Winch, in his essay "The Universalizability of Moral
Judgements" (in his Ethics andAction) discusses the moral predicament of Captain Vere of
the H. M. S. Indomitable when faced with judging the case of Billy Budd. Budd, an upright
junior sailor is bullied and falsely accused by a more senior and 'satanic' sailor Claggart. "In
the stress of the situation, Budd is afflicted with a speech impediment which prevents him
from answering the charge. Frustrated, he strikes Claggart, who falls, strikes his head and
dies" (Winch plS5). Winch discusses what action Captain Vere should take and to what
extent the circumstances surrounding the event should influence his judgement.
Crucially, Winch suggests that one could agree with the captain exactly, about all the events
that took place, and agree entirely about all the surrounding considerations and still, without
contradiction, come to a different conclusion about the case. What I "ought to do is not a
matter of finding out what anyone ought to do in such circumstances" (Winch p168). Winch
says the dispositions of the agent cannot be discounted: "We cannot know everything about
another person's concrete situation (including how it strikes him, which may make all the
difference). But ifwe want to express, in a given situation, how it strikes the agent, we
cannot dispense with his inclination to come to a particular moral decision" (Winch pI69).
This talk of disposition and inclination is not reducible to will or whimsy, but expresses a
deeper facet of an agent's being which although Winch does not call it so, is clearly
understandable as a shared form of life in which the agent partakes. It is an irreducible given
which cannot be explained and must be simply accepted.
Whatever difficulties Phillips, Mounce, Beardsmore and Winch's positions may have, there
is a clear case here for saying that ifWittgenstein's later theory oflanguage is adopted,
moral and value judgements cannot be semantically separated from a form of life. And this
must have implications for the way we attempt to teach values in schools.
The argument may be expressed as follows. Teaching children about values entails teaching
them to recognise value judgements, teaching them to make value judgements in an
appropriately informed way, arguing about value judgements and so on. In short teaching
about values is teaching how to playa particular language game (or set ofvery closely
related language games). The ability to play this game presupposes Wittgenstein tells us, a
common perspective, a shared outlook, in short a form of life. Therefore it is important to
realise that the teaching ofvalues requires that either a shared form of life be already in
place, or if it is not in place it must be established. An attempt to teach values without this
suitable background or form of life, is a doomed venture.
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The key question then becomes, how does this understanding ofa form of life relate to the
notion of a framework for teaching values; is a framework identical to a form of life or are
they different, and if so how? And it is perhaps worth emphasising I mean framework in the
sense ofthis thesis - a framework for teaching values, rather than framework in the sense
that we have seen Wittgenstein use it (PI 240) where he does seem to equate a framework
(for language) with form of life. To answer this question it would be helpful to have a
definition ofform oflife, but there is some disagreement here, and Wittgenstein himself did
not offer a definition, so any definition that I might offer is likely to be problematic and open
to dissent. However even in the absence of a precise definition it will be useful to have the
most important and non-controversial features laid bare. Hence I will say, a form of life is
the non-linguistic background to language. It is rooted in our actions, in the way we live; it is
not fixed and rigid but gradually evolves and changes and crucially it rests in nothing deeper,
it has no underlying foundations. It is simply given and we learn to participate in it, as we
learn language.
The difficulty with this definition is that it does not define the scope of a form oflife, or
allow forms to be individuated. Do we participate in just one or two, or as Kerr suggests in a
multiplicity that perhaps are nested and / or overlap and form a weave? What degree of
sharing ofform oflife is actually required for values teaching? I think the clue to answering
this kind of question is to consider what Wittgenstein himselfmight have said. Firstly, I do
not think he would have been very sympathetic to this kind of question for speaking of
games he says: "But I want to say; we misunderstand the role ofthe ideal in our language.
That is to say: we too should call it a game only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore
fail to see the actual use ofthe word 'game' clearly. We want to say that there can't be any
vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal must be found in reality" (PI 100
and 101).
In other words the concept ofform of life is an ideal one, and we cannot expect to see it
precisely instantiated in real life. There is a fuzziness to it. I do not want to put words in to
Wittgenstein's mouth, but perhaps he would also have said that on the one hand we would
know when there was insufficient sharing of a form oflife since teaching would be hugely
problematic, and on the other hand part ofthe teacher's task is to nurture and foster the
necessary formes) of life. By this I mean the teacher may need to highlight or emphasise the
non-linguistic givens that we do share, not to justify or explain them, but to show the
agreement that already exists. For Wittgenstein, showing is often far more appropriate than
trying to explain and indeed showing can often occur when telling fails.
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With this in mind it can now be said that a form of life is distinct from a framework for
teaching values in so far as there are historical and metaphysical elements in a framework
too. A framework has an additional depth and is not simply given. It seems that whilst
language andform of life are an important ingredient of any framework there is more to a
framework than this. It may be said that a shared form of life is a necessary constituent of a
framework, but is not sufficient to define it completely.
For example, ifwe were to identify a form oflife with a framework, then it would follow
that ifall words derive their meaning from use within a language game, and all language
games presuppose a form oflife then all meaning, all communication requires a framework.
There is no special status to be afforded to values education, and indeed the fact that
communication is possible at all shows that there is a framework in place already. This
however is not the truth, because much communication whilst requiring a shared form of life
requires nothing further. IfI give a pupil a basic instruction about the time of an event or the
whereabouts of an object I expect to be understood. Time / space forms of life are in place
and nothing further is needed here. However if! explain a complex mathematical idea, or
suggest a complex moral dilemma (e.g. Siamese twins) I might expect to meet with some
incomprehension, not because of any unfamiliar vocabulary I may use, but because of a
whole understanding ofwhich the pupil is not a part. So whilst it is true that discourse of any
kind requires a shared form oflife, specialised discourse requires additional agreement, a
shared framework.
Having said this though, while we may now want to say that values education requires a
framework, so too does any school subject. Values education has no special status, and again
the argument that values education requires a framework seems no more than vacuously true.
For example, if! teach physics must I not teach about accuracy ofphysical measurements,
about units and dimensions, about observer independence and objectivity? Ifmy pupil tells
me that under standard conditions water boils at 70°C or light travels around comers I must
correct him. He is challenging the agreed framework ofphysics. In short, am I not teaching a
particular language game and does not this suppose a form of life and a certain framework?
Of course it does! Therefore it would seem that whilst the teaching ofvalues in schools
requires a framework so does any school subject. (Whilst arguments concerning the
objectivity ofphysics are recognised, they do in general not playa part in school-level
discussions.) Therefore the question becomes, is there a relevant distinction between values
education and physics education (say) here?
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Oakeshott, MacMurray and Collingwood recognised various distinct forms ofknowledge,
but it was Paul Hirst who did most to formalise this position. Forms ofknowledge were not
conceived as an independent hierarchy, as in the Greek sense, but as a number of separate
disciplines which were empirically observable. These disciplines which became known as
Hirstian Forms were identified slightly differently in various texts, but they are given in The
Logic ofEducation as logic and mathematics, physical sciences, understanding of our own
and other peoples minds, moral judgements, aesthetics, religion and philosophy (Hirst and
Peters p63 - 64).
"By a form ofknowledge is meant a distinct way in which our experience becomes
structured around the use of accepted public symbols" (Hirst 1974 p44). The key features
which distinguish the forms are: each form involves certain central concepts which are
central to the form. Each has a distinct logical structure. Each has expressions or statements
that are in some way or other testable against experience. And each form has developed
particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive
expressions (cf Hirst p44). The forms are to be distinguished by the different ways we
approach them, the ways we verify different kinds of assertions, the ways in which different
kinds ofknowledge are structured and so on. Hirst's phrase "structured around the use of
accepted public symbols" (ibid.) is immediately resonant with Wittgenstein.
Hirst sees the forms as logically distinct and says elements in one form cannot be reduced to
elements in another, but he does say that the forms are not totally separate and share certain
concepts and patterns ofreasoning (C£ Hirst p44). This is what Wittgenstein would probably
have understood as a form oflife: underlying shared concepts and patterns ofreasoning.
Having said this, it could be argued that in some sense each Hirstian form presupposes a
particular form of life. Again there is a difficulty concerning the scope and the individuation
offorms of life here. Form of life could be understood in a very broad sense, or we may
simultaneously share in a multiplicity (weave) offorms of life that overlap and criss-cross,
like the language games themselves. Wittgenstein does not give a clear indication ofhis
intentions and his commentators seem divided on this point. However the necessity of one or
more forms of life seems undisputed.
The principle difficulty with Hirst's analysis has been seen to be the insistence that each
form should have statements that are in some way or other testable against experience. In the
form ofmorals (and religion) it is in no way clear what this might mean, what tests would be
possible? Hirst recognised this difficulty: "moral knowledge and the arts involve distinct
forms of critical test, although in these cases both what the tests are and the ways in which
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they are applied are only partially statable" (Hirst p45). For some this is too vague, and
questions have been raised whether morals and the arts are forms ofknowledge at all. The
implicit suggestion here is that if they are not forms ofknowledge then they are somehow
non-valid or illegitimate. However, much work has been done, especially in theology to
suggest that theological utterances constitute a separate language game, with its own internal
structure, and based on a distinct form oflife. The game is not in need ofany foundation or
justification ofthe kind that is being suggested here. Much ofwhat applies to theology
applies mutatis mutandis to morals and values generally so it is fitting to consider this
position, even if only briefly.
The suggestion that religious language is a discourse of a special kind seems to be in keeping
with the views ofWittgenstein himself. In his "Lectures and Conversations on Psychology
and Religious Belief' he points out that to have a religious belief is not to have an opinion
about something, which may turn out to be false, but to have a beliefthat orders and
regulates one's life. The use of the word 'believe' in the religious sense is not akin to the
ordinary sense ofbelieve, it is more akinto 'know'. Religious understanding entails religious
action or practice; as D. Z. Phillips puts it "there is no theoretical knowledge ofGod"
(Phillips 1970 p32). Wittgenstein stresses that Christianity is not a doctrine, but is something
that changes peoples' lives.
As a result ofthis Wittgenstein is adamant that the search for ground or justification for
religious be1iefis futile. "A confession has to be part ofone's new life" (CV p16). Religious
belief is so ingrained into the life ofthe believer, and is so connected with the habits,
customs and practices of the believer thata demand for evidence is inappropriate.
Wittgenstein says the same sort of thing about mathematics. It is a motley ofpractices which
is so entrenched, that to ask for its foundation is senseless. Indeed much ofWittgenstein's
philosophy ofmathematics is devoted to showing that the work ofthe foundationalist
schools at the beginning of the twentieth century was not so much wrong, as misguided. He
says of religion "faith is faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative
intelligence" (CV p33).
D. Z. Phillips developed Wittgenstein's position by rejecting the apparent dichotomy that
religion is either referential or metaphysical. (Compare the chessmen response to Frege's
dichotomy above.) On the one hand, to treat religious utterances as referential is a
misunderstanding. Despite the apparent similarity between requests for evidence of the
existence of a material object and requests for the evidence of the existence ofGod, the kinds
of answers that might be given to these two apparently similar questions are entirely
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different. Hence questions about the existence ofGod are in an entirely separate category to
most existential enquiries. On the other hand, to see religious questions as metaphysical is
also misleading, for religious beliefs are evident in the way people live their lives. Phillips
says, a man who has found God has not found an object, but "he has found God in a praise, a
thanksgiving, a confessing and an asking which were not his before" (phillips 1976 p181).
In the light ofthis Terence McLaughlin makes several points. He recognises a genuine
pedagogic difficulty that teaching about religious practices and participating in them cannot
be neatly separated. Explaining a religious ceremony from the outside as it were is to lose an
essential characteristic of it Religion is more about practice than doctrine, and so to teach
doctrine as if it were equivalent to the practice is to lose an essential component.
McLaughlin asserts that in the religious domain, "Truth and reality are seen as requiring a
much more subtle and nuanced elucidation" (McLaughlin 1995 p304).
Further McLaughlin says the abstract or context free treatment of religion in schools is to be
avoided. It might be wrong to give a profoundly one-sided account, but equally well it is a
pretence to suppose there is a neutral ground from which religion can be viewed. There is no
"essence or single normative form ofreligion" (ibid.p305) so teaching about religion must
include a given perspective - what I am calling a framework.
Ieuan Lloyd (1986) develops a confessional approach to education in religion from a
Wittgensteinian perspective. He underlines that religion is not simply a rational matter, and
argues that presenting it as such ignores the roots and attachments that a child has. By
extension, he says that a child should be initiated into a domain, so as to have some
unshakeable beliefs of a basic sort and (in an earlier paper) he attacks John White's notion of
maximising a child's choice, picturing school "as being like a sweet shop in which a child
has been given money to spend" (Lloyd 1980 p334).
Finally McLaughlin accepts the difficulties inherent in the confessional approach, and
recognises the issues that rise from the uncertain epistemic status ofreligious assertions.
However he says that the advantages of the confessional approach needs to be acknowledged
as significant in certain situations. Undoubtedly the most appropriate situation is in a
homogeneous school setting, and problems undoubtedly arise in situations of religious
plurality, but nevertheless there seem to be persuasive arguments that religious education
cannot be satisfactorily achieved in a context free way. A framework of some kind is
required.
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Much ifnot all ofwhat has been said here about religion applies equally well to other value
judgements, especially moral ones that are taught in schools. They all have an uncertain
epistemological status, but equally they are grounded in customs and practices which are a
form of life and the idea that they may be taught in a neutral or context free way seems to me
very dubious.
To conclude, let us return to the earlier comparison between physics education and values
education that arose from the suggestion that values education does indeed need a
framework, but that this is only trivially true in so far as all school subjects require an
appropriate framework I want to say that whilst this truth is perhaps a trivial one it is one
that has been overlooked. In school physics there is generally agreement about the nature of
the subject, the results of experiments, the nature ofthe dialogue and so the required
underlying framework is taken for granted. It is so much a part of the way we think we
probably are not really aware that it is there. It might be almost described as a 'hidden
framework', but although it may be hidden it is certainly there.
Further we may suggest that there is a continuity of a sort between school science and
common sense. Although refmed in science lessons, notions ofweight and length, for
example, are part ofa child's way ofthinking from a very early stage: the framework is in
place. Similarly a child learns words such as good, naughty and perhaps has concepts of
ought at an early stage, but it is not clear this is analogous. The young child's moral concepts
may not be formed in to any kind of system, and school values lessons may not have the
same kind ofcontinuity as in the science case. The plurality ofbackgrounds in the field of
values, and the plurality ofpositions that may be adopted by pupils upon reflection, is not
analogous to the science example, where although dissension is possible it is very
uncommon.
In values education there is little if any universal agreement about the nature ofthe subject,
there are no 'standard results' and the dialogue is a shifting and evolving entity. From
recognition ofthese characteristics and ofthe plurality in modem schools, the conclusion
seems to have been drawn that a values framework is neither desirable nor possible. The
values framework baby has been thrown out with the proverbial plurality bath water! As I
have shown though, to make such a move neglects some ofthe most fundamental features of
language itself, most importantly that language (and language about values) is a shared
enterprise that derives its very meaning from an underlying form of life, and this must be a
key constituent of any values education framework.
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To conclude, the thrust ofthe argument has been to suggest that a consideration of
Wittgenstein's later theory oflanguage leads to an appreciation ofthe need for a shared form
of life as a backdrop to language. This is true in a most general sense, it is true for school
subjects across the curriculum, and it is true for values education. I would suggest that this
latter point has been neglected, and values education has suffered as a result. It may well be
said that the conception offramework as presented here is so general as to render the
argument almost trivially true, and perhaps to be of little practical use to the teacher in the
classroom. Nevertheless it is important that linguistic considerations are not ignored, and
their relevance is acknowledged; they may be only one of a set of considerations to be made,
but they are a necessary part of the complete picture. A fuller understanding offrameworks
as they apply to values education, must also acknowledge considerations oftradition and of
community and it is to these that we now tum.
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III Tradition and Frameworks
In this chapter Alasdair MacIntyre's moral philosophy, principally as found in After Virtue
and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? will be examined and particular attention will be
paid to the notion of tradition, as this is most pertinent to our conception offramework. In
order to see how and why MacIntyre considers tradition as such an important part of any
ethical theory, it is necessary to return to his point of departure at the beginning ofAfter
Virtue, and to follow the development ofhis argument. Nevertheless, at the same time, it
must be recognised there is a depth and richness in his analysis that cannot be reproduced in
a single chapter!
MacIntyre likens our moral situation to an imagined situation where almost all of our
scientific theory had been lost and only fragments remained. These fragments are to be
imagined as from a variety ofhistorical periods and to approach their subject from a variety
of directions, leading to a variety of incompatible and irreconcilable scientific theories.
MacIntyre says our actual moral domain is such: something has been lost and all we have is
a plurality ofpositions which are both contradictory and irreconcilable.
MacIntyre continues by offering briefbut incisive criticisms ofvarious ethical positions.
Moore's claim that good is a non-natural property that can be intuited is dismissed as
"plainly false" (MacIntyre 1981 pI5). Kant's ethics based on the categorical imperative is
treated more respectfully but as MacIntyre points out many maxims that pass Kant's test
(e.g. always eat mussels on Monday (P44)) are silly. We cannot distinguish which universal
claims should be adopted and which not and Kant's attempt to base ethics on the categorical
imperative cannot be defended. MacIntyre similarly rejects the utilitarianism of Bentham and
Mill, for he says that pleasures cannot be neatly compared on a single scale. "Different
pleasures and different happinesses are to a large degree incommensurable: there are no
scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them (ibid. p62). Despite its claims,
utilitarianism does not offer any solution or method of solution to our moral dilemmas.
MacIntyre's most sustained attack is against emotivism to which he considers we now all
conform. "We take our value judgements to express preferences not to record any facts that
we might expect others to acknowledge" (pettit P178). More precisely the claim that an
expression such as 'this is good' means roughly the same as 'I approve ofthis: do so as well'
is challenged on three grounds.
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Firstly, MacIntyre suggests that to elucidate a certain class ofutterances by reference to
feelings or attitudes prompts the question: what kinds offeelings or attitudes? Emotivists are
wisely silent here for ifmoral utterances are expressions ofmoral approval then a vacuous
circularity lurks. Secondly, MacIntyre insists that utterances ofpersonal preference and
evaluative expressions are distinct since "the first kind depend on who utters them to whom
for any reason-giving force that they may have, while utterances of the second kind are not
similarly dependent" (MacIntyre 1981 p13). Thirdly MacIntyre cites Ryle's example of the
angry schoolmaster who shouts at the small boy who has just made an arithmetical error that
"seven times seven equals forty-nine". The use of this expression to vent a feeling (anger)
has nothing to do with what the expression actually means.
Various other criticisms of emotivism are offered which need not concern us here, for the
main conclusion of the early part ofAfter Virtue is that all Enlightenment moral theories fail
and were bound to fail. MacIntyre argues that during the Enlightenment morality was
separated from society as a whole. The integration ofmorality, religion and law was lost and
thus morality needed a justification of its own, but an appeal to reason or to the passions
failed and had to fail. Why?
Turning to Aristotle MacIntyre asks what is ethics, what is its function? He answers this in
terms of a threefold schema, which begins with man-as-he-happens-to-be and ends with
man-as-he-would-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the means or the pathway
by which the former is transformed into the latter. Any two elements ofthe schema without
the third are unintelligible, and in particular man-as-he-happens-to-be and an ethical code
divorced from a conception ofman-as-he-is-to-become is incoherent. This idea of a goal,
purpose or telos for man is crucial, and MacIntyre argues powerfully that it is the loss of a
conception ofhuman telos that is at the heart of the failure ofEnlightenment ethical theories.
MacIntyre considers Hume's distinction between an 'ought' and an 'is' and gives a couple of
examples where he says a value judgement can be derived from facts. "From such factual
premises as 'He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district.' 'He
has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known' and 'His dairy herd wins all
the first prizes at the agricultural show', the evaluative conclusion validly follows that 'He is
a good farmer" (ibid. p55). This argument is valid according to MacIntyre because of the
special character ofwhat it is to be a farmer - namely that a farmer has a function that can be
done well or badly. Functional concepts have a telos or purpose ofwhich we may speak.
Another example is a watch, (it keeps time therefore it is a good watch) and Aristotle
maintained that man is a similarly functional concept. The function ofman is to lead the
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good life. Expanding this is to say that man's function is realised, his te/os is achieved when
he leads the good life, which in Aristotle's analysis is a life governed by the distinctive
human capacity of reason (both theoretical and practical). The details are not relevant here
but the main point is that man is a being with a purpose, ofwhom it can be said what he
ought to do, given his nature.
Further for Aristotle and those who preceded him, central to this notion of living the good
life is fulfilling a set ofroles within society: as a citizen, as a member of a family, as a
soldier, as a servant of God or whatever. Only when man is thought ofprimarily as an
individual independent of any society does he lose his functionality and thus his telos.
Furthermore the notion of right is that which a good man does, and a good man fulfils his
purpose in life, hence judgements about what is good and right are very much factual as
opposed to evaluative (cf. p56).
For Aristotle, the te/os ofman is eudaimonia, which literally means 'having a good guardian
spirit' but denotes the supreme human good: leading the good life. Man achieves this end by
exercising the virtues; which according to the Nicomachean Ethics, lie at the mean point of
opposing vices. For example courage lies between rashness and cowardice. The details do
not concern us here but it is important to realise mean does not connote mid-point here, but
rather that balance which any given situation requires and which is determined by the
intellectual virtue ofphronesis. Additionally it should be noted that there is no mention of
following rules here.
Most importantly ofall is the realisation that, for Aristotle, all social, political and cultural
life was centred on the city-state - the polis. Hence, Aristotle's system is not considered to
be universal but for the polis of Athens and binding on its citizens only. Indeed MacIntyre
argues that there was in fact a considerable diversity in identifying and interpreting the
values in Greek thought ofthe time, but that the unit of agreement, so to speak, was the
polis. "A virtue... .is a quality which will ensure success. But success for the sophists as for
other Greeks, must be success in some particular city. Hence the ethics of success comes to
be combined with a certain kind ofrelativism" (ibid. p130). MacIntyre goes on "What is
taken to be just in democratic Athens may be different from what is taken to be just in
aristocratic Thebes or military Sparta. The sophistic conclusion is that in each particular city
the virtues are what they are taken to be in that city" (ibid.).
From this exegesis, MacIntyre continues in the final section ofAfter Virtue to look at he
historical development of Aristotle's position and from it develops a neo-Aristotelianism
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which has at its centre the key notions ofpractice, narrative and tradition to which we now
turn. Firstly, distinguish goods internal and external to a practice. External goods are goods
that come from a particular practice, but could be achieved by the pursuit of some other
practice. Internal goods are those that can only be achieved by the pursuit of that particular
practice.
MacIntyre then says; "By 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established, cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that activity
are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are
systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is
throwing a football with skill, but the game offootball is and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a
practice, architecture is" (ibid. pI75).
Since practices are goal-directed and intentional they must be rooted in a historical context;
they must have a setting or a situation that MacIntyre calls a narrative, and it is the narrative
that gives the practice sense. A practice outside the context of a narrative is senseless. For
example, Lutheran Pietists brought up their children (e.g. Kant) to tell the truth to everybody
always. Traditional Bantu parents taught their children not to tell the truth to strangers as
they believed that could expose the family to the harmful effects ofwitchcraft (cf pI80).
The point is not that one is wrong or right, but that each receives its context and indeed its
sense from the historical setting; the narrative ofwhich it is a part.
A more entertaining example is that of the young man who utters "The name of the common
wild duck is Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus" at a bus stop (see pI95). Whilst it is clear
what this utterance means, the intentions of the young man can only be made sense ofifwe
know some context (e.g. former enquirer at a library, patient in therapy, Soviet spy etc.).
Without any context at all, without a suitable narrative, the practice is rendered senseless,
and we would judge the man mad.
In the final stage of MacIntyre's analysis in After Virtue, a narrative must be located within a
tradition. If the individual is considered as an agent, engaged in practices which are part of a
narrative there is nevertheless a wider context. I am born with a past, within a particular
community (neighbourhood, city, tribe) and whilst I may come to rebel against it, I inherit a
social context which is handed on to me from my forbears. This is a tradition.
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It may be noted straight away that MacIntyre says that the Burkean contrasts oftradition
with reason, and the stability oftradition with conflict are misleading. A tradition examines
itself; it transcends criticism and evolves. When healthy, it is "constituted by a continuous
argument" (MacIntyre 1981 p206) and embodies conflict. It is not unhelpful to think of
tradition as something alive and dynamic, in which narratives are embedded. The analogy
may be continued for MacIntyre says "the history of each ofour own lives is generally and
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms ofthe larger and longer
histories of a number of traditions. I say 'generally and characteristically' rather than
'always' for traditions decay, disintegrate and disappear" (ibid. p207), and this is a point to
which we shall have cause to return.
To summarise the argument so far: MacIntyre rejects what he calls Enlightenment theories of
ethics which appeal to reason or the passions for justification. He appeals to Aristotle to
show that ethics and the practice ofvirtue is the means whereby man achieves his telos. He
goes on to develop Aristotle's position to suggest that such practices derive their sense from
being part of a narrative, which in turn must be part of a larger tradition. This tradition is not
an inert or static thing, but can be self-critical, can adapt, can change and decay or even die.
It is no surprise that After Virtue prompted much discussion and argument, and many cannot
find themselves in agreement with MacIntyre's position. In the second edition ofAfter Virtue
a postscript was included where MacIntyre responded to some ofhis critics. He concedes
various factual errors in the book, and discusses various fine points of interpretation of
classical texts. He discusses the role ofhistory or historical analysis as a philosophical tool,
and disagrees with those who suggest philosophy to be a purely analytical activity. He also
concedes a neglect ofthe theological dimension ofhis position, but suggests After Virtue
must be seen as a work in progress. Hence it is fitting for us to consider its sequel Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? and to examine the notion of tradition as it is developed there.
MacIntyre's first point is that reason is embedded in tradition. He rejects the Enlightenment
view that there is some historically and socially independent standard ofjustification. He
makes four points in support ofhis position. Firstly, he suggests justification always has a
historical element in so far as part ofjustification is the narration ofa story. There is a need
to explain what the premises are and "how the argument has gone so far" (MacIntyre 1988
p8). There can be no rational process distinct from this structure.
Secondly, MacIntyre rejects the Enlightenment position which characterises dispute as
between different doctrines whose truth, falsity and justifiability may be argued for. He says
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"Doctrines, theses and arguments all have to be understood in terms ofhistorical context"
(ibid. p9). He concedes that from this it follows that, just as there is a plurality ofhistories
and traditions, so there is a plurality of rationalities. There is no timeless place where
concepts and their justification and elaboration, can be considered in a context-free way.
Thirdly, the proponents ofthe Enlightenment assert that this plurality makes "radical
disagreement" harder, not easier to resolve. But no, says MacIntyre, for the disagreement is
not always to be solved, but is to be understood in its context and is to be transformed in
such a way as to be resolved.
Finally, MacIntyre suggest that concepts can only be elucidated by exemplification. Here he
means that uses of concepts (e.g. true) are different in different traditions and at different
times, so there can be no abstract discussion of concepts outside of a particular tradition. He
gives two examples of the sorts of thing he has in mind. Firstly he considers the post-
Homeric structure of the polis, and contrasts excellence and efficiency as the determinants of
the just. Whilst there may be broad agreement between these two positions there will be
disagreement in certain areas, and these will be irreconcilable. Each position is justifiable
and understandable in the context of its tradition but au fond the two are separate and lead to
different political standpoints.
MacIntyre points to discussion between Plato and the Sophists as another example.
"Callicies' grudging, uncandid and sullen withdrawal from the argument with Socrates in the
Georgias and to the almost, but not quite, complete silence ofThrasymachus through nine
books ofthe Republic" (ibid. p75) show the impossibility of discussion between the two
because of their very different base premises. "The premises and presuppositions of the
Platonic account certainly entail the falsity of any sophistic view and vice versa" (ibid.).
Andrew Mason takes up the point and suggests that in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
MacIntyre seems to individuate traditions by characterising them as giving rise to rival and
incompatible theories; and not only incompatible but incommensurable too. Mason
formalises MacIntyre to say that theories within different traditions are incommensurable if
they have one or more of the following:
Different base premises.
Different conceptions of rational resolvability
Partial untranslatability.
This may prompt the question: is this the end ofthe story? Are conflicting theories and
traditions with their antagonistic base premises, their rival conceptions of rationality and
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their mutual untranslatability condemned to be eternally at odds? The answer is no, and for
MacIntyre, the supreme example and indeed exemplar ofhow separate traditions may
combine is found in the work ofS. Thomas Aquinas.
MacIntyre sees Aquinas as an inheritor of the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of
Augustine which is essentially Platonic in its nature. It was the genius ofAquinas, so
MacIntyre contends, to fuse these two positions together, or more precisely to create a
synthesis out oftwo dialectically opposed positions. All the details of this need not concern
us here, but it is worth briefly noting the following points. The structure of Aquinas'
argument is an advancing discussion which is ultimately open-ended, for it is "always open
to addition by some as yet unforeseen argument" (ibid. pl72). In a similar way Aquinas'
notion of the te/os for man is a transformation ofAristotle's in that it is open-ended. It has a
transcendental or divine dimension, which can only be fully realised by the Grace of God
after death.
Secondly just as Aristotle's notion ofthe te/os for man only made sense within the context of
the polis, so Aquinas enlarges the notion of the polis by appropriating ideas from Augustine
and Gregory VII of the civitas Dei. Importantly, everyone is a citizen of this community
except those who exclude themselves, and a certain universalism albeit within a Thornist
tradition is beginning to emerge. Thirdly, Aquinas appropriates Aristotle's virtue of
phronesis, (wise judgement in exercising the virtues) and replaces it with prudentia which
has a theological dimension in so far as it directs the exercise ofhuman law to be in line with
the Divine Law (cf p197).
Finally in De Ente et Essentia Aquinas distinguishes essence and existence. This was in
response to the challenge that confronted him that: "a particular thesis can be true in
philosophy, while some logically incompatible thesis is true in theology" (ibid. pI70).
Distinguishing a thing's nature from its being, allowed Aquinas to synthesise disparate
elements of theory together in a "unified metaphysical theology" (ibid. pI7I). The details of
all ofthis are not directly relevant, but they give some idea ofwhat MacIntyre has in mind
when he speaks ofmerging traditions. From the example ofAquinas, MacIntyre develops a
more general theory ofthe evolution of traditions, and as this is pertinent to our concept of
framework. It is to this that we now turn.
Firstly, MacIntyre makes the point that the merging or synthesis of traditions is a difficult
business because there is no arbitrary standpoint from where the two rival positions can be
evaluated. A person who achieves such a synthesis must have the "rare gift of empathy"
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(ibid. p167) and MacIntyre sees Aquinas as unique on account ofhis education in that he
understood two rival traditions from within. It is this that prompts the remark that "Perhaps
no one else in the history ofphilosophy has been put in to quite this situation" (ibid. pI68).
MacIntyre contends that the merging of traditions happens in two stages. Initially each
position must characterise the contentions ofthe other in its own terms. Each must have
some understanding ofthe other, whilst leaving questions of truth and falsity on one side.
Thereafter, one position must use resources from the other to explain more adequately its
own defects or inadequacies. This may lead to a number of different possible outcomes. One
tradition may jettison some ofits contentions in favour of contentions from the rival
tradition, thus removing the division. There may be an impasse, where certain issues have to
remain undecided, or in certain rare cases "to understand may lead to a judgement that by the
standards of one's own tradition the other tradition offers superior resources for
understanding the problems and issues which confront one's own tradition" (ibid. p370).
Underlying this characterisation of concepts is, of course, the assumption that one tradition
must accommodate the language of the other. MacIntyre reminds us that there is no neutral
language, for language is historically and socially conditioned, so for traditions to merge,
one tradition must learn the language of the other as a first language. MacIntyre talks of a
second-first-language. There is some rather technical debate here about the nature of
translatability which I shall side step to come to several fmal but important points at the end
of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Firstly, MacIntyre reiterates that liberalism characterised by the lack of any overriding good,
and based on desires of the individual is not the neutral standpoint it claims to be. The
Enlightenment project ofproviding a neutral ground from which moral judgements could be
made, and a rationality, to which all would agree, failed. He continues by saying, that there is
no sound a priori argument why there could not be such a neutral ground (cf. p346) but
equally clearly, liberalism is the best contender that there has been or is likely to be. Since
liberalism has failed we can assert with confidence that there is no neutral ground; "there is
instead only the practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-
tradition" (ibid. p346).
Additionally MacIntyre asserts that liberalism is itself a tradition, but one in which "less and
less importance has been attached to arriving at a substantive conclusion and more and more
to continuing the debate for its own sake" (ibid. p344). Ifwe were left in any doubt he goes
on to say "Like other traditions liberalism has its set of authoritative texts and its disputes
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over their interpretation. Like other traditions, liberalism expresses itself socially through a
particular kind ofhierarchy" (ibid. p345). This seems rather odd for two reasons: firstly, it is
a departure from the position MacIntyre held in After Virtue and secondly it opens up a
considerable number of difficult, albeit interesting, questions about conflict and
disagreement within traditions.
Stephen Mulhall observes that "MacIntyre's conception ofliberalism and its weaknesses has
shifted signillcantly over the last decade" (Mulhall p223). InAfter Virtue MacIntyre seems
to dismiss liberalism because of "internal methodological and conceptual incoherencies at
its heart" (ibid.) but in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? as we have seen, MacIntyre
suggests liberalism is a tradition. If this is so, Mulhall makes the obvious remark that it is
"no more open to purely methodological or conceptual assault than his own neo-Thomistic
tradition" (ibid. p224). However it may be asked, is liberalism a tradition in the normal
sense?
Andrew Mason poses the question: ifliberalism is a tradition how can disputes among
liberals be explained? He suggests the question prompts the following dilemma: if
liberalism is a tradition then it contains several conflicting and incommensurable theories,
Rawls' and Nozick's theories ofjustice being the much-discussed example. However,
MacIntyre seems to take incommensurability as a central and distinguishing feature of
different traditions. On the other hand, if theories such as Rawls' and Nozick's were
regarded as commensurable how can the intractable disagreement to which they seem to lead
be explained? MacIntyre's own view of tradition would be compromised.
Mason suggests that MacIntyre might avoid the dilemma by denying that "liberalism, as it is
ordinarily understood, is a single tradition" (Mason p228) and suggests "perhaps we should
think of Rawls and Nozick, perfectionist and neutralist liberals, and utilitarian and
deontologicalliberals, as each part of different but overlapping traditions" (ibid.). But this
seems at odds with MacIntyre's implicit belief that there are relatively few traditions and his
suggestion that Rawls and Nozick are part of a single tradition (see Mason p229).
Mason admits uncertainty here but suggests a position in which a single tradition may
contain theories which are commensurable in some respects and incommensurable in others.
It acknowledges that there may be partial commensurability across traditions which
MacIntyre himself concedes (cf. MacIntyre 1988 p351). However, on Mason's view a
tradition may contain rival theories whose differences are more than superficial and which
might be significantly incommensurable. Mason goes on to suggest that the problems
49
surrounding commensurability are more fundamental for MacIntyre than "the intractability
ofcontemporary political disagreement" (Mason p229) and the charge that MacIntyre has
not sufficiently explained how traditions are to be individuated seems to linger.
Finally it is worth considering the final chapter of Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry,
and MacIntyre's reconception ofthe university. Not only does this give some inkling ofhow
his scheme might apply in reality, but also, despite the differences between schools and
universities, what MacIntyre says about universities is very pertinent to our notion of
frameworks in schools.
MacIntyre suggests that the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica offered a unified
vision of the world; it was almost a canonical text. The tenth edition was little more than a
revision of this but the eleventh and subsequent editions were no more than a set ofwell-
ordered facts, reflecting an increasingly fragmented and specialised enquiry. The largely
homogenous views of the educated public had given way to an educated public who no
longer shared fundamental values. This shift in the perception ofwhat an encyclopaedia
constituted was accompanied by a change in the nature of a university.
MacIntyre argues that the pre-liberal universities were conformist; each one having an
agreed morality and agreed standards ofrational justification. There was a "high degree of
homogeneity in fundamental belief' (MacIntyre 1990 p223) almost so that one could speak
. of a university's particular telos. This homogeneity was not static but evolved, it was a
changing consensus, but as MacIntyre points out it was consensus none the less. Historical
completeness demands that we note that such universities excluded those who held views
which were seriously at odds with the agreed consensus, most notably Jews and Catholics. A
preferment system operated so that those who would be expected to maintain the status quo
were promoted above those who had brilliance, and MacIntyre notes the preferment of
Cleghorn to the chair ofMoral Philosophy at Edinburgh over Hume (ibid. p224).
The establishment ofthe liberal universities appealed to two premises. Firstly, to the
correction ofthe injustices of exclusion, and this is lauded by MacIntyre. Secondly to a
neutral and non-partisan rationality; "freed from external constraints and most notably from
the constraints imposed by religious and moral tests" (ibid. p225). It is no surprise that
MacIntyre regards this ideal as spurious, even non-sensical, and speaks of the subsequent
history of the liberal university as one of"increasing disarray" (ibid.), Most telling is the
current sidelining of theological and moral debate, these enquiries have been 'dethroned' and
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the liberal university has no agreed values, no agreed standards ofrationality, in short no
telos.
MacIntyre attacks the Great Books Curriculum, a system of initiation in to our inherited
culture and tradition through great books such as Plato, Euclid, Locke's Essay, Shakespeare,
Mill's On Liberty etc .. These books cannot convey a tradition since they are varied and
present different view points and most crucially says MacIntyre they cannot be read
'straight' but need interpretation. But in the Great Books Curriculum no method of
interpretation is given, there is no initial consensus and of course, in the ideals of a liberal
university no standard of interpretation no consensus, could be given. The Great Books
Curriculum does not achieve what it is supposed to. What then?
MacIntyre goes on to propose that the post-liberal university has two roles. Firstly to
advance enquiry within a particular point ofview, "preserving and transforming the initial
agreements with those who share that point ofview" (ibid. p231) and secondly to engage in
systematic controversy with those with whom one disagreed. It is suggested that this
systemised controversy would have ethical and theological issues at its heart, there would be
no arbitrary neutral standpoint and positions would change and evolve in the way that
traditions change and evolve, as discussed earlier. MacIntyre imagines sets ofrival
universities with their own exclusions and prohibitions, along the lines of a "twentieth
century version of the thirteenth century university, especially the University ofParis, the
university at which the Augustinians and the Aristotelians each conducted their own
systematic enquiries, whilst at the same time engaging in systematic controversy" (ibid.
p232). Before turning to the implications of such a view for schools it is fitting to consider
other contributions to the discussion ofthe place oftradition in education that have a more
overtly 'educational' perspective.
The idealist philosopher, Michael Oakeshott maintained that reality is mediated to us via
human practices which are not things that we simply know about but are to be lived. Similar
to Wittgenstein's language games where the only way we can show we understand them is to
play them, so we engage with reality by entering practices. What exactly does Oakeshott
mean by practice? He says, "As civilised human beings we are the inheritors, neither of an
enquiry about ourselves and the world, nor ofan accumulating body of information, but of a
conversation education properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership
of this conversation" (Oakeshott 1962 p198-199). To master a subject we must be initiated
into its literature and Peters reminds us that this is a mastery ofmoves made by one's
predecessors "which are enshrined in a living tradition" (Peters 1963 p109).
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Although Peters' own philosophical position changed and developed, his early work as
found in "Education as Initiation" (1963) and Ethics and Education (1966) was driven by the
attempt to define education. In brief, Peters argued there are three elements to education: the
transmission of something worthwhile, which has a cognitive content and which is
transmitted in a non-coercive manner. He says "Education involves essentially processes
which intentionally transmit what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary manner and
which create in the learner the desire to achieve it, this being seen to have its place along
with other things in life" (Peters 1963 pl02).
This definition is underpinned for Peters by two philosophical theses: one about the nature of
the worthwhile which we can ignore, and the other about the nature of the mind. Peters
rejected the empiricist theory ofthe mind as a tabula rasa (or "empty cabinet" (Peters 1966
p51) as he put it) upon which sense qualia are impressed and from which knowledge was
derived as a sort ofprecipitate. He also rejected the Kantian notion developed by Piaget; of
innate knowledge by which experience was structured and from which concepts were
derived. "Both share a common defect, that ofregarding the educator as a detached operator
who is working for some kind of result in another person who is external to him" (ibid.).
In contrast to these two positions Peters stressed the essentially interactive nature of
education and saw education as a process of initiation, initiation in to a common language,
shared concepts and an inherited tradition. For Peters this tradition served several purposes
which can be briefly explored. He says creativity and inventiveness are important aspects of
education "but talk of inventiveness is empty unless the individual is brought up in a
tradition which enables him to see and find a way round a problem when it arises" (ibid.
p57). He says our concepts are culture bound and socially determined so that there is a
tradition or a fraternity (cf. p217) into which pupils are to be initiated. The practical
consequences ofthis for Peters are both mundane and far-reaching. Tradition underpins
school rules and classroom discipline (P272-3); it underpins reasonableness and tolerance
(P303) and is ultimately required for the functioning ofdemocracy.
Richard Pring explores the connection between tradition and the curriculum. Echoing
Oakeshott, he makes the point that Oakeshottian conversations should take place directed
only by the conversations themselves. That is to say the contents ofthe curriculum should
arise "not from the fiat of a Secretary ofState worried about the usefulness ofwhat is learnt,
but from within a tradition of scholarship and critical enquiry" (Pring 1996 pl07). He
enlarges upon this point when he considers two extremes of educational practice. In the first
52
he imagines a teacher who on account ofhis greater knowledge simply tells the pupils what
they should learn (conveys the tradition) without any consideration of their interests. In the
second he imagines teaching driven solely by pupils' interests, where everything is to be
negotiated and education is seen as mutual enlightenment.
Pring says education must lie between these two extremes, and observes that the art ofthe
teacher is to bring the interests of the pupils and the established tradition in to contact. The
teacher must inhabit a worked-out tradition which he will convey, whilst at the same time
respecting and responding to his pupils interests. These traditions are public and arise from
"systematic, disciplined reflection and criticism, and should be seen as resources from which
the student-centred curriculum is drawn" (Pring 1976 p98). Pring is mildly critical ofa
headmaster who integrated a curriculum around the idea ofbees; queen bees leading to
associations with royalty etc., worker bees leading to ideas of careers and jobs, drones
introducing "social security, layabouts and hippies" (ibid. p107)! He suggests such a scheme
is no more than idiosyncratic, for it is just an association of ideas without any conceptual
unity. He prefers a structuring of curriculum, around a reality that has "already been found
adequate and has withstood scrutiny by others" (ibid.).
Finally we should note that Pring persistently talks of traditions in the plural, almost to the
point of suggesting each teacher may inhabit his own tradition, which without qualification,
risks being non-sensical. Pring does not tell us how broadly or narrowly he imagines
traditions or how they are to be individuated, and this is an issue which will be considered
again in chapter five.
In his inaugural lecture as professor, John White explored the relationship between values
and personal well-being. He recognises the role that Christianity has historically played in
British values education, but suggests that this is now outmoded and irrelevant. "Christianity
is crumbling everywhere" (White 1995 p16) he says and he struggles to see "how the
government's attempt to involve a by-and-large godless school population in the rites of a
dwindling religious cult will do anything for the students' own or other people's flourishing"
(ibid. p3). In the light of this White asks is there an alternative framework?
He develops the idea that ethical ideas associated with well-being are rooted in our human
nature, but that our nature is not simply given but is a social and more importantly a
historical construct. [Values] "have been developed across human time in response to our
needs and desires [and] ifyou ask me why friendship is a good thing, or sexual
pleasure, or concern for the needy or personal autonomy, my answer will have to be in those
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terms" (ibid. p8). That is to say although White has a very different agenda to MacIntyre
(say) he does recognise that our values are principally explicable in terms ofhow we have
developed, and so our history, our tradition is a something that is to be explicated and indeed
to be handed on.
To summarise all this I want to say that a tradition is that which we receive from our forbears
as opposed to that which we invent or discover for ourselves. It underpins a shared
rationality, a common approach to the rational solving ofproblems and certain other agreed
base premises. In addition to this epistemological machinery a tradition also functions as a
backdrop to moral discourse and to human narrative; a context within which human lives are
situated and from which they derive their significance and sense. Our engagement with
reality is mediated through a particular tradition that is a product ofhistorical discussion,
debate and refinement.
It is tradition in this sense that I understand as a constituent of a framework for values
education. If teacher and pupil do not share a basic rationality and agree on base premises it
is hard to see how education could occur - even communication would be hugely
problematic. More specifically and for our purposes then, there must be a shared moral
dimension here, recognition of an inherited tradition as a backdrop to making moral sense of
human lives as a part ofvalues education. Moral understanding is a part ofwhat values
education is about. When considering questions ofvalue the pupil must not only understand
the meaning ofwhat the teacher teaches but must also grasp its significance too. School
values education is inextricably linked with morals and MacIntyre's whole argument is that
these are only coherent within a given tradition. The pupil must understand that to make a
moral judgement in particular, and a value judgement more broadly, is not an isolated event
but has a cultural and historical context, and that this context is not just a context for the
judgements but is the context ofthe life ofthe pupil (and the teacher!) too!
In other words the tradition not only provides a common rationality and a backdrop to moral
judgements, but provides a broader context that gives human life meaning and sense. A
tradition embeds human narratives and provides continuity between our moral lives and our
lives more generally. Our moral life is not a disjoint part ofus, but is continuous and
contiguous with the rest of our lives, and the recognition of an inherited tradition behind all
this gives meaning and sense to the way we live, and is a crucial part ofvalues education.
I want to express all of this by saying that a framework for values education must have a
component of tradition. I do not think that tradition is the only component; the only part of
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the framework that needs to be considered but it seems to me that in the absence oftradition
and the recognition of the place oftradition, values education would be incoherent.
The practical implication of this may be considered in two separate cases. Firstly, in the case
of culturally homogeneous schools such as Lutheran schools in Norway, or some Catholic
schools in Britain, there seems little doubt that tradition would and I would suggest should
be a significant factor in the life of the school. The history and ethos ofthe school, the
particular religious perspective, the kind oflanguage that is used in school documents, even
hymn singing and public assemblies/worship would all be part of a shared tradition. Even in
some cases the decor or plan of the school might be influenced by tradition and in particular
ifwe think of long-established independent schools, the place and importance of tradition in
unquestionable. This is not to say that this tradition is fixed for indeed it evolves; nor is it to
say that other traditions are ignored, for they are acknowledged and discussed, but crucially
from the perspective of an established position. Finally we may note that such schools are
readily replicated and one may think ofBenedictine schools (or former Benedictine schools)
at Ampleforth, Downside, Douai, Belmont and so on that despite their superficial
differences, are profoundly similar, because they are a part of a tradition originating in S.
Benedict (c.480-547).
In culturally heterogeneous schools the situation is very different. If MacIntyre's views about
universities were to be replicated in schools, the suggestion is presumably that culturally
heterogeneous schools should be replaced by culturally homogeneous schools, in which
cultural groupings ofpupils could be separately educated. In Britain church schools of
various denominations already exist and the emergence ofIslamic schools is a current
phenomenon. We can imagine an extension ofthis provision to reflect other ideological
traditions, although such a move may well be opposed on the charges of separatism, and the
institution of rival ghettos. This is a potentially powerful objection, but more work needs to
be done to make it stick, for all that is being suggested here is that schooling be divided on
traditional lines, not that society generally, or the leisure activities that people enjoy be so
divided.
However it is not clear that schooling and 'society generally' can be so neatly partitioned.
The situation in Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Roman Catholics are separately
educated, might seem to suggest that separatist schools divide communities and are part of
the problem rather than part ofthe solution. However, that situation there is highly complex
and judgements about schools cannot be meaningfully made in isolation from a considerable
number of other issues.
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The reality is, l think, that culturally heterogeneous schools are with us to stay. If one were
to continue a strict MacIntyrean line, one might consider schools as places where rival
traditions are assimilated and where new traditions emerge, but in the light ofremarks about
the unique intellect and position ofThomas Aquinas, this seems an unlikely occurrence! A
more balanced approach seems to me to be an acknowledgement ofthe central importance of
tradition, tempered by the realisation that tradition is not the only factor to be considered.
A balanced response must recognise the cultural diversity within schools and attempt to
embrace various traditions to the full, rather than watering them down to the lowest common
factor. Additionally however, schools cannot be thought of as ideal institutions, they are real
institutions inhabited by real people, and whilst the traditions ofthese people must be
respected and fostered, it also must be realised that these people form or should form a
community. Not only is this community to be understood as within the perimeter fence ofthe
school, but the school itselfis (or should be) an integral part of the wider community. It
would seem that school situation is not analogous to MacIntyre's post-liberal university, and
in order to develop a framework for values and values education in schools, the demands of
tradition must be considered alongside the demands of a pluralist community life.
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IV Community and Frameworks
Thus far I have explored the notion offramework through the lenses oflanguage and
tradition. I have also suggested that the notion ofcommunity is important in the pluralist
world in which we live, and in this final chapter of exploration, I turn to the notion of
community and the work of Charles Taylor. Taylor's work is relevant here, because he
locates the selfwithin a community, and this location; this structural setting is not just a
possibility or an optional extra but is a necessity. I think this unavoidable location of the self
within community is highly relevant for the broader location ofvalues education within
frameworks.
Recall, MacIntyre's analysis is principally historical in nature and follows a long line of
development from Aristotle, through Augustine, Aquinas, and the Enlightenment to the
present day. Taylor adopts a very similar type ofhistorical analysis in his magisterial
Sources ofthe Self, which traces the development ofthe understanding ofthe self,
particularly the self as a moral agent. As Taylor puts it: "What we are constantly losing from
sight here is that being a self is inescapable from existing in a space ofmoral issues, to do
with identity and how one ought to be" (Taylor 1989b, pI12).
In her review of this text Martha Nussbaum observes that: it is difficult to give a sense of the
richness ofTaylor's argument, and impossible to do justice to the all ofhis historical
articulation, and this is a sentiment that we can echo here, but some attempt must be made.
Like MacIntyre, Taylor begins with the ancients and observes that Plato locates the self or
the soul as a unit within society. One has a place and a role to play within the ordering of
society. More importantly individual morality, man's orientation towards the good and
indeed one's reason cannot be independent of society but must be integrated with it. "The
cosmos... is related to the right order ofthe soul as the whole is to the part, as englobing to
englobed" (ibid. pI22). Furthermore this very large picture is instantiated in the polis, where
our moral and rational well-being depends not only on our individual selves but also on our
place within and our relationship to, the society ofwhich we are a part.
Saint Augustine combined Platonic philosophy with Christian doctrine and in particular
viewed the created order in all its parts as participating in the Divine order, which is a
manifestation of the good. "God sawall he had made and indeed it was very good" (Genesis
1:31). That is, for Augustine, God rather than the idea ofthe Good is the source of all good,
and man's ultimate well-being depends on orientating oneselftowards God. This is
consonant with Plato's orientation towards the Good except that Plato's man must look
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outside himself but Augustine's man finds God on an inward road. God is the very source,
the root ofhuman being.
As we noted earlier, Augustine's man is situated within the civitas Dei, he is located within a
community ofthe faithful, but according to Taylor, a crucial change has occurred. By
suggesting God is to be found interiorly, Augustine has introduced a self-centred,
introspective or reflexive stance that was to dominate future thinking. Taylor goes as far as
to suggest that Augustine foreshadowed a "radical reflexivity" (Taylor 1989b, p143) that
Descartes adopts and indeed enshrines in his cogito. Taylor also notes that Descartes' theistic
proofs start from within the self's own ideas, unlike Aquinas' proofs which start from
external being.
More generally Descartes abandoned any teleological approach to reasoning, and thought
that the universe was a mechanism to be understood by independent reason, grounded
ultimately in the method of doubt. The proper intellectual stance was detached engagement.
Crucial for Taylor's analysis is the moral shift that went with this: Descartes situated the
source ofmorality within the self Descartes' self could rationalise independently about
moral matters, and although theism remained, on a human level, the selfhad an autonomy
and a dignity based on its own reason. For Descartes, strength ofwill is the supreme virtue
and reason is no longer determined by societal factors but is a procedure, internal to the self,
for establishing the truth.
Locke advanced this position further by developing the notion of the human agent who is
able to shape his own destiny. The selfhas an instrumental stance towards his own feelings,
desires and habits and can regulate them to an extent. The self is neutral, objective and
disengaged and can tum reflexively upon itself, as well as considering the external world.
Moreover Locke also rejected any teleological concept of the selfand any claims to innate
knowledge. He adopted a strict empiricism reconstructing epistemology on the grounds of
experience alone. "Rationality is above all a property ofthe process of thinking, not ofthe
substantive content of thought" (ibid. p168).
Locke's stance leaves little scope for authority in any shape or form, but morality is not
jettisoned. We form habits whereby doing good causes happiness and evil causes uneasiness.
This habituation is a mechanical thing, which is instrumentally determined, but lacks the
background ofnature which characterises Aristotle's hexeis (cf Taylor 1989b, p 171). This
habituation however is not escapable; Taylor points out "Locke is acknowledging in his own
way here what I argued in part I; the close connection between our notion of the selfand of
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moral self-understanding. Locke's person is the moral agent who takes responsibility for his
acts in the light offuture retribution. The abstracted picture of the self faithfully reflects his
ideal of responsible agency" (ibid. p173).
Kant following Rousseau defined freedom and morality in terms of each other. Since for
Kant, to act morally is to act according to a motive or sense of duty, one must be free to do
this! Further this motive or duty is not determined by nature but is a law ofmorality
determined by reason, the reasoning of the self. This reasoning which is based on the rational
has a normativity for Kant, in that all rational agents would draw the same conclusion about
the same circumstances. There is an internal activity, generated within the self:
independently ofnature, that motivates the rational agent.
It is interesting to note that it is this rational capacity that confers dignity upon man, and
although Kant retained a Christian belief, it was God who designed things the way they are,
and man who was able to confer dignity on himself. At the beginning ofhis well-known
essay on the Enlightenment, Kant writes that "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his
self-incurred immaturity" and he continues, "Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own
understanding!" (cf. Taylor 1989b, p366) The selfis an established entity, morally
independent ofGod, and its natural surroundings.
Considering modem philosophy Taylor highlights Kierkegaard who suggests that we attain
the ethical by "choosing ourselves in the light of infinity" (ibid. p449). That is to say on the
one hand the aesthetic man ofEither/Or never moves beyond worldly, finite choices dictated
by his senses; and is ultimately unfulfilled. His life is not a proper life. On the other hand the
ethical man ofEither/Or gives value to the selfby the very act of choosing it. By choosing
the ethical above the aesthetic my life, my very self is transfigured, it is freed from the
ultimate drudgery of the senses, it accesses a new dimension, and I become a full person.
Although this was not to be the final word and Kierkegaard ultimately came to value the
religious above the ethical, nevertheless it was the place of the Divine, or perhaps better it
was the acceptance of the Divine, that allowed the individual to fully realise his own self.
The individuated self is paramount!
Taylor also highlights Nietzsche, who characterises man as trapped in a suffering, finite
cosmos and searching for an escape: a resolution, a way out. In particular Nietzsche sees
Christianity as one such illusory attempt to find a way out, an option or doctrine for escape, a
promise offuture reconciliation and justice. But Nietzsche's Ubermensch (supermen) are
those who realise there is no way out, there is no escape. The Ubermensch recognise and
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accept the situation as it is, and in so doing overcome themselves and take on a transfigured
self New meaning is found by a new orientation ofthe self
All of this and the moral stance which it entails is an act ofwill, an exercise ofpower that the
Ubermensch summon from within themselves. It is the influence of the community and
surroundings that heightens our sense ofunworthiness and condemns us to an all-too-human
life (cf ibid. p453). Finally it is worth noting that Nietzsche's rejection of theism further
underlines or emphasises that the force that transfigures is not external, but comes from
within; within the unencumbered self
Alongside and interwoven with these more overtly philosophical positions, Taylor also
considers a number of other social and cultural developments that have severed the self from
its community in modem thought, and he finds the origin of these developments in the
affirmation of'ordinary life'. For Aristotle the highest aims in life were contemplation and
political association, although he realised that these had to be underpinned by more modest
(ordinary) aims-such as production and labour, marriage and sexual fulfilment and so on.
These latter aims however were not seen as ends in themselves but were means to higher
ends. In the modern era Taylor suggests Aristotle's highest aims ceased to be universally
acknowledged and so-called ordinary life was given a dignity and worth in itself
Taylor argues that there were two especially significant aspects to this. The first was the
emergence of a work ethic and the development of commerce. The high ideal ofmilitary
conquest was replaced by the idea ofbusiness success, which provided corporate stability
but which also elevated successful individuals and engendered a sense of competition
amongst them. The second was a shift in the understanding ofmarriage. There was an
increased emphasis on the affection ofthe partners for each other and for their children, and
so there was an increased emphasis on the voluntary nature ofmarriage and choosing a
partner. More families were able to have their own homes and in the homes of the rich,
family and servants were partitioned. This promoted a general sense ofprivacy and
exclusiveness within the family relationship and "the open, goldfish bowl world of
traditional society" (ibid. p291) declined.
Taylor also charts the development, in the eighteenth century, of the novel as a literary form,
and points out that the new novel tended to focus on the individual (the hero or heroine) and
concerned itselfwith the particular rather than the general. Taylor cites Ian Watt (P287) who
points out that the characters now have ordinary proper names, unlike those we find in
Bunyan (say) which are "personified qualities" (ibid.). Similarly Taylor mentions the
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emergence ofthe biography and autobiography and these too add to the notion of a world of
individuals, and play down notions of community and the place and role of archetypes and
universal forms.
Finally reformation theology moved away from the notion ofuniversal salvation brought
about by Divine grace to a notion of salvation for the individual who lived a life by faith and
good works. Protestant religion brought the focus of eternity in to the life of the individual
who ultimately had to account for himself and who would be judged as an individual. Using
a perhaps rather well worn but effective metaphor, Taylor has it; "1 am a passenger in the
ecclesial ship on its journey to God. But for Protestantism there can be no passengers. This is
because there is no ship in the Catholic sense, no common movement carrying humans to
salvation. Each believer rows his or her own boat" (ibid. p217).
At this point we must not lose sight ofTaylor's aim. He charts the history ofthe self, the
development of the individual's reflexive stance not to endorse it but to understand it.
Through his detailed analysis he aims to show where modem society has gone wrong. Only
towards the very end of Sources ofthe Selfdo we see Taylor's rejection of the doctrine
summed up so well in Herder's phrase "Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes Mass" (Each human
has his own measure. ibid. p375), and the suggestion that in poetry man still has some sense,
some longing, for the transcendent which goes beyond the craze for social atomism and self-
fulfilment.
Taylor speaks of an attempt to recapture "public poetry" (P483); a conversation between the
poet and a broad audience. The aim is to articulate "common realities and hopes, pains and
fulfilments" (P484) rather than plumb the inner depths ofmeaning. Now these common
realities, hopes etc. may be aesthetic, but it is Taylor's contention that they have an ethical
element too, and this ethical dimension based upon common shared themes locates the
individual within community. This idea is taken up in Taylor's Ethics ofAuthenticity to
which we now turn.
Taylor characterises the modem ethical position as individualism "whose principle is
something like this: everyone has a right to develop their own form of life, grounded on their
own sense ofwhat is really important or ofvalue. People are called upon to be true to
themselves and to seek their own self-fulfilment" (Taylor 1991 pI4). Taylor says this
position is not so much to be criticised but suggests a fundamental ideal has been lost, and
sees the philosopher's job as one ofrecovery.
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Taylor characterises human life as essentially dialogical. Firstly in its genesis: we learn
language and other skills through interaction with others, we cannot accomplish this alone.
Additionally throughout life we develop and grow not in a monological fashion but through
dialogue. This dialogue provides a ''background ofintelligibility" (ibid p37) to our lives
which Taylor goes on to call a horizon. We define ourselves against this horizon, and indeed
our very identity requires recognition by others. Further intimate and loving relationships are
seen to be "the prime loci of self-exploration and self-fulfilment" (ibid. p45). Behind this
must be some shared standards or values, against which difference can be recognised, and
we must recognise that we are essentially embedded in a human mesh, we are not
disengaged, and we cannot function in the disengaged way that individualism would suggest.
Taylor argues against choice as a source ofworth. He counters the suggestion that "all
options are equally worthy, because they are freely chosen, and it is choice that confers
worth" (ibid. p37), because this ignores all pre-existent horizons. If these are denied then all
our choices are on a level plain and no one is more or less significant than any other.
Taylor suggests that ifhomosexual orientation were to be justified on grounds ofchoice,
then sexual orientation becomes no more significant than a preference for "taller or shorter
sexual partners, blondes or brunettes" (ibid. p38) which is absurd. That is to say no one
would discriminate against another for preferring blondes or brunettes for these choices are
not important. But, by contrast, to choose a sexuality is to choose a whole way ofliving, and
this cannot be considered unimportant! Although it is questionable whether sexual
orientation is something that one chooses, appeal to the right to choose is often made, and
the point remains that conferring worth by choice collapses horizons, and the very thing to
be valued is rendered insignificant - valueless. Resonating with Wittgenstein's forms of life
Taylor declares, "horizons are given" (ibid. p39).
Moreover, my very identity depends on givens in history, nature and society where there are
given demands and orders of significance, and to ignore these and appeal to choice as the
ultimate is to undermine and trivialise the very nature ofthe self This is a point to which we
shall return.
Taylor's philosophical arguments have extended and developed into the political sphere. The
fragmentation that Taylor describes can lead to a sense ofpolitical powerlessness, but it also
has prompted the emergence of the recognition of common purposes. This has happened
most significantly in the USA and has centred on the notion of rights, but it has also led to
the increase of so-called "single issue" politics and has had implications for devolution and
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the decentralisation ofpower. Much contemporary discussion has surrounded the theory of
communitarianism.
Broadly speaking communitarianism is "the thesis that the community rather than the
individual, the state, the nation or any other entity is and should be at the centre ofour
analysis and our value system" (Honderich p143). Kymlicka underlines that whereas
utilitarianism, liberal equality, libertarianism and Marxism promote people's interest by
letting them choose the kind of lives they want to lead, and indeed almost take self-
determinism as axiomatic, communitarians question our ability and even right to be totally
self-determining. We can certainly imagine members of society who through immaturity or
disability need decisions making for them, but liberals allow for this (cf Kymlicka 1990
p200). What we need to ask is are there individuals who are perhaps unsuccessful at making
life-decisions, and who would be better off if these were made for them? Are all choices best
left to the individual?
Kymlicka imagines a policy of taxing wrestling and subsidising the theatre. Defenders of
such a policy might say they were justified if studies revealed "theatre is stimulating whereas
wrestling produces frustration and docility; or that wrestling fans often come to regret their
past activities, whereas theatre goers rarely regret theirs; or that the majority ofpeople who
have tried both forms ofentertainment prefer theatre" (ibid. p20 1). If any of these could be
shown, should the government not encourage theatre and save the people from wasting their
time on wrestling? Naturally questions arise as to whether any ofthe claims above could be
justified, but more broadly what a government should do in theory and what it does in
practice needs to be distinguished, and we have to question whether it would be right to give
a government such power. Nevertheless "nothing in principle excludes the possibility that
governments can identify mistakes in people's conception ofthe good" (ibid. p203).
The retort to this is that choosing and being mistaken is a higher good than being led, we
might say coerced! If, say we were to take somebody to church and make them say and do
the right liturgical things at the right time this would in itselfhave no value, because such
convictions must come 'from within'. Paternalism concerning inner convictions or life
choices (as opposed to pragmatic issues such as the wearing of seatbelts in cars) defeats the
very thing it sets out to achieve!
But communitarians argue that paternalism is not what they are about. The centre of the
debate is about an interpretation of the common good. On the one hand liberals argue that
people are entitled to neutral concern from governments and all choices, so long as they do
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not violate the rights of others, are equal. Communitarians suggest not that some choices are
compulsory but that there is a weighting and that some choices are valued more highly than
others in the public conception of the common good. This public, shared conception of ends
defines the community's way of life and thereby ranks some values above others. Kymlicka
points out that there may be occasions when an individual has the right to veto a common
decision, but observes that it is not clear or agreed what occasions these might be (cf.
Kymlicka 1989 p77).
Now ifthe shared ranking constitutes a given for the communitarian, in contrast to the non-
weighted equal choices offered the liberal, the question is why must the communitarian take
these shared values as given? Michael Sandel offers a self-perception argument against the
notion ofthe unencumbered self (Sandel 1982). Sandel says that if the self is unencumbered,
then when we introspect we should perceive a pure self distinct or prior to a selfwith ends,
aims, ambitions, desires and so on. He says that since we do not in fact perceive this pure
self then the selfis in part constituted by the givens ofmy community. These givens are
inescapable. Kymlicka suggests that this argument is misleading since the liberal does not
deny that the self cannot be separated from its ends, but that the ends which I currently have
could be different. In other words although the selfmust have ends, it could have any set as
opposed to a particular given set (cfKymlicka 1990 p212). Sandel must argue, not that the
self cannot be separated from its ends, but the self cannot be separated from given ends. This
is an argument about the very nature of the self, which will be postponed.
Although in depth consideration ofthe selfhas been postponed, there are other social and
political aspects of communitarianism to be attended to. Taylor presents a social thesis,
which asserts that even ifthe liberals were right about choice, they emphasise it so much that
they ignore the very conditions for making that choice possible. Taylor's social thesis has
two elements: conceptual arguments and empirical arguments. Taylor's conceptual argument
is that ifthe ability to exercise choice requires a certain kind of society, then the society has
already been put above the individuals and communitarianism is endorsed. Kymlicka
expresses it: "It would be incoherent to put the rights of individuals above the good of
creating a society where those rights can be exercised" (Kymlicka 1989 p78).
Kymlicka seems to advance the counter-argument by suggesting that proposing constraints
so that people are able to choose is distinct from requiring a community to pursue a shared
ideal. He says, "there's nothing incoherent in saying that the common good for liberals is to
bring about a society governed by a politics ofneutral concern" (ibid.). But this is precisely
Taylor's point: it is incoherent in that it is self-contradicting!
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Taylor also puts forward an empirical argument in favour ofthe social thesis. If the ability to
exercise free choices depends on having a particular kind of liberal society, which it does,
then the proponents ofliberalism have an obligation to protect that kind of society and to
oppose those things that threaten it. Liberals must maintain a culture which enables free
choice. Now ofcourse liberals such as Dworkin and Rawls agree with Taylor but there is an
empirical difference in that the liberals appear to think such a culture is self-sustaining whilst
Taylor seems to suggest that such a culture is in danger of collapse.
For the liberal the requirements ofjustice ensure that a culture of choice is maintained and in
cases of conflict the justice considerations take precedence over or trump the implementation
of the common good. In Taylor's view, the increased centralisation of government and the
increase in political bureaucracy, threaten the culture that liberals require and the notion that
it is self-sustaining is socially naive. Now Kymlicka characterises Taylor as having saddled
the liberal position with "a lot of extraneous baggage" (Kymlicka 1989 p84) and having
proposed a counter-position which need not be communitarian. Historical and political
judgements are required here but these raise complex empirical issues which take us a long
way from classroom education, and so having noted the problems we move on.
A central issue that does concern us is the communitarian attitude towards minority groups.
The communitarians are strangely silent on the shared ends and practices that we can all
endorse. What is the communal ranking ofvalues? And how can the continued
marginalization, ifnot discrimination against ''blacks, gays, single mothers, non-Christians"
(ibid. p87) in certain parts of America be explained and defended? This is a real issue for
communitarians, although liberals have to face it too. It is arguable that the pursuit of a
liberal economy and cut-backs in the welfare state have themselves contributed to the lack of
appropriate care for minority groups.
Kymlicka cites McDonald (1987) who advances a defence of communitarianism against this
charge. He (McDonald) reiterates that our personal identity is inseparable from the
community to which we belong; our very selves are historical, social and cultural products.
He also quotes Kant to the effect that we all have a duty to respect others, and a part of that
respect for others is a respect for the community from which they derive all or part of their
identity. Minority rights are an extension ofwhat it is to treat individuals as persons. But for
communitarians not all minorities are necessarily to be tolerated; under what circumstances
are minority rights to be respected? McDonald answers that minorities which partake of a
form of life are to be acceptable. But what constitutes a form of life here? McDonald
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supplies two criteria: firstly a form oflife is found, discovered or given as opposed to chosen
or created. Additionally forms of life are characterised by shared projects, ends and general
conceptions ofthe good life (cf. Kymlicka 1989 p238).
Kymlicka goes on to suggest that this is really no help and cites the example of two French-
Canadians who share a certain inherited cultural identity, but whose life plans are totally
different. Exercising personal choice in matters of religious conviction, sexuality,
professional conduct and so on need not entail abandoning a particular French-Canadian
cultural identity (ibid. 1989 p239). However equally it may, and one may want to dissociate
from one's inherited form oflife. Kymlicka's riposte seems to me to miss the point. It says
nothing specifically about the rights (or otherwise) ofminority groups and fails to show the
precise fault with McDonald's position,. To put this another way: ifKymlicka's riposte is to
be successful then he must show that McDonald's distinction between forms oflife that we
are given (or that we discover), and those that we choose is not coherent or does not do the
'work' it is supposed to do. This difficulty is not unrelated to the difficulty we have already
considered: that ofindividuating forms of life.
This difficulty is compounded in that we do not simply belong (or not belong) to one
community only, but we belong to many overlapping communities: family, village,
workplace community, professional association or trade union, sports' club not to mention
nation, state or country. In the light of this I might consider myself as a marginalized
minority on one level, but the centre of community life at another. For example I might be
the centre of attention and fully part ofthe professional body to which I belong, but I may be
a marginalised, misunderstood and perhaps even discriminated-against member of the village
where I live.
Henry Tam talks of inclusive communities which are characterised by all citizens being
included in decision making processes. There is to be no hijacking of such processes by
authority. "Inclusive communities are to be distinguished from other forms ofcommunity by
their operative power relations, which enable all their members to participate in collective
processes affecting their lives" (Tam p8). He goes on to say that from a communitarian
perspective, changes need to be made so that citizens can develop in order to participate in
these processes at every level of society. "Such developments must involve changes to the
way citizens are educated, engaged in productive work for their communities, and enabled to
protect themselves from the threats to their common values" (ibid.).
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Tam envisages a hierarchy ofthreats: to life, physical damages, psychological damages,
economic deprivations and cultural deprivations. He suggests that there is a broad consensus
here but acknowledges that there are also areas ofdisagreement, which are "far from being
settled" (ibid. pI18). He discusses abortion, euthanasia, and drug use and suggests that "In
the absence of any general agreement on the basic principles involved the only thing we can
agree on in practice would be to guard against any single faction dictating to the others about
what is to be done. However, a call for compromise is not to be interpreted as a signal for
quasi-market negotiations that inevitably favour those in a stronger bargaining position"
(ibid.).
This concession is a difficult one, and raises more questions about the place ofminorities or
more precisely the toleration ofminorities than it solves. For the possibility of compromise
seems to offer the possibility of a minority group pursuing its ends against the wishes ofthe
majority, on the grounds of there being no universal agreement. Issues surrounding abortion
seem particularly apt here, but also pertinent questions could be asked about the degree of
toleration ofeuthanasia, animal experimentation or recreational drug use. Tam admits the
communitarian approach is not always clear cut in such cases (P120), but then a slide
towards liberalism, which seems to undermine the communitarian position, seems a real
possibility.
Taylor is perhaps more radical and wants to include the communal sharing ofqualities that
are not necessarily found or discovered, but are part ofthe groups conception ofthe common
good. Taylor makes no appeal to the right ofindividuals, but appeals to the fundamental
right ofthe community. Extending his position concerning the essentially dialogic nature of
human interaction, and illustrating how an interaction can be more than the sum of individual
parts he says: "One could never describe what it is to be on an intimate footing with someone
in terms of monological states. On a transpersonal, institutional level, the same difference
can play an important role" (Taylor 1989apI68). Kymlicka characterises the position:
"Special protection ofthe historical community, including the shared choices of its members,
may not be justified on the grounds of treating individuals as equals. But there is some
independent claim by the community itself to equal treatment" (Kymlicka 1989 p241).
Now Kymlicka regards this position as incoherent for he says: "Groups have no moral claim
to well being independently of their members, groups just aren't the right sort ofbeings to
have moral status. They don't feel pain or pleasure. It is individual sentient beings whose
lives go better or worse, who suffer or flourish" (ibid. p242). But again this seems to beg the
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question, for surely the heart ofthe communitarian claim is that communities can suffer or
flourish, and can rejoice or mourn qua community?
There is a fmal and important point which Taylor makes in his essay "Cross Purposes: The
Liberal-Communitarian Debate" to which we must now turn. Taylor says much of the
communitarian-liberal debate is at cross-purposes because there are two fundamental
communitarian theses which are not properly distinguished. Taylor identifies an ontological
issue and an advocacy issue. The ontological issue concerns "what you recognise as the
factors you will invoke to account for social life" (Taylor 1989a p159). Taylor characterises
this as a debate between atomists and holists: those who believe communal identity is
accounted for in terms of individual identities, and those who believe individuals are formed
by their communities. And of course there are shades in between.
The advocacy issue is the moral issue and again is a continuum between those who give
primacy to individual rights and those who give primacy to the community. Taylor
characterises these positions as individualist and collectivist, and again recognises shades in
between.
Taylor's point is that whilst these issues are not unrelated the adoption of a particular
ontological stance does not logically commit one to a particular advocacy stance. Taylor
identifies atomist individualists (Nozick), holist collectivists (Marx), holist individualists
(Humboldt) and atomist collectivists although he says these are only "for the student of the
bizarre or the monstrous" (ibid. pI63). Taylor suggests conflation ofthese two categories is
the source ofmuch muddled thinking. In particular he characterises Sandel's position in
Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice as an ontological one, but suggests that the liberal
response to it has "generally been as a work of advocacy" (ibid. p160). Sandel's thesis of the
situated self does not logically commit him to advocacy of anything! Taylor emphasises that
we must be aware of the multi-faceted nature of the communitarian-liberal debate and with
this in mind we turn to consider some ofthe implications ofcommunitarianism for education
and our concept of frameworks.
Tam devotes a whole chapter ofhis book to education, and begins by saying the aim of
education is to enable citizens to participate fully in inclusive communities. He underlines
that education is not to be seen as the function of schools and colleges only, but is the
responsibility ofresearch institutions, the media and parents too. Tam notes the increased
crime rates in the USA and stresses the importance ofvalues in education but is quick to
point out that these cannot be imposed by authority.
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The communitarian seeks co-operative solutions to problems based on values of love,
wisdom, justice and fulfilment which he considers in turn. Tam says that instead of adopting
a neutral policy that excludes intolerance teachers must genuinely care for their pupils, they
must communicate the importance of love and compassion and must have special regard for
those pupils deprived oflove. They must fight against those "false values" (Tam p60) that
undermine loving relationships: that is discrimination based on sex, religion, race etc ..
A commitment to wisdom rules out irrationality and indoctrination but also underlines that
knowledge is not just the assimilation ofraw facts. Pupils' knowledge must be coherently
organised, or as Tam puts it: pupils must be introduced to the "epistemological reality that
knowledge is embedded in discursive communities" (ibid. p64). All claims to knowledge are
to be validated and when appropriate modified, in a spirit of co-operative enquiry, he says.
On the face of it this is not dissimilar to a Hirstian-type claim about forms ofknowledge but
whereas Hirst would see the 'discursive embedding' as a logical function of the subject
matter itself (its internal grammar etc.), Tam sees this embedding more in terms ofreal
communities. Putting words in to Tam's mouth perhaps, but I would imagine that a
distinction between discursive communities and real communities would be one Tam would
hesitate to draw.
Justice is to be based on a spirit of "imagined reciprocity" (P61) where a pupil is to be taught
to consider how he would feel as a recipient of a proposed action or omission. The notion of
discipline is first and foremost a notion of self-discipline or self-mastery, based on a
principle offaimess not fear. Tam acknowledges the possibility of dissension within the
community here, but contrasts the Rawlsian notion ofabstracted agents behind a veil of
ignorance, with communitarians whose "inclusive community would rely on citizens with a
deep appreciation oftheir common values, [and] to consider together and choose the
principles with which they could live" (ibid.).
Finally, the increased prevalence ofboredom is to be countered by the teaching ofhow
fulfilment is to be sought. Pupils are to be inspired by exemplary teachers both in their
academic studies and in other 'non-academic' activities. In all things the teacher is to guide,
not to impose authority, and there is to be a shared search for the truth which is not allowed
to collapse in to the assumption that everything can be challenged.
Tam is realistic about some of the practical problems involved in his suggestions and
acknowledges the need for smaller class sizes, he suggests teachers need more thorough
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teacher training, and suggest teachers' status and salaries should be brought in to line with
those of doctors and lawyers. However there is no adequate explanation ofhow co-operative
enquiry is to overcome the deep and profound disagreements that are found in modem
society, both inside and outside the classroom. At the beginning ofMacIntyre's After Virtue
the seeming intractability of some contemporary moral dilemmas is discussed, and it almost
seems as ifTam was not aware ofthis or perhaps finds it more convenient to ignore it?
Similarly it is in the very nature of teenagers to disagree with one another and it is often the
case that when co-operative enquiry fails, a decision must be made by someone with
appropriate authority. Now it may be countered that this is a reflection of the kind of society
we currently live in, and when communitarianism is more widely understood and practised
this would not occur, but is seems the burden ofproofhere lies with the communitarians and
has not been adequately met.
Tam goes on to stress the importance of the role ofparents in education. Parenting is a
responsibility which citizens must undertake, and must be helped to undertake, and issues
surrounding traditional and single-parent families are discussed, but the well being of
children is to be the paramount concern. There is to be recognition that the community may
curtail the private rights ofparents and in particular parents are not to teach their children
values which are opposed to the values ofthe community.
Finally, we should note that Tam distinguishes between guiding values and comprehensive
values. Guiding values are central to inclusive communities but do not prescribe behaviour
in every situation, they offer more general norms. Comprehensive values by contrast purport
to cover every situation. Tam says that a school "dominated by a set of comprehensive
guidelines would suffocate intellectual and cultural diversity" (ibid. p77), but he also
recognises that there is a continuous scale here. Indeed he suggests that the guiding values
might be thickened in the interests of Islamic, Hindu, Catholic, (etc.) traditions and
communities. Schools should be able to encourage their respective pupils in a faith or
tradition so long as this does not undermine social cohesion through depriving them of a
common core ofguiding values (cf. Tam p78).
Little has been said so far offrameworks, but undoubtedly Tam is proposing a framework
here and indeed he uses the word himself. Citizens are to ''use their own initiative in a
framework that best guarantees the realisation ofthe good for all" (ibid. p59). The core
guiding values possibly supplemented by additional traditional or religious values pursued in
a spirit ofnon-authoritarian co-operative enquiry is the framework that Tam proposes.
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Some similar points are made in the recent collection: Education for Values edited by Roy
Gardner and co.. Robert Fisher (chapter 4) says communities should give a voice to all
individuals and permit them to vote in accord with democratic principles. Critical reasoning
not convention should be the arbiter ofmoral judgement and the community should be
organic in the sense that its procedures and values should be open to adaptation (cf Gardner
p54). He goes on to characterise a community ofenquiry which additionally has shared
experiences, meanings and voluntary communications (Gardner p55) and this is seen this as
a paradigm for the classroom.
Fisher too, challenges the idea that learners are "solo learners who do most ofthe intellectual
work oflearning inside their own heads" (ibid. p56) and emphasises the social, physical and
symbolic aspects of cognition. Teachers are to manage and exercise executive control over
group learning, which sounds a fine ideal until we read that "children and their teacher sit in
a circle" (ibid. p57)! This immediately suggests to me a gap in understanding, a gap which
fails to recognise a distinction between a discussion of an ideal community of enquiry and a
real classroom situation. Serious models of community learning need not entail sitting in a
circle!
There are issues surrounding both what pupils can actually discover for themselves and what
they need to be taught (told!) by a better informed person. This of course raises questions
about the very nature of education itself Additionally there are questions ofgroup discipline,
which the ideal model fails to address. Real children get bored easily, have their own selfish
agendas and are at times deliberately and purposefully disruptive and malicious. An appeal
to co-operative enquiry, or group discussion on such occasion would in my view be
inappropriate and very likely impossible. If a group spent prolonged periods of time (which
it well might) discussing internal discipline issues, would it ever get to the substantive core
of the enquiry?
John Annette (chapter 8) discusses citizenship studies and community in the light ofrecent
political change and with reference to a large body ofreports, recommendations and other
written materials. In particular he points on the one hand to research that shows there is a
significant proportion of secondary teachers who feel uncomfortable with citizenship
education as it is value-laden and inappropriate for the multicultural classroom. On the other
hand he points out that Nick Tate as chief executive of QCA has urged that British values be
a central part of citizenship education (see ibid. pl12).
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Apart from the obvious difficulties of 'British values' Annette suggests that it is crucial to
clarify how "education for citizenship can recognise difference while providing a framework
for a shared political identity based on historical tradition and contemporary social and
political reality" (ibid.). He does not offer a clarification but emphasises that this is the
central challenge.
Michael Totterdell (chapter 9) discusses ethical frameworks in the context of the
professional preparation and formation of teachers. Whilst this is not our direct concern his
remarks about frameworks in education generally are illuminating, and provide insights as to
what a framework is. He suggests that the moral role ofteachers is increasing, and in the
light ofthis he suggests teachers need to be adequately trained and prepared. He says: "if
teaching is to sustain its claim to professional status, it not only needs a professional
structure, supported by a framework ofnational standards but also a professional ethic, based
on a sense of collective responsibility" (Gardner p129).
Acknowledging MacIntyre, Totterdell says a key role of ethics is to help individuals pursue
their te/os "that is, the 'good life' ofhuman flourishing in community" (ibid. p133). The
community is an essential part ofTotterdell's understanding here and relates to his
understanding ofpersons whose identity is constituted through relations with others. In
virtue ofbeing a teacher the teacher teaches something to somebody. There is an inescapable
dialogic aspect to the very identity of one who teaches and right behaviour for the teacher is
therefore right behaviour qua teacher. Being good is to be understood as being good in one's
role, that is teachers' professional practices and their actions as moral agents are inseparable.
Having said this Totterdell rules out any "attempt to assert ethical proprietary rights over
teachers-in-the-making" (P137) and describes approaches "that provide little moral
sustenance" as "unsatisfactory" (ibid.) and he reasserts that "Notions of competence....need
to be re-appropriated within a framework which gives more space for the exploration of
educational values underlying 'good' practice and encourages a morally serious conversation
about the insights and aspirations of education" (ibid. p138).
To summarise all ofthis I want to make three points. Firstly I want to acknowledge the
difficulty in individuating communities and I recognise that we simultaneously belong to
several which are not necessarily disjoint. However each community to which we do belong
is one in which (as Tam says) we all have a say, but within the context of the values of the
community. There is both a dynamic and dialogic exchange and an acceptance of common
values.
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Secondly I embrace Taylor's argument and accept that morals and values are not just an
individual concern. This is true both in the genesis ofvalues; the set ofvalues that a person
comes to hold is in part determined by the community to which they belong. And also, and
perhaps more significantly the values an individual holds cannot be divorced from the
community to which they belong. To repeat Taylor's remark, "being a selfis inescapable
from living in a space ofmoral issues" (Taylor 1989b pIl2). The self can only choose in the
context of the community to which it belongs.
Thirdly then, I think it follows from this that any attempt to teach values must recognise and
indeed explicate this connection between the values that an individual holds and his or her
community. I think an inescapable part ofvalues education must be an understanding ofthe
extent to which community shapes and contains our moral life and the life ofvalues more
generally. To put this in my terminology, the shared values of a community will and must
permeate any values education framework. A framework must have a component based on
community and this communal component must be recognised and integrated with the other
two. It is to the details of this overall picture that we now turn.
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V Frameworks for Values Education
The concept of framework can and has been used in a variety ofdifferent ways. It is
therefore worth reiterating that the kind of framework that is to be established here is a
framework for teaching values in schools. It is to be expected that there would be certain
moral and perhaps theological norms at the heart of such a framework, but the preceding
discussion indicates that a framework for teaching values would and must be much richer
than this. Firstly the framework would include a common language and a shared form of life
to underpin it. Secondly the framework would embody certain "epistemic machinery": a
commitment to a certain understanding oftruth and rationality, ways ofarguing and
procedures for establishing validity and veracity. This machinery could not be simply
invented or devised, but is historically rooted in tradition and embodies certain recognised
practices and narrative patterns. Thirdly, a framework is not only rooted in a historical
tradition but is also shared or communal. It is both established by and definitive of the
community and as such shapes and forms individuals within it. A framework for teaching
values is therefore not just about the values themselves although these are not unimportant,
but is a more comprehensive commitment to ways of living.
A number ofpositions have been considered which distance themselves from various forms
of individualism expressed succinctly in Herder's phrase that every man is his own measure
and reified in the classroom by an approach to teaching that aims to present pupils with the
relevant 'facts' concerning moral and value questions and encourages them to choose their
stance. This approach to teaching seems to bend over backwards to avoid the charge of
indoctrination, emphasises personal autonomy as the summum bonum, and aims to encourage
each pupil to create his or her own framework, or what we might characterise as a
framework-for-one. It should already be clear that I do not consider such a framework to be a
genuine framework for it does not pay sufficient heed to the place of tradition in society;
education as the teaching of shared practices. Nor does a framework-for-one accommodate
our essential dialogic nature and the role of the individual in a community. However the
framework-for-one does playa useful and instructive role if considered as one extreme or
endpoint of a sliding scale.
At the other end of this sliding scale would be some kind ofuniversal framework, a
framework that everybody would agree to and in this context John White's discussion of
cosmic frameworks and the SCAA recommendations on values is relevant. In his inaugural
lecture as professor, White examines the notions ofpersonal well-being, human flourishing
and the idea of a framework. He asks whether "personal well-being needs to be understood
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against some kind ofcosmic framework" (White 1995 p7) and suggests that some kind of
framework is required for values to have any existence or meaning at all. He also suggests
that the work ofwriters such as MacIntyre, Taylor, Raz and Nussbaum point towards the
concept of a framework as a backdrop to personal well-being.
He suggests three possible kinds of cosmic framework. Firstly, Christianity in which the will
of God is seen as the source of a framework from which the notions of good and right are
ultimately derived. Secondly, he suggests, some non-theistic Platonic form of the Good
which somehow "irradiates our value-world" (ibid. p7), but suggests these theistic,
supernatural or even natural frameworks carry an epistemological price tag which is too
great; for neither can we know the will of God, nor, as he puts it, can we "interrogate nature"
(ibid. p8) and make any relevant discovery. Thirdly he wonders if a cosmic framework is not
to be found in human nature itself and suggests a framework which is innate, rooted in our
very nature; "a product of our human world" (ibid.).
White is aware of the difficulties surrounding such cosmic frameworks, but he does also
speak of social frameworks (note the plural). Social frameworks relate to one's family,
friends, political community and other social groups. However White hints that there must
be something behind these ifwe are not to confront a world with "no apparent meaning or
purpose" (P14). He suggests some thin cosmic framework must underpin a thicker social
framework for everyday life.
In a similar way many who have the task of teaching values are aware of a profound
uncertainty or even a void at the centre ofwhat they are trying to do. It has been thought that
schools might do a better job ifthere was a reliable source ofvalues supported and agreed by
society, and it was to this end that delegates at the School Curriculum and Assessment
Authority's meeting "Education for Adult Life" on 15 January 1996 recommended the
creation of the National Forum for Values in Education and the Community. The initial
consultation document states SCAA set up the Forum to make recommendations on: "ways
in which schools might be supported in making their contribution to pupils' spiritual, moral,
social and cultural development" and "to what extent there is any agreement on the values
attitudes and behaviour that schools should promote on society's behalf' (SCAA 1996a).
The Forum consisted of 150 members nominated by a variety of groups with an interest in
education, and from a broad cross-section of society. The members were divided in to ten
groups which each met on three occasions. One of the outcomes ofthese meetings was the
SCAA document Education for Adult Life: the spiritual and moral development ofyoung
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people published in July 1996. Whilst the Forum emphasised that there was no agreement
about the source ofvalues that we share, nor on how to apply the values that we share there
was overwhelming support for a list ofvalues that we do share and which form a framework
for discussion. These values are listed under four headings: Society, Relationships, the Self
and the Environment and include such things as respect for the dignity of all people,
developing a sense of self-worth, preserving areas ofbeauty wherever possible etc. (Cf.
SCAA 1996b pp3-4)
These finding were further endorsed by a MORl omnibus poll of 1500 adults, approximately
95% ofwhom agreed with the values outlined in the Forum's statement. This consensus
confirmed the view that there is a set ofvalues to which we all agree, but we have to ask
does this constitute a framework for teaching values in schools, for the Forum's report was
not without its critics.
Briefly these criticism were firstly that the values were obvious and couched in terms to
avoid disagreement, to which Talbot and Tate reply, of course! (Talbot and Tate p3) Given
the aim was to find a list ofvalues to which all could agree this is hardly a surprise or a
substantive. criticism.
Secondly it has been said that so few people live up to these values that they are not our
values, whatever the supposed consensus might be. This criticism misses the point that
values are ideals, goals to strive for, and even when we fall short this does not itself
invalidate our ideals or values. Thirdly, it is said that The Forum's agreed list ofvalues
avoids areas of controversy and disagreement. It says nothing on how pupils should deal
with moral conflict. Again supporters of the Forum's report point out that the Forum's remit
was to decide ifthere are any values that we all share, not to solve the problems with which
theologians and philosophers continue to wrestle! The agreed values are supposed to be a
starting point, a set of agreed initial premises from which debate can develop.
Finally and continuing from the point above, the Forum recommended that SCAA produce
guidance for schools on spiritual, moral, social and cultural education, but guidance that
could be adapted by schools. The Forum's list of agreed values is a starting point, to be
adapted by schools as their own circumstances dictate and in consultation with the local
community (cf. SCAA 1996b pI6).
To summarise, in contrast to the notion of a framework-for-one there has been some
discussion ofuniversal frameworks for values education, but those who propose these are
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insistent that these very general proposals must be instantiated locally. White underlines that
his cosmic frameworks underpin social frameworks, and SCAA's list ofagreed values is to
be a starting point for concrete school and community partnerships. Even given that a
framework for values education must occupy a point between the extremes of 'social
extension' we may still ask how exactly will this work? More detail is required to answer the
question ofhow a compromise position is to be found.
Something of a compromise position is recognised by the Norwegian Signe Sandsmark who
speaks ofworld view rather than framework. She says, "A world view would normally
include beliefs about the nature ofreality, the existence ofa god, the nature ofman, life after
death and ethics" (Sandsmark 2000 p6). She adds religions are world views but have an
added dimension ofworship.
She goes on to say that every person has a world view however fragmented or unconsciously
held; and that this has an 'inside' and an 'outside'. The outside is made of collective socio-
cultural and public elements, the inside personal and subjective, a product of experience and
emotion. She concludes, "A person's world view is influenced by and depends on both
traditional world views and the society he or she is a part of; but there is also room for
personal variation and decision" (ibid.).
Before continuing it is necessary to distinguish Sandsmark's world view from the kind of
framework I have in mind. Although I think there are many similarities it is important to note
in particular that Sandsmark seems to suggest that liberalism is, or could function as a world
view, although this is one she rejects. In contrast I do not think that liberalism can function
as an educational framework. The reason for this is tied up with Sandsmark's view that we
all have a world view, individually as it were even if fragmented and unconsciously held;
whereas I think there is an essential "sharedness" about a framework. It must be held in
common as it is a product of common language and tradition. As an aside it is perhaps worth
noting that this point relates to a difference between a protestant Christianity which
emphasises the nature of each individual's relationship with God and a more Catholic
approach which emphasises God's universal salvific purpose and is latent within the
positions that both MacIntyre and Taylor adopt.
For the purposes of education I propose that each school should have its own framework
which should be loosely rooted within a wider world view. As the school is the principal
locus ofmost pupils' formal educational experience it is a natural unit for such a framework.
I think an individual year group or class is too narrow a unit and would fail to recognise the
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communal nature ofthe school as a whole. This nature is inherent in that pupils move from
one part of the school to another over time, and that special or solemn occasions are usually
celebrated by whole school gatherings: e.g. end of term services or assemblies, prize giving,
sports day etc.. I also think that a geographical region or LEA would be too large a unit, as
there need to be different kinds of school in a given locality to reflect and enhance the
plurality of society itself. When I say that each school should have its own framework this
need not entail that each school have its own unique framework. This could be the case, but
much more likely is that similar schools would adopt similar frameworks as best suit their
educational aims and ethos. It may well be that the number of distinct frameworks is quite
small or that there may be a number ofvariations clustered around a handful of 'core'
frameworks.
Michael Smith seems to endorse a similar point when he writes of schools as communities
and says: "Each [school] has its own moral practice, and although there may be 'familial'
overlaps between schools as regards their moral practice or their 'prevailing winds', it is
nevertheless a defining feature of individual schools that they have their own customs and
professional practices derived from their moral practice, which distinguish them from other
schools" (Smith 1999 p324). He goes on to say, "each school community provides a non-
prescriptive framework in which professional reflection, choice and action can take place"
(ibid.).
The question is what will be included and what will be excluded from each framework? In
Sandsmark's terms what will constitute the outside, the given ofthe framework and what
will constitute the inside, the open-ended element where a degree ofpersonal choice is to be
encouraged? I think that this is a question which can largely be answered by reference to
language, tradition and community. That is to say considerations oflanguage, tradition and
community are ways ofunderstanding or explaining what a framework for values education
must be like. They are the lenses through which the framework comes into focus. It is true
that there are problems individuating languages, traditions and communities but I would
suggest that these are perhaps more akin to family resemblance terms rather than precise
categories, and are not irredeemably obscure. Remember Peters' aim of illuminating
concepts and links between them, even when precise definitions are elusive.
I think education generally and values education in particular should take place in a language
that all the pupils understand; a language that they all share and with the exception of
multilingual or very able pupils this would normally be their mother tongue. It is worth
noting that many foreign countries have English schools. These are sometimes international
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schools where English is the lingua franca or most commonly spoken language, but there are
also English schools for English pupils abroad in many places. Why are there so few if any
foreign language schools in Britain for students whose principal language is not English? I
would be happy to see Arabic (language) schools for Arabs and Muslims, Indian (language)
schools for Indians and so on. I would insist that the study ofEnglish was a principal
component of the curriculum and I would encourage social integration outside school but I
do not see why this could not be done in the medium ofthe mother tongue.
Although mundane - the reason behind this suggestion is practical in part - surely pupils will
be hindered in their learning if they do not adequately understand the language in which they
are being taught. However the question of language goes deeper and Cardinal Martini has
observed that "it is nonetheless evident that the names of things do have importance because
a name is not an arbitrary thing but rather the product ofan act of intelligence and
comprehension that, when shared with someone else, brings the recognition, however
theoretical of shared values" (Eco ands Martini p29). A pupil has to be sufficiently
competent in a language (relative to his or her age) for this intelligence and comprehension
to be possible.
John Rae also underlines that I am only able to be tolerant towards another's position when I
am secure in my own, and to be secure in my position I must understand it and be able to
articulate it. Tolerance is not passive acquiescence but is active and based on understanding.
And recall from Wittgenstein, understanding is not some private, inner state but is manifest
in the ability to enter into and continue dialogue; to be a fluent user of a language (cf. Rae p
8).
Therefore I think we may say that a framework presupposes a common language, or more
technically a shared language is a necessary component of a values education framework.
In the light of chapter two above, it hardly needs repeating that when we talk of sharing a
language there is more to it than sharing a vocabulary although this is important! There is an
implicit background to language that we share, and as we saw above playing a language
game presupposes a form of life. This form oflife is in part epistemological, like
Sandsmark's world view, it consists ofthings that we believe and possibly the way in which
we organise those beliefs but there is more to it than that. It also consists ofthe things that
we do and the way that we do them. Wittgenstein tells us that language is embedded in
communal activity and George Vesey's example (considered above) which points to a link
between the concept ofland ownership and patterns ofgrazing, emphasises this
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embeddedness. I am suggesting that a shared language and a shared form of life go hand in
hand and that our attempts to teach values must accommodate this.
It may be countered that my assertion is simply not true. There are many millions who speak
English for example, as a second language and do not share a form oflife. Similarly it may
be said that many Europeans do share a form of life but do not share a language. We can
imagine groups ofpeople in France and groups in England who are alike in almost every
way (who share a form oflife) but speak different languages. What then is the significance
of language? The answer lies, I think, in the fact that we are speaking of education. Weare
not talking here ofreflective multilingual adults, but ofchildren, and children in an
educational setting where language, forms of life and abstract concepts are introduced,
nurtured and developed. In this educational context language has a heightened role, and
although it is perhaps more of a psychological than a philosophical point I think the use of a
shared language is inextricably connected to a shared form of life and a conceptual
development that goes with it.
Further, I want to say that a form of life is to a large extent constituted by shared practices
and the resonance ofthis term is wholly intentional but needs to be further examined. Recall
that in MacIntyre's analysis a practice is a goal directed human activity, which is given its
sense by being part of a narrative. Furthermore the practice has internal goods which are
realised in the pursuit ofthe practice.
For example, imagine I am teaching young children the importance oftelling the truth, and
perhaps I tell a suitable fable in which a person who lies come to a sticky end. This lesson is
in one sense an end in itself, it has an internal good, namely the teaching oftruth telling. But
this is not coherent unless there is some wider teaching agenda and some attempt to show
how truth telling is connected with the prohibition on stealing, with notions offidelity in
relationships and with concepts ofjustice generally. In MacIntyrean terms the practice of
truth telling must be located within a wider narrative. The individual lesson on truth telling
must be part of a wider framework. Hence a further clue to what a framework must be, is
afforded by a re-examination ofMacIntyre's notion ofnarrative.
From his consideration ofHomeric and Icelandic epics, MacIntyre suggests that the epic
narrative has a threefold structure. Firstly the individual has or inhabits a social role.
Secondly, there is a conception ofthe qualities or virtues that the individual requires to fulfil
this role and thirdly there is a notion of the fragility and vulnerability of the human condition
and its ultimate end in death. These three elements cannot be properly understood without
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the other two and MacIntyre writes, "all three elements can find their interrelated place only
within a larger unitary framework. ..... The framework is the narrative form of epic or saga"
(MacIntyre 1981 pl29).
In other words individual actions only make sense within a wider setting. This setting has
temporal and teleological elements; the order and the reasons for which I do things is
important, and MacIntyre calls this a narrative. Indeed without a narrative my actions are
rendered senseless. Not only does the narrative give my actions sense, but also it provides a
coherence for my very identity. MacIntyre is critical ofboth empiricist and analytic
philosophers' attempts to define personal identity in terms ofpsychological states or events,
as they both "fail to see that a background has been omitted" (ibid. p2l7). To put it another
way I am not principally a chooser, shaping my own destiny as emphasised by liberalism,
but I am a discoverer and in searching for what I might or ought to do I enter a narrative
quest. I am both the subject ofmy own life-to-death narrative and a player in a wider
narrative (just as others are players in my narrative) and I am both accountable for, and able
to ask for account of, actions.
What this means for education is that teaching values is not just about teaching individual
lessons but is also about teaching pupils about the intelligibility of life, which derives from
locating themselves within a personal and social narrative. My pupil, ifhe is to behave
coherently, cannot do just as he likes but is (morally) constrained by the narratives ofwhich
he is a part. Hence my values education framework must recognise and reflect the narrative
nature ofthe self. It must be a structure enabling a pupil to be taught that he has a position
and a role within society, from which his identity and the intelligibility ofhis actions are
derived. But this personal narrative itself is not free-floating: it derives its status from
historical precedent and other members of society; from tradition and community.
Much has already been said about tradition but recall that a tradition underpins a personal
narrative, it is the historical and social context into which the individual is born and which is
handed on to him. MacIntyre does not see this as a fixed canon, an immutable constitution,
but as an evolving entity. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, MacIntyre insists that
the meaning of concepts and the notion of rationality itself is only coherent within a
particular tradition and he gives examples of those who are debarred from debate because
they do not share in the relevant tradition. (Thrasymachus is silent throughout nine books of
the Republic! (MacIntyre 1988 p75)) Mulhall and Swift express it "A tradition is constituted
by a set ofpractices and is a mode ofunderstanding their importance and worth; it is the
medium by which practices are shaped and transmitted across generations. Traditions can be
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primarily religious or moral (for example Catholicism or humanism), economic (for example
a particular craft or profession, trade union or manufacturer), aesthetic (for example modes
ofliterature or painting), or geographical (for example crystallising around the particular
culture ofa house, village or region)" (Mulhall and Swift p90).
A part ofvalues education then, must be a recognition that our values are located within a
tradition which has formed them. Even ifthe tradition is not fully defined and articulated, the
role ofhistorical development needs to be recognised and studied, in order that we better
understand our beliefs and our practices. It is worth emphasising the historical dimension
here and underlining that ifa pupil is to understand his values, his beliefs and practices then
he needs some historical context. Not a full-blooded study ofthe history ofvalues
necessarily, but some notion ofwhere his values came from. It is worth noting that firstly
this is not to suggest that historical study or context is all that matters, because then any set
ofvalues with a history would do! The influence ofthe community and its response to this
history is relevant too. Secondly it is important to note that the emphasis on historical
awareness is at odds with SCAA suggestions and some forms ofliberalism, which emphasise
a foundation based upon a presently existing consensus rather than historical development.
The notion ofa tradition as an underpinning of any values system suggests to me that history
cannot be simply ignored.
However, this does not suggest and need not entail a slavish devotion to continuity for
discontinuity, evolution and even revolution within traditions are to be recognised too. This
is a point that MacIntyre makes, and in a diverse and multi-cultural setting it is obvious that
a pupil's values education is not the only thing that will influence him. The persuasiveness of
other influences may encourage him to develop or even abandon his 'home' tradition. It may
be conceded that the more culturally isolated a tradition is the less likely this will be, but
there are few ifany completely isolated traditions these days and so powerful or not, the
impetus for development and change will be present.
To summarise the argument so far: we have said that a shared language is a necessary
component of a values education framework. We have gone on to suggest that for children in
an educational context a shared language goes hand in hand with a shared form of life and
that this is constituted by shared practices which are only intelligible in that they are a part of
a human narrative. This narrative itself is part ofa broader historically constituted tradition
and therefore tradition is a second necessary component of a values education framework. In
other words when we teach values we must recognise and indeed explicate to pupils that we
cannot choose any old values, or the ones we would like, but are necessarily constrained by
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historical and cultural forces. In some ways the point is clearer when expressed negatively: a
failure to recognise the place of tradition and the effect that it has, will lead to disconnected
human narratives, meaningless practices and hence, confusion about values.
As mentioned above MacIntyre in ThreeRival Versions ofMoral Enquiry does give a model
ofhow this might work in the university setting. Each university would have its own agreed
standards ofmorality and standards of rational agreement to which its students would be
expected to adhere. There would be a fundamental homogeneity based upon a consensus and
a shared tradition. The role of the university would then be to pursue studies and develop
ideas within its own tradition and to challenge and respond to those ofother traditions.
Can we imagine a school system like this? We might have a number of Christian schools
representing different Christian denominations, Islamic, Jewish and Hindu schools; perhaps
politically orientated schools, Conservative, Marxist, green; and a more wide spread
distribution of schools specialising in music, sport, ballet and the like. It is easy to imagine
possible networks of such schools serving different geographical areas, and parents and
pupils choosing the particular school they like the most, or they feel is most appropriate. We
can, I suggest, imagine this all too easily and at the same time we recoil from the idea
perhaps even with horror. We must ask why is this, but also, we must consider can this
imagined school system be legitimately inferred from MacIntyre's remarks about
universities which are by no means fully developed?
Firstly, we feel uncomfortable with the idea of a child choosing so narrowly at an early age.
We do not want dogmatic theologians, fanatical politicians, or sports superstars who have no
other interests. We want broadly and roundly educated pupils. But not only do we want
roundly educated pupils, the very exclusivity implied by such choice raises a number of
practical ifnot political difficulties. Surely it would be better to pursue a broad curriculum
which allowed natural talent to emerge. There may be a place for specially focussed
academies but these will surely be the exception rather than the norm.
Secondly if our system is motivated by considerations of tradition it becomes crucial to
know what exactly constitutes a tradition and how they are to be individuated. For example it
is not clear that Catholicism, green politics and cricket playing (say) represent different
traditions for we can readily imagine a Catholic, green cricket player. It may be here, that the
choice of categories is fortuitous for it is much harder to imagine a Catholic Marxist or a
Quaker at a military academy! This makes me think that traditions are to be understood as
more broadly demarcated than the multiplicity ofschool-types above might suggest. A
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tradition is a broad thing and can accommodate much variety. Having said this, at the same
time it must be recognised that there are certain differences that cannot be accommodated
within a single tradition and fundamental disagreements do exist..
Further light is shed on this by consideration of a point made by Horton and Mendus who
question the coherence ofMaclntyre' s position and describe him as "interestingly Janus-
faced" (Horton and Mendus p13). They argue that on the one hand MacIntyre recognises a
number of rival traditions with a rightful claim to pursue serious study, which are to politely
and seriously interact with one another. And on the other hand he strongly rejects a basic
liberalism and points to the exercise of authority within traditions, the need to safeguard
traditions and the exclusion of those who do not agree with the tenets of the tradition.
I think it has to be said here that the multiplicity oftraditions which Horton and Mendus
imagine is much wider than that which MacIntyre has in mind. Liberalism suggests a wide
diversity ofpositions and Horton and Mendus interpret this as a wide diversity oftraditions
or stemming from a wide diversity of traditions. When MacIntyre talks ofdifferent traditions
he only seems to have a handful in mind, although the difficulty ofhow many traditions
there are and how we distinguish between them remains. MacIntyre speaks ofHomeric,
Aristotelian, Augustinian and later Thomist traditions, which observe, are not temporally co-
existent, and two or possibly three are all we could imagine in a particular locality. He also
talks ofthe "Scottish tradition" (MacIntyre 1988 p326) but again it does not make sense to
talk of a multiplicity ofnational traditions all present in one place.
Further MacIntyre suggests that the relationships between individuals and traditions are
various; ranging from unproblematic allegiance, to opposition which may extend as far as
attempting to amend the tradition. Additionally there is a strong sense that we do not choose
a tradition (at least not initially) as the liberals would seem to have it, but find ourselves in
one, inhabiting one and although we may subsequently undergo conversion that is a separate
matter. In so far as education implies an initial formation, it is within a given tradition
although we might subsequently move from one tradition for another.
What is important here for education is the idea of commensurability. We can ignore the
debate about whether commensurability is coextensive with tradition, as MacIntyre seems to
maintain or whether commensurability is more fundamental as Mason suggests and simply
say that the requirement oftradition in a framework for values education is that the values
we teach must be internally commensurable. This means that they are all derived from a
basic set ofpremises to which all agree. There may be conclusions drawn from these
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premises which are not universally accepted but this is legitimate diversity within the
tradition. Rationality and fundamental premises are not disputed. There is space here for
pupils to question received values, to learn through the exploration and even creation of
values but crucially the search for truth does not entail that everything may be questioned
and challenged.
The tradition component of a framework for values education is the requirement that there
are certain basic premises, and certain modes ofreasoning which are historically and
culturally produced and which are not open to question. In order that values education be a
coherent and worthwhile endeavour pupils should be educated alongside those who share the
same base premises and an agreed mode ofreasoning. I suggest those who do not share base
premises and modes ofreasoning would be better served by a separate programme ofvalues
education.
At this stage it would perhaps be appropriate to consider some real examples of sets ofbase
premises or consider different modes ofreasoning, but if these practical queries can be left
aside at present there is another theoretical issue to be examined. This arises since the
requirement oftradition has an inherent vagueness that needs further examination. Suppose
two people or two groups ofpeople, call them A and B, have a shared rationality and each
has a set ofbase premises. Suppose further that 80% ofB's base premises are identical to
80% A's base premises but 20% differ. Are these the same tradition and are they to have a
common values education or is separate provision required? And what if the 80:20 ratio
changes? And what ifwe have a groups A, B, C, D etc. who each have sets of overlapping
but non-identical base premises, what happens then? Must there be a great multiplicity of
values education programmes, or can there be a common programme or a small number of
programmes?
There seem to be two possible ways of approaching this set of difficulties. The first is to
deny that these all these varying groups could actually exist. We might say that tradition is so
pervasive and the number of sets ofbase premises is so small that there are very few
different groups. These groups should have separate values education provision, but as they
are only a handful this is not a problem. This is something of a MacIntyrean answer, as he
frequently seems to infer that there are fewer separate traditions than many ofhis critics
would seem to want to foist upon him.
This is a difficult comer to argue convincingly, and it is not the approach that I wish to
adopt. I want to say that those who have wildly different base premises should have separate
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values education but that in the main individuals or groups who have broadly similar sets of
base premises will benefit from a common values education programme. The difficulty of
fully articulating sets ofbase premises remains but again I think sufficient difference may be
recognised so that traditions may be distinguished in schools.
However there is a further consideration to be made because in addition to the constraints of
tradition there are constraints of community. From what has been said so far it may seem that
MacIntyre's analysis of tradition is wholly backward-looking, but this is not really the case
as there is a strong forward-looking, teleological or purposive element to his analysis too.
Recall that the individual has a telos; a purpose, a social function, a role within society.
Admittedly this was perhaps more overt in ancient societies than it is now and Maclntyre's
discussion centres on the social structure of the polis, but he also urges that this truth has not
been superseded. There may have been an element of a crude determinism in the ancient
world but it remains true that human identity can only be understood in relation to a
particular society.
Taylor too is most insistent about this point, and argues as we have seen, that one's
orientation to the good and one's reason are only intelligible within a community. This is
because human life is essentially dialogic. It is inextricably embedded or enmeshed with
those around us and it is dialogue that gives a background of intelligibility. It is true that we
each belong to a number of communities, but nevertheless these are not all of equal
importance and some measure ofpriority is certainly plausible. Further, just as MacIntyre
recognises that there are differing relationships between individuals and their traditions,
Taylor recognises that there are degrees in the bond between an individual and his
community, but he suggests that ultimately that bond is ineradicable. He offers the following
example which though long is worth quoting in full.
"The householder, who sees the meaning of life in the rich joys offamily love, in the
concerns ofproviding and caring for wife and children, may feel that he is far from
appreciating these joys at their full or from giving himself to these concerns unstintingly. But
he senses that his ultimate allegiance is there, that against those who decry or condemn
family life or who look on it as a pusillanimous second best, he is deeply committed to
building over time a web of relationships which gives fullness and meaning to human life.
His direction is set" (Taylor 1989b p46).
In chapter four we saw how this philosophical position locating the self in community may
be developed to a more political position where the community is the principal unit of
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analysis, where the community is to be valued above the individual. Communitarians value
the community above the individual. Liberals value the individual above the community.
There would appear to be a choice, either or, but the real situation is not so simple and
suggests something ofa both I and solution. We need to value individuals in that they are
part of a society, and we need to value the society as an entity in that it is made up of
individuals.
Recall Kymlicka is keen to defend communitarianism against the charge ofpaternalism and
suggests that the communitarian orders values hierarchically for the common good. He also
suggests that there may be occasions when an individual may be able to exercise a veto and
we can imagine an individual permitted to reject some part of the hierarchy so long as it does
not undermine the community as a whole. Conversely an individual choice which threatened
the very community itselfwould not be permitted.
Similarly Tam suggests that in the absence ofagreement, in the cases of abortion and
euthanasia etc. the policy must be to guard against the domination ofthe majority by a single
faction, who dictate policy. Tam says this is not a signal for "quasi-market negotiations"
(Tam p118) but could be recognised as an instance where both I and choices have to be
made. That is to say in the case of abortion for example there might be those who would say
that the individual has a right to a termination over the collective will of the community, and
there would be those would say that to permit such termination undermines the very fabric of
the community itself The question then becomes what type ofdecisions properly belong
with the community and what decisions properly belong with the individual?
At this stage it is worth remembering that our concern is not a restructuring of society as a
whole, but concerns itselfwith schooling and education! Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in
the Liberal State recognises a distinction between adults and children. Ackerman says
children are not full citizens because they cannot linguistically frame their objections and
therefore cannot enter into full dialogue with the community. This dialogic requirement is at
the heart ofAckerman's liberal state and is enshrined in his rationality principle. "Whenever
anybody questions the legitimacy of another's power, the power holder must respond not by
suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he is more entitled to the
resource than the questioner is" (my italics) (Ackerman 1980 p4).
Ackerman continues that as a result of children not being full citizens parents and educators
may exercise legitimate authority over children. This is not because oftheir moral
superiority; indeed Ackerman rejects all horticultural models ofeducation, but in order that
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children become full citizens. This is the only justification for their exercising ofpower. He
gives the example that it is legitimate to prevent a child from stealing (say) and teach it not
to steal because if it is not so taught it will, in all likelihood, be restrained in prison later! It is
legitimate to limit a child's behaviour in order to minimise the limits on the behaviour of a
citizen over his whole life. Ackerman's parent says ofhis daughter "she will still be
subjected to special restrictions" to which Noble replies "I don't deny it" (ibid. p152).
Having said this, Ackerman concedes that "it is however, one thing to state a principle, quite
another to work out the particular shape ofparental control that is justified within a particular
institutional setting" (ibid. p148). Two points can perhaps be made. Firstly, Ackerman does
recognise that children need a familial and cultural situatedness for their upbringing. He
concedes that exposure to the full "cacophony" (PI55) of liberal views may not only be
harmful to a child, but may make upbringing incoherent. Ifall views were pressed upon the
young child then its development would be undermined for it would not be able to form any
views at all, and so some restrictions and something of a 'framework' is appropriate at an
early stage.
Secondly, it is important to note that Ackerman, arguing as a liberal, agrees with Taylor's
insistence on the central place of dialogue within community. Taylor and Ackerman may
denote something slightly different by the term community, but despite their differing
positions, they both recognise the importance of it. And it must be a part ofour framework
for values education too. Community must be a third necessary component ofa values
education framework, because it is within community that humans in general and pupils in
particular come to full maturity. Pupils should be taught about the nature and history oftheir
own community and they should be urged to consider their place within it. It certainly
follows that different communities may be better served by different frameworks for their
values education. Perhaps not wildly different, but subtly different certainly. These need not
entail wholly inward looking and "suffocating" communities, for the community may well
be outward looking, and well-informed about others beliefs and practices, whilst, at the same
time, being secure and confident in its own.
It is perhaps strange to write this in the light of some recent disturbances centred on schools,
and I cannot help but think ofthe dispute centred upon Holy Cross Catholic School in
Belfast, Northern Ireland during September 2001. IfI understand correctly, the Catholics
wished to assert their right to travel to their Catholic primary school via a predominantly
Protestant residential area, and the Protestants saw the Catholic action as inflammatory and
wanted the Catholics to find an alternate route. Powerful pictures on the television showed
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terrified Catholic schoolgirls being shepherded by their intransigent parents and terrorised by
Protestants on their journeys to school. The situation seems all the worse for the enormous
presence of the military and armed police personnel. The news reporters contrast this
segregated schooling, with mixed Catholic-Protestant schooling in other parts of Ireland,
which are presented as models ofharmony and excellence. How then can the separate
education of different communities be justified?
I suppose it may be argued that Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians do not actually
constitute separate communities, but I think in this case this is mistaken. What I do think
however is that agitators on both sides, in a political dispute over territory and government
which is over 100 years old are only too ready to use religious practice as a scapegoat. As I
have said earlier separate schooling does not and need not entail a segregation of society
generally, and a part of either a Catholic or Protestant schooling would be a tolerance or even
a love of ecumenical partners. As this hasbeen successfully achieved elsewhere (e.g. David
Shepherd and David Hope in Liverpool spring to mind) this suggests to me that the
schooling arrangements in Northern Ireland are not the root cause ofthe problems there.
Returning to our theme, it should be mentioned that Ackerman draws a sharp distinction
between primary and secondary education, and suggests that much less coercion or restraint
may be legitimised as a child gets older. Indeed he suggests it is a paradox that the more
successful parents and educators are in their educative endeavours the less justification they
have for continuing! This of course hints at the central rationale for liberal education which
is to prepare children for full citizenship in a liberal state; "to provide the child with the
materials he will find useful for his own self-definition" (ibid. pI54).
This of course, is where we must part company with Ackerman, for in our analysis such self-
definition within a liberal state is not the purpose of education, and is ultimately not even
possible. Definition ofthe self is not solely within a community or state, as Ackerman would
have it, but must also be in the context of a tradition. In our analysis tradition, in part, defines
not only what is possible but also what is desirable and this is a move that the liberal would
not be willing to make.
In this context it is interesting to note that Ackerman repeatedly contrasts liberal with
authoritarian whereas Taylor contrasts liberal with communitarian. Ackerman's liberal
seems to be trying to escape from the overwhelming and possibly malevolent intentions of
some authority, whereas Taylor's liberal seems more ofa solipsist, unwilling to recognise
and conform with the community ofwhich he is necessarily a part. In schools it seems better
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that we teach pupils about their roles and positions within community, rather than educate
them to defme themselves against authority, real or imagined.
At this stage it seems that by way of a conclusion to this section a definition of a framework
for values education should be offered, and this will be done in a moment but two final
observations need to be made. Firstly the framework we have been discussing is not really a
document or text that might be part of a mission statement or a teachers' handbook. It is a
conceptual apparatus; a linguistic and socio-cultural backdrop which provides coherence,
and structure. Implicit within it perhaps, is a description ofthe kind ofpupils who can be
taught values together and this is best phrased negatively. That is to say values education
will be difficult ifnot impossible ifthe pupils in the school do not share a common language,
if they do not share a common tradition and ifthey cannot be said to form something of a
community. The framework might almost function as a part of a school's admission policy,
in that it suggests that values education requires a certain homogeneity in the pupil body.
A second point is the recognition that the framework is an ideal, it has been arrived at by
philosophical means and takes little or no account ofpractical concerns. In the real world
factors such as the shortage ofnative Urdu teachers, or a crippling budget deficit will make
the situation considerably more complicated. Further the framework will need to be
"unpacked". Theory must inform practice. Again however whilst this is an important issue it
is a separate one and problems of instantiating the framework do not undermine the
framework itself. It has been suggested to me that my framework might be a framework for
successful values education and in its absence unsuccessful values education might take
place. I find the notion ofunsuccessful education somewhat contradictory, and indeed Peters
tells us that education brings about something essentially valuable or worthwhile. However
this does not mean we cannot admit of degrees ofworth or success, and talk ofmore and less
successful values education.
Hence to conclude: an ideal framework for the most successful kind ofvalues education
requires a full consideration and indeed integration ofcomponents oflanguage, tradition and
community. Values education is ofnecessity, most successful in a largely homogeneous
setting and as heterogeneity increases then values education, ofnecessity, becomes harder if
not impossible to achieve with a comparable level of success. This is a descriptive
conclusion; it employs philosophical arguments to explain what does or will work best. It is
not a prescription, but leads very quickly to a prescription, for ifwe think the best possible
education should be provided for children, then this conclusion should be adopted.
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VI Bridging a False Divide
The kind offramework that I have proposed may be attacked from two principal directions.
On the one hand it may be said that such a framework is too doctrinaire, too rigid and leaves
no room for personal choice, individuality and autonomy. In short it is tantamount to
indoctrination. On the other hand it may be said that, of course children's values education
needs to take some account oftheir linguistic background, of tradition and the role of
community - that is obvious! The assertion that such a framework is required is a trivial
truth and hardly worthy of discussion. I think this is an extreme polarisation, which is a
product ofcertain developments in the philosophy of education, which need to be explored
and explicated if they are to be escaped. The aim ofthis chapter is to explore the
development ofthis dichotomy, and to show how the framework that I propose is a genuine
via media.
In philosophy generally there are many discussions centred upon pairs of opposites; or
example mind and body, sense and meaning, realists and idealists, deontologists and
consequentialists and so on. When there is such polar opposition there are three ways for the
discussion to proceed. Each side can develop and entrench its own position in the hope of
finally defeating the opposing position. The two sides can begin a process ofconvergence by
realising that there is some truth in both positions and what is needed is a compromise; some
measure ofreconciliation. Or, finally ofcourse the whole debate may be thrown out as
resting on a misunderstanding, or upon a philosophically nonsensical distinction.
This last option is a favourite of feminist and postmodern thinkers who have characterised
much modern debate as based on a number of dichotomies or binarisms which silently
influence our thinking and our social structure. Their aim is to deconstruct these binarisms,
to destroy what they consider to be outmoded philosophical dichotomies, to jam the
theoretical machinery ofmodern debate. This is not an approach that I wish to adopt here.
The compromise option has been become increasingly widespread; for example in the field
ofmoral philosophy Kantians have had to incorporate elements ofvirtue ethics in to their
analysis and in political philosophy liberals have had to take elements of communitarian
theory in to their analysis. In some areas ofphilosophy such syntheses are being developed,
but it seems that philosophy ofeducation is a little slow off the mark in this respect. For
example in international education, Richard Pearce has observed a divergence between what
he calls "New WorIders" and "Old Worlders" who espouse mutually exclusive positions in
their attitudes (pearce 2001).
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The particular dichotomy that faces us is an extreme partition of liberal education and
indoctrination. We may ask how did this come about? In Ethics and Education R. S. Peters
begins by defining the concept of education. Although he came to reject this approach (that
is, the separation of the concept of education from those who are educated) he suggested
then that education is (briefly) the transmission of something intrinsically worthwhile, which
has a cognitive content and which is transmitted in a voluntary manner. In particular
education is to be contrasted with conditioning or brainwashing which has no
epistemological content and is on a level with blinking or salivation in the sense that the
subject is unaware ofwhat is going on. Similarly education is to be contrasted with
indoctrination, which although it may be understood or assented to in some embryonic way
(cf Peters 1966 p42) involves a lack ofrespect for the learner who must be free to choose or
reject the teaching. Indoctrination is not cognitively grounded as the foundations,
development and critique of the doctrine are not a part ofthe indoctrination. Furthermore,
those who oppose the doctrine are not acknowledged.
Peters goes on to say that his defmition of education is to all intents and purposes a definition
ofliberal education in the sense that 'liberal' emphasises a lack of constraint in respect of
Peters' three conditions. In particular Peters notes the connotation of 'liberal' as a protest
against the "tendency to constrain people's beliefs along narrowly conceived or doctrinaire
lines" (peters 1966 p44), and underlines that education is a voluntary process. In a brief
discussion ofthe liberalising ofvocational education he also remarks that "the knowledge
required for vocational education should be transmitted in a less dogmatic way, that trainees
should be encouraged to be more critical about what they are taught" (ibid. p45). This is the
first sign that education has become liberal education by default.
Hirst working alongside Peters at that time, observed that the notion of liberal education
derived from the ancient Greeks was liberal in the sense it was for free men rather than
slaves but also liberal in the sense that it freed the mind. Education was the pursuit of
knowledge which was defined in terms of scope and content in order that the mind be
satisfied and fulfil its end thereby contributing to the good life of the individual as a whole.
Considering the scope and content ofknowledge, Hirst, drawing on earlier work of
Oakeshott, MacMurray and Collingwood, came to believe that the structure ofknowledge is
characterised or mapped in terms oftypes or forms which are logically distinct. The details
of this need not concern us here, but following such an analysis, Hirst was to write "A liberal
education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself: is thereby
concerned with the development ofthe mind" (Hirst 1973 p99).
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Given such a position it became important that all the forms should be studied in a balanced
way and that one or more should not been given 'priority' over the others as this would lead
to imbalance. Further the notion that a form ofknowledge should contain some distinct
truths of one kind or another, probably led to a worry about falsehoods being taught and so
there developed a notion that everything could or maybe even should be challenged. It is
worth noting that in the seventies the main debate in education moved away from these
epistemological concerns, and became centred on questions concerning child centred
education. The effect of this, I suggest, was to leave the indoctrination / liberal education
dichotomy under-developed and this is a legacy we have received today. In other words,
very little work considering a synthesis between the two positions has been done.
Indeed it may be said that much of the work that has been done in developing the liberal
position has only served to further entrench the divide. As the philosophical successor to
Peters and Hirst, John White's account of liberal education (in Education and the Good Life
(1990)) distinguishes between what is taught and the way it is taught. The central issue for
White is that because in a liberal democracy there are a number of conceptions ofthe good
life, the pupil must be allowed to choose between them, and indeed a principaleducational
aim is to develop the pupil's facu1ty for making this choice. There must be a guard against
the possibility ofindoctrination, which White defines as "intentional prevention of
reflection" (White 1990 pl04). In other words autonomy is all important so that people will
be free to "practise their religion, express their ideas, control their own lives and determine
where they will live and what kind ofwork they will do" (ibid. p22).
Furthermore White appears to think that there is a sufficiently thick agreement ofwhat
constitutes the good life, for this to form a basis for values education in schools. I do not
want to criticise White's position at this stage, but it is important to notice that this
development of an earlier position is an entrenchment, a sharpening of the divide, and offers
no real compromise.
It is significant, I think, that in a 19% book, 1. Mark Halstead can approvingly refer to
Bailey who "describes a liberal education as one which liberates individuals from the
restraints ofthe present and the particular, so that they can become free choosers ofwhat is
to be believed and what is to be done" (Halstead 1996 p24). Note that in this analysis, the
alternative to a liberal education is one that restrains the individual and prevents his free
choice!
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So to summarise we have, it seems, at one extreme, indoctrination that presents material to
be learnt in a closed manner, fails to provide alternatives and curtails the pupils' response.
We may put it that a particular values system is taught as ifit were the only value system. At
the other extreme we have a liberal position that offers a broad and balanced picture of
reality and leaves pupils to choose concerning matters ofvalue. This polarity excludes the
possibility which I imagine, that a particular values system be taught, further that it be
suggested that this system is the best, or most complete picture. However, at the same time it
is made very clear that there is licit dissent from this position and other viable alternatives
exist.
Some philosophers of education have developed compromise positions, but not many and
this does suggest that there is an under-explored territory between the two extremes.
Kenneth Strike, for example, deals with these some ofthese issues in his Liberty and
Learning, and although much ofwhat he says is about universities, it is applicable to schools
too. Strike characterises the debate as an attempt to answer the question, of "how the notion
ofthe authority ofreceived ideas applies to questions ofliberty in both educational and civil
contexts" (Strike 1982 pviii). As an example ofthe conflict Strike cites the legal case of
Yonder v, Wisconsin in the US Supreme Court which hinged on whether children from the
Amish minority, who have a religion which is connected with a simple farming life, could be
compelled to attend school after 12 years of age. The court recognised the state's interest in
producing educated citizens but also recognised that the Amish themselves were making
good citizens oftheir children, well suited for their way oflife and the court forbade the state
from enforcing its compulsory education programme over the Amish children.
Strike develops a philosophical view which rejects empirical epistemology and is largely
based upon a Kuhnian scientific method. Concepts or theories are not simply read offthe
surface ofphenomena but observations must be integrated with pre-existent theory ifthey
are to make any sense. The pre-existent theory Strike (following Kuhn) calls a paradigm,
which "serves to set the problems that science must solve, it suggests the direction to be
pursued in solving the problem and it indicates what counts as a solution to them" (ibid.
p29). The paradigm is both a set of initial beliefs or assumptions and a set of tools to pursue
further investigation. Those who would wish to separate teaching a child certain values and
teaching it to be able to make autonomous choices are making a distinction that cannot be
drawn. Strike approvingly quotes Toulmin and goes on to assert that "the things that I have
been loosely referring to as received ideas or that Toulmin calls a conceptual inheritance are
not simply the objects ofthought, they are the means or instruments ofthought" (ibid. pI9).
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This is not to imply doctrinaire rigidity: the paradigm is not set in concrete. Strike insists that
the paradigm has a provisional status, that is to say (following Kuhn) in the light offurther
experience it may come to be modified, enhanced or rejected but from the outset a paradigm
ofsome kind is required.
Furthermore, Strike notes that for knowledge to develop and research to proceed, scholars
who will not agree to everything must share a common paradigm. Strike talks of
communities of intellectuals, who are inheritors ofa particular tradition and ''who have been
initiated into and have mastered the communities' standards" (ibid. p36). Strike insists that
research is not a matter of individuals collecting evidence, but is a social enterprise where
findings are reproduced, checked, discussed etc. within the appropriate peer group. Strike
defends such a conception against the attack that it can lead to failures in objectivity and is
essentially closed, for he says "the notion of objectivity is substantially defined at any given
moment by the concepts that have become authoritative in the field" (ibid. p37). Note again
the temporal qualification, and the implicit view that paradigms can shift, can be rejected or
replaced, but that we cannot do without them!
Considering a particular and very relevant issue, Strike says universities should be neutral.
He develops a number of slightly different senses ofneutral which need not concern us here,
but to ensure academic freedom a university cannot have an official point ofview on a
matter, because then those faculty members who disagree with it would be on a collision
course with their own employer! Given the role ofthe university to pursue knowledge and
truth, its members must be free to do so. Strike rejects the notion ofa university having any
mission statement, "A university that is Catholic or Protestant, conservative or communist, in
any way that binds the views ofits members, cannot fully be a place where truth is sought"
(ibid. p76).
Such a view ifmodified and applied to schools would be a terminal blow to any framework
of the sort that I am suggesting. However Strike himself subsequently concedes that mission-
orientated universities are legitimate provided that three conditions are met. Such missions
must be constrained so that they: "be extensions ofthe university's primary role of research
and teaching, that they be selected in a legitimate way, and that they generate minimal
conflict with academic freedom" (ibid. p97ff). Ofcourse it may be said that this simply
raises the question ofwhat counts as legitimate, and what constitutes minimal conflict.
However Strike suggests that a mission is acceptable if it does not interfere with the
university's primary function, and this in turn will be some function ofthe broader values of
society. So for example it would be legitimate to have a Catholic framework in a school, so
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long as this did not extend to compelling staffand pupils to engage in practices they did not
accept, or dismissing staff or expelling pupils if they changed their minds. However it seems
to me that during the selection ofpupils or staffit would be legitimate, even prudent, ceteris
paribus, to choose one who could more fully participate in the Catholic life ofthe school
over one who was less able to do so.
Furthermore, it is not entirely obvious that the aims of schools are quite the same as the aims
ofa university. The school's teachers are employed to teach, not to research and so are, to
some degree, in a different situation to university researchers and professors. Criticism and
debate are essential to the university's life and function, whereas in a school open and
healthy debate may be seen as a good and positive thing, but they are not essential in the
same way. In terms ofthe student body too, Strike defends a form ofpaternalism on account
of the immaturity of the pupil and says this is more justified the younger the child He also
says the parent (or teacher) who controls some part of a child's life also has a duty to act "for
the sake ofthe interests and well-being ofthe child" (ibid. p131), and emphasises all such
relationships must be balanced. In particular he observes that "it is an abdication of the
responsibilities ofparents and teachers to fail to provide guidance with respect to the
preferences that children acquire" (ibid. p139).
To summarise, Strike recognises and argues for the need for balance between recognising
and encouraging students' and pupils' rights on the one hand. And recognising that they must
be taught certain things without the possibility ofdissent in order that they are able to
express those rights. In an amusing analogy he has it that it would be lunacy not to teach a
child language on the grounds that it had not expressed which language it wished to learn. In
this case teaching English, French or Chinese cannot be described as an imposition, a
restriction of thechild's liberties and Strike asks, "How do moral concepts differ? The
answer is that they do not" (ibid. p54).
Elsewhere Strike takes up this metaphor oflanguage again. Writing more specifically about
schools, he sees morality as the basis ofvalues education and suggests that each community
may have its own private or local language, but in addition liberal societies must have a
public or civic language that everybody understands. The public, civic language is thin and
neutral between communities and should be the main language of schools and should be
taught in schools. This language is based on an overlapping consensus which Strike calls
pragmatic liberalism.
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The private local language is thick and is the way that each community expresses its values.
Such languages may be religious, ethnic or philosophical and augment the public language.
Strike observes that the liberal public discourse is insufficient to sustain society, but is a
necessary tool in a pluralistic context, so the local languages should be left "significantly in
place" (Strike 1992 p277). The school should help pupils with their local language, perhaps
in small groups. There is a striking affinity here between my earlier remarks and Strike's
suggestion of separate language provision, although I think a neat distinction between public
and private (civic and local) language cannot be made. We play a number of separate
language games, with their own rules and conventions, their own norms and expectations,
which overlap and intertwine and I am not sure that the neat partition that Strike suggests can
be made. Nonetheless, and more importantly, we do have a significant move away from the
stark dichotomy described at the beginning ofthis chapter and a realisation and acceptance
that balanced values education inevitably leads to the murky waters of compromise and
playoff.
As Strike distinguishes between public and private, or better local, language Terrence
McLaughlin distinguishes between public and private or non-public values. Public values are
seen as inescapable and binding upon all persons and should be taught and upheld in schools.
Non-public values are those that go beyond what can be required for all members of society
and are often a source of strong disagreement. The school should adopt an attitude of
"principled forbearance" (McLaughlin 1996 p146) of influence, and remain silent about such
issues or assist pupils to come to their own reflective decisions about them. Additionally
McLaughlin endorses the development of autonomy as an aim of all education but suggests
that particular world-views or religions cannot be taught as true, as they are fundamentally
uncertain.
Drawing the distinction between public and non-public values immediately suggests that
there might be some middle ground to explore and a number ofquestions may be raised.
Two in particular seem to dominate McLaughlin's writings. The first ofthese is can one
teach public values without explicitly or implicitly teaching some non-public values?
McLaughlin seems to answer this question negatively, even ifa little hesitantly. The second
question is, can a Catholic education (either in a common school or under separate provision)
be compatible with liberal educational principles? Here McLaughlin answers positively and
offers extensive argument.
McLaughlin suggests that" every form of education teaches implicitly or explicitly a
philosophy ofman" (ibid. p14l) and McLaughlin approvingly quotes Archbishop Beck who
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writes, "only when we know what man is can we say how he should be educated" (Beck
1964 p109). Several authors use a cake metaphor and say ofChristianity, and presumably
this could apply to other values systems as well, that it is not the icing on the cake of
education, but is the yeast that invigorates the whole mixture (cf. Walsh 1983 p4). That is to
say any values education, by the very way that it is conducted, and by what is included and
what is excluded, has a non-public values commitment.
Kevin Williams goes further, and writes "It is hard to see how we can actually teach religion
without actually initiating children into a particular religion, just as we cannot teach sport
without actually teaching children to playa specific game, or teach music without teaching a
particular musical instrument" (Williams p53). It must be noted that this is a remark about
teaching religion specifically rather than values generally, but it is a definite exaggeration
and overstates the case. For surely we can teach about the principles and rules ofa game
without being able to play it, and indeed many sport spectators attest to this fact. Similarly
we could teach about space travel, its principles, history, we could study things written by
astronauts and have a very competent knowledge of space travel without ever having left the
earth! Williams' analogy does not work.
To a certain extent the debate turns on what a religion is considered to be. McLaughlin and
other Catholics would emphasise belief, the knowledge ofdoctrine and the familiarity with
practices; and although true faith would be said to be more than this, much of it may be
taught. Catholic emphasis on catechesis is evidence enough for that. Protestant Christians,
such as Signe Sandsmark for example emphasis that Christianity is all about a living
relationship with God and this cannot be taught: "indoctrinated dogmas are ofno use"
(Sandsmark p122) she says! Notice again how Catholic doctrine is not teaching but
indoctrination and belief is dogma! The dichotomy discussed above still has a very powerful
grip, and there is a reluctance to move in to the middle ground.
McLaughlin also asks can a Catholic Education be liberal? And spends some time arguing
that it can. He says a proper Catholic education is characterised by its openness, and
Catholicism invites pupils to reflect in a systematic way on the world and their place in it.
Faith is proclaimed or offered but never imposed and McLaughlin reminds us ofthe teaching
ofthe Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education that in the Catholic school "great respect
is called for those people in the school who are not Catholics" (McLaughlin 1996 p144).
McLaughlin also highlights the teaching of the Church that adherence to faith on the part of
those who are taught is seen as the fruit of grace and freedom (ibid.). And characteristically
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without qualification, Williams declares: "there is no incompatibility between being
autonomous and participating in the Christian tradition" (Williams p51)]
To those who might fmd such remarks laughable, McLaughlin does identify a shift in the
way Catholicism is perceived. The emphasis on truth and received doctrine has given way to
an emphasis on human relationships and issues ofjustice and peace. The role of the
individual conscience is affirmed in a way it once was not, and there is an increased
recognition of the need for balance (cf. McLaughlin 1996 pI49). In the light of this
McLaughlin is able to reaffirm that Catholicism is not incompatible with liberalism, and
indeed suggests that distinctive Catholic education contributes to democracy, by offering a
counter position to many contemporary trends.
Myself: I am not convinced by McLaughlin's argument and Ldo not see how a proper
Catholic education can also claim to be truly liberal. For example the Catholic must teach
that abortion is wrong and the right ofthe unborn baby take precedence over the will ofthe
mother. To support a pro-choice position could not be Catholic and similarly to allow pupils
to believe that there are a number ofviable alternatives which they might choose is simply
not Catholic teaching! This does not worry me as I am not trying to endorse liberal education
and think liberalism has lots ofdifficulties of its own, but the debate here seems somewhat
muddled by different parties attaching slightly different meanings to the same term.
McLaughlin says, freedom in the Catholic tradition is a freedom to respond to the moral law
through grace, the greatest obstacle to which is sin. The law is still binding on the conscience
and the notion that one might accept or reject one law or set oflaws as the liberal must allow
is nonsense! Perhaps Catholic education may be said to be liberal in the sense that the
teaching may not be liberal but ultimately the pupil cannot be compelled to accept it, but
then any teaching is like this. I thinkCatholic education is ultimately incompatible with
liberal education, for the salvation of souls is not on the liberal agenda. The Church is in an
important way contra mundum and this is a point that McLaughlin concedes. However, and
this is the really important point, it does not follow from this, that Catholic education is
indoctrination, which seems to be an inference all too commonly drawn. Of course this
would follow ifliberal education and indoctrination were the only alternatives but as I have
tried to show there is a middle ground, a compromise position, even if it is poorly
illuminated and only vaguely defined.
Finally in this section I which to re-examine the kind offramework that I have proposed and
to show that it is neither liberal nor doctrinaire, but is a genuine via media. As I have
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analysed it, a framework for values education rests upon language, tradition and community.
These categories are not arbitrary since each contributes something about our life that is
given. That we speak a particular language, play certain language games and partake in a
particular form oflife is given. It could have been otherwise but for a particular group of
speakers it is just so. Similarly the traditions which we have received and which shape our
rationality and our morality are fundamentally inescapable. They might have been otherwise,
but as it happens they are as they are. And similarly with the community or communities of
which we are a part - to a large extent these are functions ofwhere we were bom, where we
live and whom we have, as it happens, bumped into on the way. This is not to deny choice in
any way but is to recognise the human situation.
Any coherent values education must recognise and build upon this framework, it must
recognise that certain factors are given and are not functions ofchoice, and it must seriously
accept that in an educational context these must be preserved, explained and handed on. Two
important things however follow from this. Firstly, I have tried to show that even ifsome
things are given it does not in any way follow that everything is given or that there is no
room for individual choice or expression. Secondly it must be remembered, that there is a
difference between saying 'we as a group believe X, we encourage you to question it, argue
against it and even reject it' and saying 'people believe X, Y, and Z and you must choose
any or none as you think fit.' Values education within the context of a framework recognises
the rights ofpupils, but also recognises a legitimate paternalism; an insistence on certain
standards. Hence those who are educated will come to have the knowledge, capacity to
articulate and the maturity to accept or reject the framework. It may even be, of course, that
those who are best initiated in to the framework are those who are most able to contribute to
its future evolution and modification.
The burning issue, as we have said before, would seem to be then what precisely are these
givens, what is part ofthe framework and non-negotiable and what may be negotiated, what
is a matter for individual choice. The problem with such a question is that it has no general
answer, since it depends on the framework itself. Framework F1 built upon language Ll,
tradition Tl and community Cl will have givens inherent in Ll, Tl and Cl; whereas
framework F2 based upon L2, T2 and C2 will have a different set ofgivens and a different
scope for the exercise of freedom and autonomy.
Perhaps a few examples will help. hnagine an urban, cathedral school with a long history.
Such a school would have a religious element in its framework; it would attach a high value
to music, and may place a lot ofemphasis on sport and academic success. This framework
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would have very little to say about political persuasion, rural issues e.g. fox-hunting, and the
place and role ofthe armed forces (say) and these would be areas within the framework
where the pupil would need to exercise his or her own autonomy and freedom. On the other
hand imagine a rural school founded by a Tory peer for the education of the sons and
daughters ofarmed forces personnel. A framework in this school would have a discernible
political element, it would emphasis values ofloyalty and duty, and it would probably
encourage pupils to consider the military as a career. It might show nominal Church of
England religious persuasion, but religion generally, academic success or the participation
particular sports may be matters largely left to the individual. Different frameworks will
have different givens and will have different areas of scope for the exercise of individual
choice.
It may be said that this comparison avoids the crucial issue. This is all very well for two
frameworks, but it still remains to be explained for a single particular framework, how we
may say what is given and what is more open-ended? What is non-negotiable and what is
negotiable? There are two kinds of answer here I think. The first is to emphasise that the
framework that I propose does not involve coercion, compulsion or indoctrination, and so
ultimately everything, even the framework itself may be rejected. If this were to happen
though it may well be that the relationship between the pupil and his teacher or the pupil and
his school would collapse also. A pupil who could not accept a school's framework may well
be better offelsewhere! Putting these extreme cases to one side, what I want to say is that in
circumstances ofnormal schooling it has to be recognised that for education to succeed some
things must be taken as non-negotiable, there will be a set of agreements that will not be
questioned. There is a temporal qualification here (we may add for the time being) and we
should recall Strike's remarks about the provisional nature ofthe academics' paradigm.
The second is to observe that we successfully use terms such as language game, tradition and
community without having strict criteria to distinguish one from another. We are not able to
say precisely where one tradition or community ends and another begins but that does not
preclude the successful use of these terms. And so it is with our framework. Wittgenstein
gets exasperated with those who press him for a precise definition of game, and imagines the
question: "But ifthe concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't really know
what you mean by 'game'" (PI 70). Wittgenstein says that in the end "one gives examples
and intends them to be taken in a particular way" (ibid.). He says general definitions may be
misunderstood too, he observes that 'exactly' and 'roughly' are used differently in different
contexts (cf PI 88) and concludes that we define a particular game by showing how it is
played. Similarly a framework will be defined or described as it is used.
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If the response to the assertion that values education requires a framework is a request for a
delineation ofthe boundary ofthe framework, then the essential point has been missed. What
is crucial is that a framework which recognises and accepts certain things as given is a
necessary prerequisite. Furthermore, what is given is simply given as part of the language we
use, the traditions we have received and the community ofwhich we are a part. Do not ask
how it must be but look and see how it is! ("Don't say there must be but look and see"
(PI 66).) This Wittgensteinian slogan does not mean that the framework is set in stone and so
cannot be modified in any way, but neither does it mean that it is a matter ofunrestricted
choice. It has elements ofboth, it is a via media and until this is properly recognised,
discussion ofthis topic will continue to be dominated, dare I say strangled, by those who
unwaveringly defend liberal education as the only alternative to indoctrination.
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VII Autonomy and the Self
Although my principal concern has been values education, much of the discussion so far may
be located within a wider debate between liberals and communitarians. Beliefs about the
nature and purpose of society and the individual's place within it necessarily influence views
about the nature and purpose of education. Having said this to enter in to the full complexity
of the debate between these two parties is a task beyond the scope ofthis thesis. However a
particular strand of the debate and an issue I have already touched on in several places is a
question about the nature ofthe self, and in this chapter I intend to expand some ofmy
earlier remarks and to tie up some loose ends. I am not in a position to defend a fully
articulated view of the self, but I do intend to present an outline ofmy own view and to
reject certain prevalent alternatives.
Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, I believe that clarity about the nature of the self
and of autonomy has implications for what education is about generally and what values
education is about in particular. Once this is understood, I contend that my claim that values
education requires a framework will follow. In other words a theory of the selfwill
contribute to a justification ofmy earlier claims about values education.
An initial difficulty that I shall note but then largely ignore is that the terms 'liberal' and
'communitarian' are not neatly defined, but represent families ofviews, which although
related can be quite varied. The debate is not infrequently coloured by claims of
misunderstanding rather than disagreement. Again to enter into all the minutiae of this
debate would be a digression, but I shall begin by considering the liberal view of the self and
the nature and place of autonomy within that view. Then I shall go on to consider the critique
of this view as found in communitarian theory. I have however already hesitated to embrace
a full-blooded communitarianism, and I have suggested that what is required is something of
a via media and I shall conclude this chapter by considering how such a compromise view of
the selfmight be characterised.
In A Theory ofJustice and Justice as Fairness - a Restatement, Rawls makes it clear that
what he is proposing is an ideal model, and that persons understood in the pre-social state are
part ofthis model. He emphasises that as a political conception ofjustice is sought, then we
have a political conception of the person. He writes, "the conception of the person is not
taken from metaphysics or the philosophy ofmind, or from psychology; it may have little
relation to conceptions ofthe self discussed in these disciplines" (Rawls 2001 pI9). Further
putting the self in the original position behind the veil of ignorance is a heuristic device; a
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part of the model designed to bring out the nature of the self in this special case.
Nevertheless Rawls' model of the selfhas stuck, sometimes without his caveats, and is the
point ofdeparture for subsequent development.
Rawls' person is free and equal, properly informed and rational. Rawls characterises free and
equal persons as being endowed oftwo moral powers: the first is "the capacity for a sense of
justice" and the second is "a capacity for the conception of the good" (ibid.), The agent can
understand and act from principles ofpolitical justice and can rationally pursue a conception
of the good. This conception of the good is not specified, it could be religious, political or
moral, and in order that citizens be free, it cannot be laid down. "Rather, as citizens, they are
seen as capable of revising or changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds,
and they may do this if they so desire. As free persons, citizens claim the right to view their
persons as independent from and not identified with any particular conception ofthe good, or
scheme offmal ends" (ibid. p21).
The other side of this coin is that to accommodate the "reasonable pluralism" (ibid. pIS) of
citizens the state must remain neutral, and further it must uphold neutrality. As Rawls notes
this is not procedural neutrality which is dictated by the understanding ofjustice as fairness,
but neutrality of aim. This means "institutions and policies are neutral in the sense that they
can be endorsed by citizens generally as within the scope of a public political conception"
(ibid. plS3 n.27). It is from this understanding ofthe neutrality ofthe state, to uphold the
citizen's right to remain an unattached chooser that modem concepts of liberal education
seem to ultimately derive.
At the heart ofthese concepts is the notion of autonomy which originated in Kautian ethics.
For Kant, autonomy is a property of the will, and the selfwills autonomously when it
follows laws it has made for itself. Most important is not that the selfwills autonomously,
but that it has the capacity to do so. The human is not constituted by the aims, interests and
conceptions of the good that it has decided to follow, but is constituted and given its worth
and dignity by the capacity to select such aims, interests and conceptions. What matters, is
not our fmal ends, not what we choose, but our ability and capacity to make that choice.
The result ofthis is to put the autonomous selfprior to its ends; it detaches the self from
those ends and puts the selffirst. To put this another way, just as the subject is prior to its
ends, so the right is prior to the good, and Rawls takes this up; "we should reverse the
relation between the right and the good, proposed by teleological doctrine and view the right
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as prior" (Rawls 1971 p560). Hence the liberal conception that autonomy is the highest
value, and is an essential prerequisite for personal flourishing; that is living the good life.
Further, linked to this is the notion that the autonomous self is responsible for his actions. He
is responsible for them since he has freely chosen them, and similarly he cannot be held
responsible for those obligations that are not voluntary. Indeed these additional obligations
undermine the subject's autonomy as they undermine his essential nature, as one who
chooses.
Liberal theories of education have taken this to their hearts and hence see the principal aim
of education as promoting autonomy and the exercise ofresponsible choice. Any attempt to
promote a particular set ofvalues, or to prescribe a particular conception of the good life
undermines the prior and most fundamental characteristic ofthe human: that he be able to
exercise autonomy. John White suggests that the overarching aim of education is personal
well-being which is based on autonomy. He concedes that autonomy is not a logical
condition for well-being and that there could be other paths to well-being, but goes on to add
that in a pluralistic liberal democracy, individual autonomy based on personal choice is the
only legitimate path (c.f White 1990 p99).
In her Colston Lecture of 1992 Susan Mendus characterises the autonomous self as detached
from its final ends, and says that as an antecedent chooser my attachments or the values I do
in fact hold are simply those that I have happened to choose at that time. Further, detached
from my own ends I am in a sense also detached from other selves - Mendus says
'estranged'. But this is not a picture we recognise for in fact we do recognise special
responsibilities to parents, siblings, even pupils which are not chosen but often thrust upon
us.
The kind ofemphasis on autonomy as personal choice is again a hardening of the dichotomy
between choosing everything and accepting everything as given. Mendus seems to suggest
that obligations restrict my autonomy, and so it is only partial and admits of degrees. In part
this is due to the non-ideal nature of the world, but more importantly, Mendus also suggests
that our notion of autonomy as it stands needs some revision. (c.f. Mendus p9). But before
we proceed here, we do well to heed Onora O'Neill's warning.
Onora O'Neill (referring to Dworkin) observes that autonomy has been variously understood
as liberty, self-rule, sovereignty, freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality,
independence, responsibility, selfknowledge, self-assertion, critical reflection, freedom from
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obligation and absence of external causation, and is a term over which "there is a spectacular
amount of disagreement" (O'Neill p203). O'Neill distinguishes 'independence of acts' and
'coherence of acts' and suggests we need some combination ofthe two. This is because if
sheer choice alone was the basis of autonomy we would not admire it, and coherent acts not
freely pursued are not autonomous.
Although this combination is desirable O'Neill argues that it is not possible within empiricist
theory, because preferences underpinning acts and beliefs underpinning coherence cannot be
separated out - preferences and beliefs are themselves dependent (c.f. ibid. p218). O'Neill
hesitates to reject empiricism outright and endorses a Kantian position, which she is careful
to distinguish from "the stereotype ofKant's position" (ibid. p219).
She suggests Kant understood autonomy as self-imposed law rather than self-imposed law
and so is not committed to any transcendent, metaphysical view of the self. Kant accepts
both independence and coherence at the expense of a unified theory of autonomy that the
empiricists seek, and on O'Neill's interpretation ofKant, "human action must be approached
from two indispensable yet mutually irreducible perspectives" (ibid. p218). Is this
compromise by another name?
Given a number ofpositions which may be described as liberal and given the confusion and
complexity highlighted by O'Neill we do well to approach the critique of the liberal view of
autonomy and the self carefully. Further, liberals are challenged by conservatives, Marxists
and feminists and these are positions I shall ignore, focussing instead on the communitarian
challenge. I want to look at a number ofcommunitarian challenges to the liberal view of the
self and their implications for autonomy, especially when it is considered as an educational
aim. Firstly I shall consider Michael Sandel's work which criticises Rawls specifically, then
I shall consider MacIntyre who attacks a much broader conception ofliberalism and then I
shall consider Taylor's views which lend themselves to a more political interpretation and
lead naturally to a consideration ofcompromise.
Although Rawls does not use the word autonomy himself (he speaks only of free and equal
persons) we have already seen that he does contend that ends are related to the self by an
action ofthe will (they may change their conception ofthe good if they so desire etc.). The
subject chooses his own ends, but as Sandel points out, this not the only possibility. The self
may select his own ends by an act of cognition, as a result ofunderstanding, knowledge and
reflection. Indeed Sandel thinks the self does engage in acts of self-scrutiny, and considers
its own position reflexively, but this is a possibility which is excluded a priori by Rawls'
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conception of the self Further not only does Sandel think Rawls is wrong, but in
emphasising a voluntary relation to ends Sandel considers Rawls to have distanced himself
from much traditional moral and political thinking (cfMulhall and Swift p50).
Secondly, Sandel maintains that the antecedently individuated selfmay identify with his
chosen ends, even very closely, but that as chosen, these ends can never be an integral part of
that self There remains a gap between the self and its values, or as Sandel calls them
constitutive attachments. If! choose my values then I can stand apart from them, and this
undermines the possibility ofbeing tom between conflicting ends, it seems to rule out the
possibility of an inner struggle. Further if! only posses an end having chosen it, it cannot be
essential to who I am. I could drop it or change my mind without my identity being
disrupted. But experience suggests the contrary: "We need only think ofpeople who build
their lives around a cause and whose life is accordingly devastated by the failure of that
cause, ofpeople whose sense ofthemselves is tom apart by conflicting desires or aims"
(ibid. p52).
As a more specific version of this second point Sandel argues the antecedent self commits
Rawls to a very vapid view ofpolitical community. For Rawls the primary aim ofthe well
ordered society is the advancement of the self, even the mutual advancement of selves, but
this is distinct from the advancement of a community. For the communitarian an individual
may derive his sense of identity by his commitment to a public ideal, he may be willing to
follow a shared aim specified by the community, but on Rawlsian considerations of the
principle ofjustice this would seem to be ruled out. Of course liberals can pursue public or
common aims, but the idea that such aims could contribute to a person's identity is rejected.
Overall Sandel claims that Rawls' absolute and unqualified commitment to justice can only
be justified by appealing to a particular conception ofthe selfwhich has some serious
metaphysical underpinnings. Sandel claims that these metaphysical views are not
acknowledged by Rawls, and that far from simply belonging to a well ordered society for
mutual advantage, the self is constituted by communal ties and bonds, the alteration or
severance ofwhich changes the very identity ofthe self Mulhall and Swift have it that "In
short Rawls' theory ofjustice seems to offer little scope for those who understand their
relationships with others as constitutive oftheir identity as persons" (ibid. p54). Sandel
characterises Rawls' liberalism as 'metaphysically myopic', failing to see how attachments
to family, community, and common causes fundamentally and essentially defines us as
selves.
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When we come to consider a liberal response to these points we have to bear in mind that
Rawls' position has evolved. I use this word cautiously for some say that Rawls' later work
has clarified his earlier position and removed misunderstanding, whilst some suggest that
there have been some substantive changes. So an attribution to Rawls is not wholly
unproblematic! At the heart of Rawls' reply to the Sandelian critique is that Rawls' theory is
a political one, not a moral one. Hence the self in Rawls' theory is the selfqua citizen, the
self as he acts in the political sphere only. Rawls is not committed to the metaphysical theory
that Sandel attributes to him. The Rawlsian conception of the self is not a reflection ofthe
whole truth about persons but is a political device which is latent in our public political
culture! As a result of this a person can hold and even be constituted by other non-political
values or ends, and one can hold that autonomy is not the summum bonum in these spheres
so long as this does not compromise one's identity qua political self. Brighouse emphasises
that in liberal political theory the person is only partially defined, and observes that the
principle ofjustice requires us to pick out commonalties not differences. Impartiality must
underpin justice and other differences are simply not relevant (cf. Brighouse 2002). However
whether this distinction can coherently be made, and whether there can be any guarantee that
one's political self and one's other selves will never come in to conflict is something I doubt.
Additionally, Brighouse argues against what he sees as a false dichotomy; namely that
constitutive attachments are chosen or given. He says of course the liberal selfhas given
constitutive attachments (e.g. love of one's family) but the autonomous liberal self can
exercise judgement about these givens. Brighouse writes "It is not plausible to suggest of
anyone that they could 'be whatever they want to be', but it is equally implausible to suggest
that we have no control over our character traits at all" (Brighouse 2002 p89). Brighouse
emphasises autonomous reflection and asserts; "judgement, then, is more fundamental for
liberals than is choice (though choice is not unimportant)" (ibid. p90).
We may not doubtthat Brighouse is a liberal for indeed he is, but we may wonder whether
he is a strict Rawlsian liberal. He seems to be developing or annotating Rawls, to take some
account of Sandel's criticisms, which he clearly does not think fatal to Rawls' endeavours,
but seems to think that certain amendments or annotations might be necessary. I would
suggest that perhaps some hint of compromise between the two sides (that we shall consider
again later) is emerging here.
Turning to MacIntyre's critique of liberalism, recall that MacIntyre's fundamental contention
is that Enlightenment theories of ethics failed because they failed to recognise the notion of
human telos. An ethical theory is to guide us from where we are to where we ought to be and
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this 'where we ought to be' can only be understood in teleological terms, Ifwe recall Rawls'
remark that "We should reverse the relation between the right and the good, proposed by
teleological doctrine, and view the right as prior" (Rawls 1971 p560) we can see that these
two thinkers are on a direct collision course!
Recall again that MacIntyre analyses moral activities as practices, which derive their sense
from being part of a greater narrative which in turn is part of a received tradition.
MacIntyre's self is located within this social matrix, and his moral actions and even his very
rationality cannot be understood apart from it. The matrix provides the very possibility of
constitutive attachment and without this social matrix any notion of constitutive attachment
(whether communal or personal) is incoherent.
Mulhall and Swift distinguish two senses in which this can be meant. Firstly there is the
"sociological-cum-philosophical point" (Mulhall and Swift pIS) that people obtain their self-
understanding and concept of the good from the matrix. The matrix provides the origins of
their identity. Language, thought and moral life are impossible without a social setting and
these are themes which we have considered already. Secondly, not only the possibility of
moral ends but also the content of moral ends cannot be shaped independently ofthe
community. The communitarian objects to the liberal's conception of selves as participating
in society solely for mutual advantage, and emphasises that social bonds and communal
values are thereby illegitimately excluded from consideration. But for the communitarian
these social bonds and communal values are the very stuff ofa meaningful life.
MacIntyre is critical of Rawls' self in the original position behind the veil of ignorance who
deliberates on what kind ofends he should choose for himself: on the assumption that others
make a similar free, equal, rational and properly informed choice. The question 'what ends
would I choose, what would I value?' (emphasising the I) rules out the possibility of ends
that oftheir very nature are held in common; ends for a community over and above the ends
of any individual in it. Not only is this at odds with MacIntyre's conception ofthe way
things are, but it is a shortcoming ofthe original position, because the subject is not free in
his choice as Rawls supposes.
Finally, MacIntyre thinks that choices especially moral choices made by the unencumbered
self are subjective and worthless as they are ultimately arbitrary expressions ofpreference. In
Rawls' scheme there is no possibility of rational or objective justification, that is to say
ratification by the community. This is not directly a point about the self but if the selfhas
ultimately arbitrary constitutive attachments as opposed to independent or given constitutive
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attachments then this will affect the way we consider selves. Common sense suggests that it
is not the case that one view is as good as another. If a life devoted to beauty is no better than
a life playing video games that we are in a sorry state, but given that people do disagree
about what constitutes the good life, how do we choose? MacIntyre sees liberalism as a
variant of emotivism; we have no grounds for choice except preference, and ultimately this
choice cannot be justified.
Again the liberal response to this is that not all choices are those ofthe unencumbered self:
not all are arbitrary and unjustifiable, made alone behind the veil. Only those that relate to
the self qua citizen. Only those features of the self that are irrelevant to the concept ofjustice
are put to one side. But the question remains, can justice be legitimately partitioned from
other ends, other constitutive attachments in this way? For example can a Christian conceive
of a notion ofjustice wholly independently ofhis religious belief?
In order to get a handle on this question I shall recast it in slightly different terminology.
Rawls calls those fundamental ideals by which people actually live their lives, the
conception of the good which they actually follow, as perfectionist ideals. To pursue justice
the state must remain neutral between these fundamental ideals, it must allow people to make
their own choices and so is said to be anti-perfectionist, Rawls defends what he calls anti-
perfectionist political liberalism, but communitarians who do not accept that the state can be
anti-perfectionist say Rawls is committed to a comprehensive liberalism, which he fails to
recognise and which undermines his claims of state neutrality. Communitarians claim our
political, moral and other final aims cannot be partitioned in the way Rawls suggests.
Mulhall and Swift have it that "the fundamental question that Rawls must face is how he can
and should respond to someone who acknowledges that the goods of an anti-perfectionist
liberal polity are goods, but believes that in some important cases they can be trumped by the
goods that form part of the comprehensive perfectionist doctrines to which she is committed"
(Mulhall and Swift p221). They examine a number of separate responses that Rawls has
made and make a further distinction between a partially and a fully comprehensive doctrine.
A fully comprehensive doctrine covers all values but a partially comprehensive doctrine
allows some political values to be separated out from other values. They suggest that in some
places Rawls does seem to embrace a partially comprehensive doctrine and in so doing has
undermined the neutrality ofthe state. "The fundamental concession has nonetheless been
made, for regardless ofwhether the comprehensive liberalism that Rawls invokes is precisely
articulated or not, it is undeniably comprehensive: it involves going beyond the resources of
purely political liberalism" (ibid. p222).
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In other words the self can be understood as having some fundamental aims, some
constitutive attachments which may under certain circumstance 'trump' the values of
political liberalism. One might try to categorise these certain circumstances, to lay down
which constitutive comprehensive attachments trump which strands ofthe theory ofjustice
and under what circumstances. However this would be extremely difficult ifnot impossible
and it seems to me that the concession mentioned above suggests that a compromise position
is required; that the road that tenaciously adheres to liberal v. communitarian or perfectionist
v. anti perfectionist dichotomies is a dead end.
In order to explore this compromise position more closely 1 shall briefly reconsider Charles
Taylor's position and then tum to the work ofJoseph Raz. Taylor's analysis begins with the
question "who am I?" (Taylor 1989b p27) and it is immediately clear that for Taylor the
answer "I'm Bob Smith" or whatever does not amount to much - ifanything. On Taylor's
view the selfonly begins to get some sense ofits identity when it 'knows' where it belongs;
" ... say as a Catholic or an anarchist. Or, they may define it in part by the nation or tradition
they belong to; as an Armenian, say, or a Quebecois" (ibid.). Furthermore Taylor insists "this
is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human beings; which could
perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some
superhuman of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive ofhuman agency, that stepping outside these limits
would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, that is
undamaged, human personhood" (ibid.).
For Taylor the individual's relationship to his community is constitutive ofhis identity and if
that relationship is severed then the person experiences an identity crisis, disorientated and
without bearings. The task of finding out who 1 am is the task offinding where 1 fit into the
community or communities to which 1belong. This commitment to community has a moral
dimension too, and knowing who 1 am cannot be separated from my conception ofwhat is
valuable or good. As a narrative self1 must be oriented in a moral space, 1must have a sense
ofwhere 1have come from and where 1 am going, in other words strong values are
constitutive ofthe self
Nicholas Smith draws out the parallel between Taylor's arguments for our situated identity
and our ethical orientation towards the good. The development ofTaylor's position would
take us a long way from our theme, but Smith argues that: "Taylor's study ofHegelian
dialectics enabled him to formulate more clearly the claim to validity ofMerleau-Ponty's
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phenomenological description ofembodied subjectivity" (Smith 2002 p62). From perceiving
objects as up or down, closer or farther away we have an inescapable structure to our
perception and ifthese disappear we lose all sense ofnormality. Similarly we have
inescapable horizons that defme our identity and these horizons bound and give sense to our
very being. Smith goes on, "Taylor responds with a transcendental argument that tries to
show that an orientation to the good is an indispensable feature ofhuman agency. The
argument has the same form as the 'proof Taylor gave of the thesis that human beings are
essentially embodied agents" (ibid. p93). Both these 'proofs' argue via a kind ofreductio ad
absurdum that without boundaries or horizons our very identity and also our moral
functioning would fall apart. In order for coherent life our selves must be embodied in
community and our moral lives constrained by a strong orientation to the good.
This philosophical position has, as we have seen, some far-reaching political implications.
Smith tells us "Taylor agrees with Hegel that neither the liberal democratic state whose
exclusive purpose and legitimacy resides in protecting the rights of individuals, nor the
'Jacobin' state whose purpose is to generate a unanimous will through the full participation
of a homogeneous citizenry, are capable of delivering freedom to the individual" (ibid.
pI42). A strongly communitarian position is inadequate as it lacks the resources to deal with
the multiplicity of identities that persons have and as we have seen earlier cannot
accommodate minority groups. Taylor proposes what he calls 'situated freedom' as a
compromise.
For Taylor freedom or the capacity to choose is not a capacity fully formed at birth. It is a
capacity that must mature and develop and the real right is the exercise ofmature freedom.
Now this mature freedom can only be exercised against a certain background, and indeed can
only mature within society. Taylor concludes: "the right to freedom of the individual cannot
be divorced from the 'obligation to belong" (ibid. pI45). Exercising freedom whilst
belonging is situated freedom.
For liberal critics such as Kymlicka this situated freedom is more situated than free. The
individual is subsumed in to a community which is unduly conservative and which restricts
the autonomy ofthe individual. "No individual is (or ought to be) compelled to align herself
with any particular goal or purpose, however 'authoritative' it may be within the
community" (ibid. pI46). As we have already noted Taylor thinks much debate in this area is
based upon confusion between issues of ontology and issues of advocacy.
112
Taylor claims that the communitarian position is generally an ontological one which posits
how selves in fact are. This thesis is not logically committed to advocacy of anything. The
liberal responses have often been works of advocacy challenging the nature of community
and their conception offinal ends. Hence Taylor claims the liberal attack is no attack at all,
as it rests on what we might call a category error. Despite this distinction, Taylor
acknowledges that the relation between ontological questions and advocacy issues is
"complex" (Taylor 1989a p160). He says the issues are not "completely independent, in that
the stand one takes on the ontological level can be part of the essential background of the
view one advocates" (ibid.). As I understand it this means that whilst there is a logical
distinction to be made, in all likelihood and as a matter of fact one's ontological position will
prompt (is part of the essential background of) what one advocates. Given this, it seems to
me that there is a genuine case for compromise between liberals and communitarians.
Joseph Raz is widely thought to be one ofthe most successful explorers ofthe 'middle
ground'. It must be said straight away that here I cannot do justice to the richness of Raz's
analysis, but I hope I can bring out the essential features without over-simplifying his
position. I shall concentrate on what Raz has to say about autonomy and largely ignore what
Raz has to say about authority. Raz agrees with Rawls that a (ifnot the) core value in human
life is autonomy. For Rawls the possibility that an individual can revise his own
commitments and pursue his own conception ofthe good means the state must be neutral;
anti-perfectionist. Raz holds the reverse, the view that for an individual to be able to revise
his own commitments and pursue his own conception ofthe good the state not only can but
also must be perfectionist.
To explore this further I shall first note three positions that Raz wants to distance himself
from, three arguments against anti-perfectionism, then I shall consider Raz's understanding
of autonomy and the argument for perfectionism. Firstly Raz says controversy in politics
does not mean one position will be allowed to dominate or overrule another. (Disagreement
and reasoned debate in politics often leads to development of ideas and acceptable
compromise.) Secondly a perfectionist approach to politics does not mean that one group
need necessarily coerce another to conform to a particular lifestyle. And thirdly, permitting a
state to act on perfectionist ideals does not mean that one lifestyle will be promoted and all
others will be eliminated, for there may be a multiplicity of acceptable lifestyles.
Perfectionism is not inconsistent with pluralism; Raz is not a political monist!
Turning to Raz's arguments for perfectionism as a guarantee of autonomy, it is first
necessary to elucidate what Raz understands by autonomy. Crucially he says that well being
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depends on living a life ofvalue, which he distinguishes from a life believed to be ofvalue.
A particular life has value because it can be justified by good and valid reasons independent
ofbelief. Or to put it another way and to bring out the sharp contrast with the liberal
position, a life is not ofvalue simply because the person living it believes it to be and has
freely chosen it. Observe that a person can be mistaken about a particular conception ofthe
good, and that there is no inherent contradiction in saying a person's life was freely chosen
but worthless. The assumptions here are that some goals and ideals in life are better than
others and that reason and argument can justify this. Neither of these claims seem
particularly counter intuitive or alarming.
Hence for Raz, an autonomous choice is a choice in pursuit if the good, and for it to be a
meaningful choice at all there must be a variety ofpossible options to choose between. And
it should be emphasised, this is not a choice between several options only one ofwhich is
good, but that there be a variety ofgood options. "To understand why Raz thinks that
autonomy requires a choice between good options we need only see that he regards the
choice between good and evil as no choice at all" (Mulhall and Swift p266).
Raz's central argument then goes like this. Autonomy ofthe individual is ofhighest
importance, but autonomy is only ofvalue if the individual is presented with a genuine
choice. This possibility of choice presupposes a certain kind of society, a society where
there is a stable social matrix, because"A person's well-being depends to a large extent on
success in socially defined and determined pursuits and activities" (Raz 1986 p309). If
autonomy requires a stable social matrix then it is the state's function to ensure that this
matrix exists and is sustainable. This is the sense in which the state is perfectionist, for it
must intervene to maintain the social matrix, it cannot fail to act, it cannot remain neutral,
when the necessary social forms are threatened.
Hence for Raz the state may endorse goals or ideals because there are valid reasons that
justify them, independently ofhow many or how few people think so. "The fact that the state
considers anything to be valuable or valueless is no reason for anything. Only its being
valuable or valueless is a reason" (ibid. p412). Raz recognises that states may be corrupt or
that states may make errors in their evaluations, but nonetheless he firmly rejects the liberal
notions that such decisions are impossible and the state should remain neutral.
But contrary to the knee jerk reaction of the liberal to which we may have become
accustomed, this does not compromise autonomy because the individual can "through the
development ofhis own variations and combinations, transcend the social form" (ibid.
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p312). The individual's rights are in no way compromised, but we must be careful here for
Raz understands rights too in a particular way. Adam Swift characterises Raz's position as
"X has a right if and only ifX can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect ofX's
well-being (his interests) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a
duty" (Swift 2001 p143). In other words by linking the rights of one to the duties ofothers,
Raz shows how individuals only have rights within a community. Far from driving a wedge
between individuals and community, Raz underlines that the former have no rights without
the latter. For example "if! have a right to a trial by jury - so others have a duty to provide
me with such a trial - then, presumably too I have a duty to do my jury service when my
number comes up" (ibid. p144). The well-being and rights of the individual are incoherent
without community.
In particular autonomy is not an individual right, for the interests ofthe individual are not
sufficient reason to burden a potentially large number ofpeople with such duties. However
autonomy is a political or social device; it does not articulate "fundamental moral or political
principles" but exists "to maintain and protect the fundamental moral and political culture of
a community through specific institutional arrangements or political conventions" (Raz 1986
p245).
In the light ofthis discussion I wish to propose an understanding ofthe selfwhich is central
to this thesis and which underpins the basic claim about the need for a framework for values
education. This understanding has both 'negative' and 'positive' components. On the
negative side the widely accepted liberal view ofthe selfwhich is antecedently individuated
and chooses its own constitutive attachments is firmly rejected. It is rejected for the reasons
that this is not what actually happens, the rationality and morals of the self are inextricably
interwoven with a community. Additionally it is rejected because of a sympathy with the
view that there is something basically incoherent about the liberal claim. That is to say that
the separation ofthe self into separate parts which seems to be a necessary feature of liberal
analysis is not possible and does not make sense. We cannot separate the self-qua-citizen
from the self as a whole. We cannot separate out essential constitutive attachments from
other attachments; there is a continuum of attachments for each person, between the loosely
held and the most deeply held, not a stark partition between those that are constitutive and
those that are not. And finally, as Raz points out, we cannot make sense ofone who chooses
in the absence of a community. These divisions prompt thinking which is based on a
nonsense premise and lead us in to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding.
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On the positive side, I contend that, firstly, the selfis 'encumbered' and has significant
constitutive attachments which are derived from the community ofwhich he is a part. This is
of course true for adults but it is also especially true for children. It is as children, with our
families and in the places that we grow up that our values have their genesis. Of course they
mutate and develop as we mature, but there can be little doubt that the earliest birth of our
values and the way that they develop is to a large part a function ofwhat happens to us at
school in the widest sense.
Crucial to this analysis is the notion of attachments. We all have a set of attachments which
are ways of living and / or thinking which we acquire to some extent by accident and to a
greater extent by the way we are brought up and educated. These attachments are a function
of the traditions that we inherit and the communities to which we belong. As reflective and
autonomous individuals we may reflect upon our attachments and some we accept readily,
some we accept uneasily and some we reject. Additionally some may be easy to reject and
some may be extremely difficult - there is a continuum here, and at the extreme there may
be those attachments that if I reject them I almost become a new person, and I leave a certain
part ofmy old selfbehind.
These most deeply held attachments whose rejection entails a change in a person's nature I
understand as essential constitutive attachments. But it is important to note that just as
change in a person's nature is an imprecise term and admits ofdegrees so there is no sharp
distinction between constitutive attachments and others. Additionally and more importantly I
do not see the rejection of constitutive attachments and the changing of a person's nature as
possible for a child. It is only possible for a mature individual who already has a set of
significantly held attachments to reject. As I see it a child must be initiated in to way of life
before the possibility ofrejecting it and choosing another becomes coherent.
The second positive claim is the beliefthat the selfis 'encumbered' does not entail that the
self is deprived ofautonomy. The self is free to make choices, to reflect on values and to
make important and significant judgements. The mistake of liberal education, I think, is to
suppose that the autonomous selfmust be able to choose absolutely anything or it is not
properly autonomous. Again I think there is a lurking incoherence here which has derailed
the liberal's good intentions, for the autonomous self cannot choose just anything. The
community ofwhich he is a part necessarily bounds his choices; there are borders of
rationality and morals, oflanguage and tradition which he cannot transgress and still remain
within the community. And as Raz points out there can be no autonomy without community.
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Brighouse notes that there are limits to plasticity ofhuman persons. What he means here is
that some individuals are able to live good lives from the inside under certain conditions
while other people are unable to live good lives from the inside under the same or similar
conditions. This second group needs more freedom or autonomy. What is essential for one
person to live the good life may not be essential for the next. Some children seem ill
constituted to develop the particular virtues their parents espouse and endorse. By contrast
some children will be well constituted to the ways of life into which they are inducted by
their parents (cf. Brighouse 2001).
Brighouse sees this as an argument for liberal education where the state does not comment
on the substantive ends of children. but leaves such questions open. It seems to me that
however, that by the same consideration ofplasticity some children may gain little from a
liberal approach and fail to find a way of life they can live well from the inside. They may
drift and feel lost or confused in a moral maze. Appealing to the differences in plasticity of
children seems to do little to help us here.
At this point it is perhaps also worth noting the distinction that John White makes between a
weak sense of autonomy and a strong sense. Weak autonomy is autonomy within a system or
framework. Strong autonomy is a radical autonomy that questions the entire system or
framework. For example I might be weakly autonomous about deciding whether to marry or
in choosing a spouse, but I am strongly autonomous if I question the whole institution of
western monogamous marriage. Voting within a liberal democracy may be seen similarly;
choosing how to vote within society is a different matter to critically reflecting on the
democratic structure of society as a whole.
White thinks that weak autonomy is essential for the personal flourishing ofboth children
and adults and I agree with him. There is nothing in my argument against autonomy within a
framework. White goes on to suggest that adults cannot avoid (at least) occasional reflection
about wider issues and therefore they will be better placed ifthey can also exercise
autonomy in the stronger sense and I have no disagreement here.
White considers the appropriateness or desirability of strong autonomy for children and
admits "things tend to get complicated at this point" (White 1991 p92). He suggests a child
may flourish in a community which is not strongly autonomous, but says for this to happen
"educators and other community leaders have to take steps to keep children within the fold,
to prevent their being influenced by the values ofthe wider society. This means that forms of
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indoctrination may be used, aimed at a deliberate sequestration from the wider society and a
deliberate restriction of attention to the values and traditions of the community" (ibid.).
No! White is wrong, he assumes children will reject what they are taught and will need to be
kept in the fold. Why? They may accept the teaching and values oftheir community and be
happy to be in the fold! And even ifthey do question the values and norms oftheir
community these may be explained and reasons for them may be given - this is not
indoctrination! Nor does it follow that ifI pay attention to the values of society as a whole or
even if I am influenced by them, I will reject the values ofmy community - I may come to
hold them more firmly. The deliberate restriction of attention to the community's own values
that White suggests is necessary, has no justification.
It seems to me that distinguishing weak and strong autonomy is an instructive device, but
there are not really two types, but a continuum. MacIntyre and Taylor speak of a multiplicity
ofrelationships ofbelonging to tradition and community. Hence the young child may be
encouraged to be weakly autonomous but not allowed to question the framework. As the
child matures a stronger sense of autonomy will be progressively more appropriate and the
young adult may come to reject the framework in which he has been educated. I have no
problem with this, but that a framework is required initially seems to me undeniable.
Again, White presents his arguments as a choice between very stark alternatives. The pupil
who is not fully autonomous is one who has been indoctrinated, and this seems to me to be a
fruitless dichotomy. White saves his final burst of scorn for Christianity and says, "in an
autonomy-supporting society all children must be protected against true believers who wish
to impose their non-autonomous conception ofthe good life" (ibid. p92). There is a
regrettable ambiguity here: on the one hand ifWhite means that children must be protected
from those particular believers who wish to impose their non-autonomous conception of the
good life then the claim is relatively uncontroversial and I agree with him. On the other hand
it: as I suspect, White means children must be protected from all believers who oftheir very
nature wish to impose their non-autonomous conception ofthe good life then I disagree.
It is by no means clear that the believing Christian is non-autonomous and whilst it may be
true that some believers 'impose' their belief there is no general requirement to do so.
Additionally the claim that all children need protecting from Christianity seems to me either
deliberately inflammatory or neurotic. White seems keen to sharpen and delineate the battle
lines despite recognising difficulties here, and to reject any possibility of compromise
between autonomy and communal attachment in advance.
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Finally, although not directly a point about the self, we may note that a political compromise
between liberals and communitarians; a belief in partially comprehensive liberalism or
'partial perfectionism' ofthe state would seem to suggest that schools other than common
schools should be allowed and even encouraged. If certain value systems are to be
understood as providing essential and fundamental constitutive attachments for individuals
and do not undermine the stability ofthe state as a whole, then it seems such individuals and
groups of individuals have every right to see these systems instantiated in schools. This is
not necessarily to say that there could or should be no common schools, but it is to say that if
one of the roles ofthe state is to provide education, then it should provide for a pluralist
society; schools for Christians, Muslims, Hindus, whatever. This is a complex issue which
immediately raises questions ofhow and to what extent the state may regulate 'faith
schools'. This issue is particularly pertinent in the USA and is an issue to which 1 shall return
in chapter ten. However it is important to note again how philosophical arguments about the
selfmay have far reaching consequences.
As a footnote it is important to realise that interest and debate in the nature ofthe self and in
particular its relationship to community, is not a debate that is confined to liberal-
communitarian circles. In the analysis ofthe American George Weigel, Pope John Paul II
has been one ofthe most influential ifnot the most influential character ofthe twentieth
century. Before his election to the See ofPeter in 1978 Karol Wojtyla was professor of ethics
at Lublin University (appointed 1 December 1956), where long before the publication ofthe
texts upon which I have focussed, Wojtyla was concerned with the relationship ofthe self to
the community. Wojtyla's work was very much a product ofhis department which was
concerned to study the nature of the self, to answer the question 'quid est homo?' in the light
of the horrifying Polish experience of the Second World War. Wojty1a's and his colleagues
considered themselves to be studying philosophical anthropology and their approach,
possibly best developed by Wojtyla, was based on realist metaphysics combined with a
phenomenological method.
On the one hand, Wojtyla emphasises the primacy of the self as a free agent. When persons
interact with others they endow their own existence with a personal dimension. Wojtyla sees
participation in community as a distinctive property ofhumans as persons and a method by
which the selfis fulfilled. Participation is a property "of the person by virtue ofwhich human
beings, while existing and acting together with others, are nevertheless capable offulfilling
themselves in this activity and existence" (Wojtyla 1993 p237 my italics).
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On the other hand Wojtyla emphasises community, not as a multiplicity of subjects, but as
"the specific unity ofthis multiplicity" (ibid. p238). That is to say in community the set of
relations that holds the group together and defines it come to the fore. "The concept of
community....has both a real and an ideal meaning: it signifies both a certain reality and an
ideal or principle. This meaning is ontological as well as axiological, and hence also
normative" (ibid. p239). The mention ofnormativity here is Wojtyla's recognition ofthe
ethical constraints that the community exerts on the self.
More interesting perhaps than this difficult presentation is the recognition ofthe essential
conflict: "the problem of the relation between the community (the value ofthe community)
and the autoteleology of the human being" (ibid. p240). Wojtyla's resolution of the problem
resides in a distinction between 'I-Thou' relationships and 'we' relationships. 'f-Thou'
relationships are person to person relationships, one-to-one, where both parties are
simultaneously subject and object in the relationship. There is a reflexive recognition that the
Thou is also another 1, and each recognises the other as "fully constituted, separate, personal,
subjects with all that comprises the subjectivity of each ofthem" (ibid. p242).
By contrast the 'we' relationship is the relationship ofthe person to a group, and this is more
than a relationship to many selves, it is a bond to a common good. The self is not diminished
in this relationship, but in fact finds a new social dimension. Wojtyla's compromise (ifwe
wish to call it that) is his insistence that both types of relationships are necessary for a
fulfilled life: for the complete development of the person. His favourite example is
marriage, in which there is clearly an interpersonal 'I-Thou' relationship between the man
and the woman, but there is also a 'we' relationship, they are a single entity, they have new
responsibilities and duties, and through the 'we' relationship each partner grows and is
enriched.
The lesson to be learnt in the context of education and education for values is a rejection of
the antipathy between freedom or autonomy of the self: and alignment with or membership
of a given group or community. Of course there are manipulative and coercive communities
just as there are wicked and destructive individuals, but in speaking of education to a certain
extent we concern ourselves with an ideal. I contend that because ofthe very nature ofthe
self, the ideal here is that the individual reaches maturity and fulfilment not as a liberal
autonomous self contra the community, but as a situated autonomous selfwithin it!
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VIII Frameworks Justified
My early discussion about what constituted a framework was underpinned by and dependent
upon certain assumptions about the nature ofthe self I hope that in chapter seven these
assumptions have been laid bare and have been located within the context of the liberal-
communitarian debate. Following Raz I contend that the autonomy of the individual is not an
autonomy contra the community ofwhich the individual is a part, but that membership of
some community is an essential prerequisite for the exercise of autonomy. The notion of the
unencumbered self is rejected, and the self is understood as partly encumbered and yet
autonomous. As I suggested earlier these clarifications do not only serve to explicate what a
framework is but they also provide the reasons why a framework is necessary for values
education. In short, I contend that the concept ofthe self that I have proposed also serves to
justify my claim that values education requires a framework.
The purpose of this chapter is to present that justification: that is to draw out the links
between the notion of framework that I have developed and the notion ofthe individual as a
free but encumbered self. In its simplest or most basic form the argument runs like this:
Al The well-being of the self requires it to be situated.
A2 The enhancement ofthe well-being ofthe self is (or ought to be) the purpose of
education.
A3 Hence the (or at least a) purpose of education is to situate the self
A4 Hence education must provide a situation - that is a framework.
As it stands this is too stark and requires a number ofadditional qualifications and
expansions. It will be necessary to consider the notions of individuals and selves, ofwell
being, the obvious communitarian reply to A3 that education is about the formation of
communities not individuals, and the connections between situatedness and frameworks need
to be shown. So with these qualifications in mind, let us start again. Finally as this thesis is
about education rather then about selves it seems education is a more fitting place to start
than selves.
B I Education in a liberal society should aim at the flourishing of individuals.
Three points may be made here. Firstly, the term well-being (in AI), derived from Aristotle
and bound up with notions of the good life, is widely used and may be taken to mean "both a
condition of the good life and what the good life achieves" (Honderich p908). Possible
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ambiguities lurk here however not only because ofthis dual designation but also on account
ofthe good life being understood in moral terms or as a life of enjoyment. Whilst Aristotle
saw these two as integrated, i.e. the moral good life is the enjoyable life, other philosophers
have found this dichotomy problematic. Further well-being seems to suggest something of an
inert state, a condition in which one is or to which one aspires. In the literature 'human well-
being' is used almost interchangeably with 'human flourishing' and little distinction is drawn
between them, but for our purposes flourishing seems a better term as it less burdened with
ambiguity and suggests a characteristic of the person as a whole. Further and perhaps more
importantly, flourishing suggests something of a mode of existence rather than a state of
being and seems more appropriate to the endeavour of education. We do not aim at a fmal
end product (well-being) but at a way of living. Hence it seems appropriate to replace well-
being in Al by flourishing.
Secondly, we do not tend to refer to people as selves, but rather as individuals. It is almost as
though the individual has a self, but is more than it. The self is that theoretical, perhaps inner
part of a person about which philosophers speculate; the meaning and nature ofthe self are
under scrutiny, but in schools the concern is broader than this. Schools and education are
concerned with the development ofwhole persons, individuals not just selves. Hence this
section of the argument seems better expressed in terms of individuals than selves.
Of course, this does not mean that the previous discussion (chapter VII) is redundant for we
may make a distinction between the more theoretical and the more practical aspects ofthe
discussion. The theoretical side ofthe discussion is located within the context ofthe liberal
communitarian debate and is couched in the language ofthe self When we engage with this
debate it is appropriate to speak ofthe self and selves. When we come to apply some ofthis
theory to the educational situation, talk of selves seems less appropriate and talk of the
individual seems better. At the beginning ofSources ofthe Self, Taylor declares his is a
search for the modem identity, "what it is to be a human agent, a person or a self' (Taylor
1989b p3). Taylor does not unravel the distinctions between these terms but settles for self,
as "morality and selfhood tum out to be inextricably intertwined themes" (ibid.). It is then I
think, legitimate to move from one expression to the other when the parameters of our
discussion are widened.
Thirdly, the notion of the aims of education is not unproblematic. We should observe the
obvious communitarian concern and likely counter to A2, that education does not concern
the flourishing ofthe selfbut the flourishing of the community as a whole. However, we
may notice that the flourishing ofthe community entails to some extent the flourishing ofthe
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individuals within it. We can imagine individuals flourishing without their community
flourishing but we cannot imagine a community flourishing without the individuals who
constitute it doing so. It is, of course, something of a question ofnumbers for a flourishing
community may have a minority ofmalcontents or deprived individuals, but they cannot all
be so. The communitarian would maintain that the community must take precedence over the
individual whereas the liberal would put the individual first. I would want to suggest the two
cannot really be separated out and hence a compromise must be sought, but we can in fact
side step the problem for, philosophy aside, we do in fact live in a liberal society.
In other words whilst this analysis is largely theoretical, it is supposed to be applicable to the
real world. It is supposed to have the situation that we are presently in as its starting point,
and so we can with some justification, base the purpose of education on the liberal society in
which we find ourselves. In other words we may go along with the liberal agenda for
education here, for as a matter of fact, that is where we find ourselves.
In addition to Bland in the light of chapter seven we need a second premise:
B2 The flourishing of individuals necessitates that their selves be situated.
It is worth briefly reiterating what this means and why it must be so. In MacIntyre's analysis
the individual is situated in a social matrix apart from which the rationality and the moral
action of the individual cannot be understood. Without social attachments the actions and the
utterances of the individual are incoherent. The actions of the individual are only given
meaning in so far as they conform to certain practices which are in turn part of a wider
narrative and ultimately a tradition. In so far as the individual's actions are rendered
senseless without a situation, his flourishing depends on one!
Taylor's analysis emphasises the individual as situated within a community. My self identity
and my concept ofthe good are derived from the community or communities ofwhich I am a
part. I am essentially an encumbered self or agent. Taylor suggests that the unencumbered
agent is somehow damaged or even unrecognisable as a human agent. Again the flourishing
of the individual - his full and rewarding participation within social discourse - depends on
his situation.
Additionally it has been noted that even if autonomy is taken as the summum bonum of
human flourishing, then on Raz's account with which I am inclined to agree, choosing and
the exercise of autonomy must have a context. They must have a stable social context or
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form, which we may call a situation. Raz points out that "generally speaking, to entertain
thoughts and to have beliefs we need concepts, and as concepts are historical products, so is
the ability to have the beliefs and thoughts which they are needed for" (Raz 200 I p65). In
response to the suggestion that we may invent or develop our own thoughts and beliefs, Raz
concedes that we may, but says "no one can invent all the concepts needed for further
invention, and therefore everyone depends on the socially available concepts to think about
and to understand values" (ibid. p66).
Finally we should observe that in this analysis situatedness is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for flourishing. That is to say that we must have situatedness for flourishing, but
situatedness is itselfnot enough. A person, and a child in particular, must also have his or her
physical needs met. He must be clothed and fed, As a child he needs to be safe from danger
and ideally within a stable family. These latter requirements are crucial but are not the
domain of education. It is the particular educational aspects of situatedness that concern us
here. What are these? To answer this we may qualify B I with:
B3 The most important aspects of education, as far as situatedness is concerned, are
those relating to values.
The kind of education that is relevant to situatedness as discussed above is education that
covers social, historical, cultural and moral norms. Education that derives from our common
heritage and in short our values. There are certain aspects of education that are effectively
valueless and these do not relate to situatedness. The sorts of things I have in mind are
teaching a child to swim, or to do mathematics where the learning outcome is more ofa
process rather than a corpus ofknowledge. What about teaching a child to paint? This is a
process, but has inherent values relating to aesthetics and perhaps too the inescapable
influence of religious art etc..
In saying this we must also distinguish the content ofwhat is taught and the way that it is
taught, for the manner of teaching may well convey certain values very strongly. In teaching
mathematics I may well convey all sorts ofvalues by the language I use, the manner I adopt
and the examples I choose. In saying this there is perhaps no value free teaching, but this is
not a real problem as B3 asserts what is most important; where values and situatedness are
most likely to be to the fore. B3 does not assert that values education is the only relevant
aspect where situatedness is concerned.
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Finally, the consideration of a subject like physics reveals a further complexity. On the face
of it we may think of physics as a typical 'hard' science, factual in the extreme and as value-
free as any subject is likely to be. But behind our doing physics is a multitude ofassumptions
about the scientific method, about epistemology and procedural protocol, which quickly
become apparent if we compare the twenty-first century physicist with his twelfth century
counterpart. In other words we should not ignore a distinction between what we might call
explicit values and implicit or tacit values. Nevertheless, having recognised these subtle
influences, I think, it is appropriate to continue to concentrate on the more overt
contributions to values education because these are the ones that are likely to have the
greatest effect and are the ones we can most readily control.
Hence, given B I to B3 we ought to be able to say that if flourishing requires a situation and
situatedness is the domain ofvalues education then values education should lead to
flourishing and situatedness. But this still needs to be tightened for why cannot the individual
be situated entirely independently of education? Might a sufficient basis of language,
tradition and culture be acquired in the home and in recreational and other non-educational
activities? The answer to this question must be that it might be possible, and cannot be
logically ruled out, but in all likelihood education, (and by that I mean school education) will
playa large part in the acquisition of situatedness. Why should this be so?
In earlier times society was indisputably more homogeneous, people who lived in villages or
suburban settlements formed tight knit communities, schools were generally much smaller,
and the school life ofa child and his home life were closely linked. We might almost say that
the school life of the child was an extension ofhis home life. In such cases a child may have
received much ifnot all his situatedness through his family life. Language, tradition and
community would have been as much a part oflife outside the school as within it. In present
(late-modern or post-modern) times this is not the case. People generally live in larger,
heterogeneous and often urban locations. They go to schools which are often very large and
which may be at some distance from their homes. There is much less continuity between
home and school life, and so the importance ofboth the school and the family to the
acquisition of situatedness is increased.
Additionally, if family life is increasingly unstable, if there is a higher divorce rate, if there
are more single parents and broken homes, then the school has a greater responsibility to its
pupils. There is more and more reason why schools must consciously and deliberately
contribute to the situatedness of their pupils.
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Furthermore, it has been the experience of teachers that those things that one could or might
assume a child would know by a certain age, because he had learnt them at home, he often
does not know. My own experience as a child was being taught my multiplication tables at
home by my parents and being rewarded by two pence for each one (up to twelve!) that I had
mastered! My experience as a mathematics teacher would very strongly suggest that this
kind ofparental involvement is very rare nowadays. Much the same can be said of literacy
skills, and the demise of reading at home (bedtime stories) can be clearly understood in
terms of the increase oftelevision watching and the playing of computer and other games. I
think similar things can be said in terms of education generally and ofvalues education in
particular and in the field of sex education and HIV prevention the teaching is to be based on
the assumption that the pupil will not have learnt the lesson at home.
Hence given that there are areas of doubt and uncertainty about what a child learns at home,
and indeed uncertainty about the kinds of counter-culture that the child may be exposed to
outside the school, it seems appropriate to strengthen the argument above with:
B4 It cannot be assumed that individuals will achieve and maintain situatedness without
deliberate educational intervention.
Combining these four premises we can now conclude;
B5 Therefore it should be a part of the business of education to try to ensure that, as
regards values, individuals are situated.
Having achieved this much, the transition must be made from arguing about situatedness to
arguing about frameworks. The deliberate educational intervention to achieve and maintain
situatedness must be within a framework. Why does situatedness require a framework? In
the light ofwhat has already been said the answer to this should be obvious but it is worth
repeating the essential points again.
In the light ofwhat has been said above the self cannot be conceived as an atomistic entity
but must be situated within a social matrix. This matrix is inseparable from a tradition and a
community, and is instantiated locally by shared rationality, shared practices and shared
language. Furthermore these elements whilst distinguishable are such that one cannot be
reduced to the others, nor can any be jettisoned.
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Ultimately these matrices cannot be escaped but as we have already noted the relationship
between the individual and the matrix may be harmonious or troubled, it may be close or
distant, easy or uneasy. It is the purpose ofvalues education, surely, to try to give an
individual an easy and comfortable relationship to the matrix in which they find themselves.
A framework along the lines that I have proposed does this, in so far as it is based on these
crucial elements oflanguage, tradition and community.
It is worth noting that Haydon writes ofhis wish to have a "conception ofmorality which
teachers can be comfortable with and articulate" (Haydon 1999 px). He seems to mean, as I
would mean, a conception in which they were well grounded, one which was widely shared,
in the sense ofnot largely contentious, and one which they could readily expound and
explain. In his review Dunlop takes Haydon to task for trying to find a conception of
morality with which we can be comfortable, rather than one which is true or truly conceived.
Dunlop's remarks seem misplaced for I do not think Haydon is advocating comfort at the
expense of or instead oftruth. Admittedly much turns on one's view ofthe origin and
purpose ofmorality, but on any account I would want to agree with Haydon that morality is
largely tradition and community specific (or at least the interpretation ofmorality is). In this
social context it is hard to see what 'true' in some universal sense might mean for truth is a
socially constructed concept too. I would want to go along with Haydon that a comfortable
relationship with a framework, or conception ofmorality is a valuable thing.
A key element here is coherence. The individual (especially the young pupil) who is
provided with a mountain of information and invited to choose about key issues will find it
difficult ifnot impossible to integrate them. A framework will provide the link, the
continuity underlying certain value judgements, by relating the whole educational endeavour
(as far as values are concerned) to language, tradition and community.
Recall MacIntyre speaks of the narrative unity oflife. Narrative renders individual practices
intelligible and when we ask of the source of the unity of life: "the answer is that its unity is
the unity ofa narrative embodied in a single life" (MacIntyre 1981 p218). As we have
already discussed, the narrative underpins the intentions ofwhat I do and relates them to my
goal or end, providing continuity to my identity over time. I am the main subject ofmy own
life to death narrative, but others are also significant players in my narrative, just as I am in
theirs. And indeed without this narrative unity, if it is not nurtured or if it is fatally damaged,
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then my identity is put at risk and as the young man at MacIntyre's bus stop (c.f. MacIntyre
1981 p21 0) I would be considered mad.
Similarly, in his book on liberal theory, when considering children, Bruce Ackerman makes
the point that cultural coherence is essential for primary education. "Exposing the child to an
endless and changing Babel of talk and behaviour will only prevent the development ofthe
abilities he requires ifhe is ever to take his place among the citizenry" (Ackerman1980
pI41). He says the infant needs coherence but concedes that the degree of coherence is a
matter of dispute.
In the realm of secondary education, the 'restrictions' on coherence are loosened but "on the
one hand, school curriculum must be respectful of the parents legitimate - ifdeclining -
authority over their children. On the other hand parents have an obligation to refrain from
using their residual authority in ways that sabotage the child's right to a liberal education"
(ibid. p156). Ackerman also considers what kind ofrestrictions there should be in schools,
on the voices (or those who express them) of outsiders. In short he says that legitimate
outside voices must be trustworthy (c.f p155) but goes on to say that what counts as
trustworthy depends on "subtle facts about particular societies" (ibid.). Even as a liberal
then, Ackerman concedes there should be restrictions based on societies. But what are
societies based on? Surely among other things they are significantly based upon shared
language, tradition and community! Ofcourse Ackerman does not propose a framework as
such, but where restrictions end and frameworks begin is a questionable point.
In the light of all this it seems that we cannot speak of a person being just 'situated' but he
has to be situated within something. This something is variously called a social matrix, a
narrative unity, a society restricted for children so that it coheres or what I have called a
framework. The elements oflanguage, tradition and community behind the structures above
are all present in my concept offramework, and so it is not inappropriate, as a corollary to
B5 to make the transition to:
B6 Therefore it should be a part of the business of education, to try to ensure that as far
as values are concerned, individuals are educated within a framework.
and
B7 The more detailed nature of such frameworks can be explicated by considerations of
language, tradition and community.
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Finally it is fitting to return to elements ofprevious discussions regarding the scope of a
framework. If each class or year group in a school had its own framework then as a pupil
moved from class to class (in the course of a day) or from year group to year group over a
longer period oftime, then it would encounter a changing framework. It is abundantly
obvious that this would lead to confusion and bewilderment, but additionally since language
tradition and culture do not change between classes or year groups within a school the
framework cannot either.
On a much wider scale we can imagine a geographical area or LEA having a particular
framework for pupils and schools in that area. This however does not accommodate the
mixture oftraditions and communities within society. It fails to recognise that in almost any
given area in the UK, people who follow different religions, come from different cultures
and have different backgrounds, and indeed speak different languages live side by side. A
geographical area or educational zone is not the appropriate field for a values education
framework.
This leaves a middle way that each school should have its own values education framework.
This is indeed what The National Forum for Values in Education and the Community seem
to suggest when they say that their list ofvalues is a starting point which is to be adapted by
schools as their circumstances dictate. (cf. SCAA 1996b p16). Hence we may conclude our
argument in this section by:
B8 The way for schools to ensure that they maintain situatedness is by whole schools
subscribing to a particular framework.
This takes us to the heart of the debate about New Labour's faith schools which we shall
consider shortly. Before we turn to these, however, it is worth considering some observations
made by Geoffrey Alderman in The Guardian (6 November 2001, Education section p16).
Alderman begins by referring to a suggestion made by Lee Jasper, race advisor to Ken
Livingstone, the Mayor ofLondon, that Afro-Caribbean children might be better educated in
separate schools. He (Jasper) encouraged the black community to avail itself of the
opportunity for funding independent state schools where that could be based on the black
community serving the needs ofblack children. These schools would have black governors,
black teachers as role models and would deliver a "culturally relevant curriculum" (Guardian
Education p16). In addition to these positive elements, Jasper claims, such a school would
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shield Afro-Caribbean children from the "institutional racism" ofthe current educational
system.
Alderman points out that the knee jerk reaction to such a suggestion is that such separate
education is inherently unequal, and cites a 1954 ruling ofthe US Supreme Court (Brown v.
Topeka Board ofEducation) to support this. But it does not follow that distinct educational
provision is necessarily unequal. No two educational institutions are identical, and so those
factors relevant to equality need to be separated out. Further, it may be argued that the notion
ofeducational equality cannot treat, or should not treat all pupils as identical and some
consideration of their educational needs or requirements is relevant to the question.
Leaving these issues to one side Alderman discusses a number of segregated universities in
the US. He notes there are Jewish, Catholic, Methodist and Baptist universities and whilst
these universities "will accept (indeed, must accept) students of other faiths or no faith in no
way (sic) detracts from their denominational status and ethos" (ibid.). Additionally he notes
that there are black universities and again although they cannot exclude white students they
are "overwhelmingly (over 90%) black" (ibid.). Howard University, America's most
prestigious black university whilst pledging itself to a policy ofnon-discrimination also
declares itself (in its mission statement) as a "predominantly Afro-Caribbean
university.....providing educational opportunities for African-American men and women and
for other historically disenfranchised groups" (ibid.).
And it is not only America, Alderman points out that Oxford and Cambridge are Anglican
foundations, and an advertisement in June 2000 for a pro-Rector for the university ofSurrey
stipulated that the successful candidate would be a Methodist. Although not directly relevant
to our discussion I think both ofthese examples are poor. Oxford and Cambridge are not
really"Anglican foundations" as both pre-date the Reformation and whilst they may have an
Anglican flavour now (many colleges have Anglican chapels and chaplains) this does not
influence their appointments, admissions or curricula to any significant degree. The Surrey
case is presumably a consequence of some founding charter or benefaction, but I am almost
certain that the broader operation, admission and teaching ofSurrey University is in no way
influenced by its having a Methodist pro-Rector. The comparison with the American
universities is not analogous, for there, I think the whole point is that admissions,
appointments and indeed curricula are influenced to a point by the ethos and orientation of
the university. (cf Our earlier discussion ofMacIntyre's remarks in Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiryy.
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But the key question remains. Given that this segregation is voluntary, (and very few people
defend enforced racial segregation), and given that Afro-Caribbean pupils fare better in
segregated schools should they be established? Alderman's own view is that "to permit
genuinely voluntary segregation seems to me nothing less than common sense" (Guardian
education p 16) and I am inclined to agree with him. Indeed such schools based on common
language, tradition and community seems just the kind ofthing I have been arguing for.
One reservation remains. Alderman and Jasper seem to suggest that such segregated schools
are better or provide a better education. Now what does better mean in this context? If it
simply means enhanced examination results then we must be very careful, for despite the
modern obsession there is more to education than exam results. Ifbetter means something
like increased exam performance or a reduction in teenage crime and improved racial
harmony then this is a very strong case. But these consequentialist concerns, however
compelling, are distinct from the sort of! claim I have been making based on the essential
nature of individuals with situated selves. My claim is that human nature is such that
individuals flourish when their selves are situated, and hence situatedness in the context of
an educational framework is an inherently worthwhile thing.
It is worth emphasising: I have said that 'in so far as the individual's actions are rendered
senseless without a situation, his flourishing depends on one!' and 'the flourishing ofthe
individual- depends on his situation' but these are quite distinct from comparative
statements. That is: I am not saying the individual is better offwith a situation (or some
similar locution) I am saying it is essential. Even ifwe return to theuse ofwell-being there is
no comparative here for we do not speak of' better being' or 'more well-being'. Therefore
whilst I am largely inclined to agree with the sort ofconclusions Alderman reaches, I would
say that my reasons for so doing are distinct from his.
Additionally Alderman stresses that there is to be no compulsory segregation ofpupils, and
presumably those Afro-Caribbean pupils who did not wish to attend the Afro-Caribbean
school could attend any other schools oftheir choice including the local common or
comprehensive school. I am in full agreement with this but again need to point out that this is
slightly different to my claim. There is no precise analogy in that those who did not want to
attend School S with framework F would be free to go elsewhere, but there would be no
neutral or common school. Every school would have a framework ofsome kind. As I have
tried to say these may be tighter or looser, confessional or non-confessional, but I do not
imagine a neutral or framework-less alternative as selves could not then be situated. Further,
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I believe there is no such thing as a neutral or liberal (I use the terms loosely) framework, but
this is a more controversial claim, and one to which I shall address in chapter nine.
And finally whereas the Alderman discussion explicitly talks of segregation ofpupils, my
school frameworks entail no such segregation. A school with a given framework would be
open to all, but those who did attend that school would expect a particular ethos and would
be expected to participate in it and to contribute to it. Admittedly this becomes a little more
complicated in the case ofconfessional frameworks and we may ask for example, would
non-Catholics at a Catholic school be expected to attend Mass? The answer in my mind is
yes but two points may be made. Firstly this is a particular kind of example given that the
Mass is a central part ofwhat Catholicism is all about; it is at the heart ofwhat Catholics do,
and a Catholic who never attends mass is an oddity indeed. This example is chosen as it
raises the dilemma starkly. Secondly, however, it is to be acknowledged that one can
participate in the Mass at different levels and whilst it may not be appropriate to ask a non-
Catholic to read a lesson or lead prayers, they could reasonably be expected to attend and
engage with the liturgy at their own leveL I do not consider this in any way problematic as it
rests on the prior choice of the pupil (or his parents choice for him) to attend a Catholic
schooL
Having said this a distinction needs to be drawn for unlike the present English situation
where Catholic schools are generally oversubscribed (often for reasons other than religious
affiliation) and are often the only schools in an area with a clear framework, under my
system there would be a plethora of choice. In other words my framework is really a recipe
for what happens at the schools, not one for who is allowed to attend. I appreciate that this in
practice is likely to lead to a certain "segregation", but this is now a pejorative term,
conjuring up images of apartheid, and it seems to me, talk of something like community
schools, or communities ofpupils, is more positive. I would rather concentrate upon and
emphasise those who are included rather than those who are excluded. Additionally,
emphasis on the diversity of choice that might be available is again a positive thing, quite
distinct from the notion of segregation which tends to conjure images of 'them' and 'us'
which seem to colour the debate adversely.
It is worth noting briefly that whilst the kinds ofreasons I have given for segregated
schooling are distinct from the kinds of reasons that Alderman gives, these do not exhaust
the possibilities. Kevin Mott-Thornton argues from the primacy of autonomy as an
educational aim, and says that autonomy must be based on rational choosing rather than
arbitrary choosing, and that "rational choices can only be made from within some given
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framework ofvalue" (Mott-Thornton p166). Mott-Thornton goes on to argue that the
common school cannot adequately provide such a framework for a heterogeneous body of
pupils and argues for an "alternative model. ... [involving] the rejection of common state
schooling... and based on the conservative or civic pluralist perspective" (ibid. p165). The
details of this need not concern us but the possibility of a number of separate arguments here
should be noted, and the premises from which they proceed should be distinguished.
Of course, there are many who disagree with these arguments and vigorously defend some
liberal conception of education. We will address these challenges in chapter nine, but at this
point we may observe a less theoretical but perhaps more widely held worry. Shirley Rowan
writes: "My hesitation, however, runs as follows: for a school to embrace whole-heartedly a
particular tradition seems to involve a rejection ofrival traditions as wrong, misguided or
flawed in some way" (Rowan p83). My answer to this would be, I think, yes and no.
That is to say yes, I think there are cases where it would be legitimate to say we reject the
tradition you hold as wrong, muddle headed, or misguided. I do not think we should be
afraid of this possibility, and thinking of some particularly extreme or fundamentalist
religious sects, this is a view I would certainly want to adopt. Equally well on some
occasions I think it would be appropriate to say no, we do not reject another tradition as
wrong or misguided, nor do we see it as a rival, but it is not our tradition. I can envisage
separate traditions existing side by side, with one accepting and respecting the other, but
nevertheless disagreeing perhaps about certain fundamental issues. I think this is the kind of
situation MacIntyre imagines and Rowan accedes to this, but thinks there are more ofus
"betwixt and between" (ibid.) than MacIntyre's analysis accounts for.
That is to say, I think, that Rowan recognises that many ofus are products of a number of
traditions, which perhaps overlap, and to which we are related in a variety ofways. This may
be true, but I think there is, in the majority of cases, an identifiable 'home tradition' and that
fewer ofus are really betwixt and between than we might imagine. This theoretical
consideration is easily muddled with a more practical concern that traditions often do not sit
comfortably side by side, but threaten and fight one another. This is perhaps what motivates
Rowan's remarks, and indeed many examples ofsuch tension may be cited, but I would want
to contend that it need not be so. Ifthose educated within a particular framework act with
hostility towards those educated within an alternate framework, that is not a reason to throw
out the whole notion offrameworks, but to adjust or modify them. As part of any
framework, pupils must be taught that there are alternatives which can co-exist side by side.
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By making these kinds of distinctions and recognising the real possibility of error, I think we
need not share Rowan's hesitation. I think we can both reject certain traditions without any
qualms, and at the same time recognise and respect others without seeing them as flawed or
inferior to our own, just different! Saying that such options are possible does not mean that
decisions will be easy or unproblematic, but we should not shy away from making difficult
decisions as a part of a genuine search for values education which is effective and
appropriate.
The notion of different frameworks for schools co-existing side by side brings us back to the
heart of our theme. In this chapter I have argued that schools must recognise and accept their
role in the acquisition of situatedness for their pupils, and that this must be done by teaching
values within the context ofa framework. I have refrained from specifying particular
frameworks beyond a general characterisation in terms of language, tradition and
community.
I have noted that a number ofwriters come to conclusions similar to mine, albeit for different
reasons. I have also acknowledged the challenge of those who consider what we might call a
'liberal framework' in the context of a common school to be a better and viable option. It is
to a consideration ofthis fmal challenge that we must now turn.
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IX The Impossibility of a Liberal Framework
Whilst the central argument in this thesis has been a positive one: namely that values
education requires a framework, there has also been a strong critical element underlying this.
I have repeatedly suggested that certain aspects ofliberal political theory in particular the
liberal conception ofthe self are wrong and have suggested that the liberal approach to
education is misguided. The time has come to focus on the liberal approach to education and
to explain precisely why this is so, or in my language to argue that there can be no liberal
framework for values education.
There is a difficulty here though that liberal theory is not a single well-defined theory, but is
rather a family of theories and ideas, and the liberal approach to education exists in several
forms. Furthermore, the relationship between a liberal political theory and the liberal
approach to education has not been made specific. However this is not a thesis about
liberalism in any form, so having noted this problem I think it will suffice if the salient and
principal features of liberal education are outlined, and finer details are added if and when
they are needed.
At the beginning of chapter six, I argued that the early definition of education proposed by
Peters became to all intents and purposes a definition ofliberal education, as it emphasised a
lack of constraint in respect ofPeters' three conditions. Working with and alongside Peters,
Hirst mapped education into distinct forms ofknowledge and suggested "liberal education is
then, one that determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned
with the development ofthe mind" (Hirst 1973 p99).
Although determined in scope and content by the forms, the key element here is that liberal
education concerns itselfwith the development of the mind, with understanding and
rationality as qualities superior to knowing particular things, and perhaps (although this need
not detain us) somehow independent ofthem. Furthermore this pursuit ofrationality and
understanding was to be sharply distinguished from anything that might be or appear to be,
brainwashing, indoctrination or in any way non-voluntary.
Dearden developed the idea ofrational autonomy and emphasised liberal education's aim as
the recognition of"the idea of the individual as an autonomous chooser with a recognised
right to rule his own life within wide moral limits" (Dearden 1984 p43). He distinguishes the
teaching and learning oftopics that may be characterised as the choices of a "well-informed
chooser" (those things with which we all broadly agree) and those topics that must be
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"subject to the pupils' choice" (ibid). Contrasting this with any proposed science of
education he suggests that liberal education seeks "agreement on agreement to disagree"
(ibid).
I also suggested in chapter six that John White is in many ways the successor to the Peters,
Hirst, Dearden line, and White's work has developed and underlined the approach to liberal
education that they took. White has emphasised that it is not so much what is taught but the
way that it is taught, allowing pupils to choose and indeed enhancing their capacity for
choice. White's work has been closely related to notions ofwell-being and the good life, and
how these can be best achieved in the context of a democratic society which is, and is
increasingly, pluralistic.
White defines well-being in terms of satisfaction ofour most important, informed desires (cf.
White 1990 pp28-30) and whilst he does concede there is a broad agreement among most of
us about what desires are worth fostering, he does not emphasise this agreement so much as
the opportunity for licit dissent. The task of education is to help pupils form their desires,
establish a priority of desires and as they grow help them to become choosers of their own
desires, in other words to promote autonomy.
As I have discussed earlier (chapter VII) autonomy has become increasingly central to the
liberal education agenda and is understood by White as the only legitimate path to well-
being in a pluralistic liberal democracy. (cf White 1990 p99). Indeed White sees autonomy
as the fundamental prerequisite for well-being. The autonomous pupil is neither deprived of
choice nor coerced into certain choices concerning matters ofvalue, and the development of
the capacity to choose is the best insurance against the prevailing influences ofreligion,
tradition and the like, all ofwhich are social constructs. Precisely how White advocates that
this be done, and the need for some initial criteria to enable an informed choice need not
concern us here and indeed has already been considered. What we must note is the central
concern with autonomy and choice.
More recently certain post-modem thinkers have gone further than White. They insist that
we construct the world we live in, so all measures and norms that we use are constructed too.
In particular we construct our notions ofvalues, oftruth and even ofrationality and so all-
encompassing schemes must be ruled out, and as Sandsmark points out, for the post-
modernist, the claim that one ideological or religious claim is superior to another is
necessarily wrong (cf Sandsmark p47). The only absolute is that there are no absolutes and
pluralism is the order ofthe day!
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In such systems the bearers ofvalue are those things which have been freely chosen or
constructed. Truth or moral rectitude in any absolute sense plays no part and the act of
choosing whilst at the same time keeping one's options open becomes central. Meaning itself
is conferred by the choice ofthe individual and so it is the job ofthe educator to enable the
individual to make such choices and to foster and confirm the rights and the development of
the individual as paramount.
Ofcourse the post-modern position is distinct from the liberal position since many liberals
do admit of objective values, for example freedom and autonomy. However it is instructive
to view the post-modern position as an extension or extreme version ofthe liberal position
since this emphasises its key elements. What I mean here is the notion ofconstruction that
Dearden mentions, and the centrality and emphasis on choice in White's work. Of course it
may be said that the post-modernist has unfettered choice and the liberal advocates choice
within something like Dearden's 'wide moral limits ' and I do not wish to deny this, but
neither should the absolute centrality ofchoice be overlooked.
Although there are differences between the different conceptions of liberal education
sketched here and the post-modem position that I have suggested may be seen as an heuristic
extension of it, I do think there is a sufficient consensus to legitimate the question ofwhether
mainstream liberal education, or perhaps better the liberal approach to education, constitutes
a framework. It need hardly be said that I do not consider that it does, but more relevantly
and more importantly we must turn to the question ofwhy the liberal approach to education
does not constitute a framework.
Firstly it is appropriate to consider language. Does the putative liberal framework have a
sufficient linguistic foundation? I said earlier that a framework presupposes a common
language or that a shared language is a necessary component ofvalues education; is there
then a shared or common language behind liberal education? I think the answer is both
straightforward and positive. It is clear from the development of liberalism in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and the extensive discussion ofboth liberalism and liberal
education in our own day that there is a widely understood and shared arena ofdiscourse or
language. Not only is the vocabulary understood, but also there is broad agreement about the
nature, scope, or content ofthe discourse and there is no doubt in my mind that there is a
sophisticated language game that underlies liberal theory and liberal education. The
publication ofcopious books and journals is ample evidence if any were needed!
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Further I think there is an identifiable liberal form of life, which, recall, Wittgenstein
recognises as the linguistic and non-linguistic machinery behind our language. In other
words I think it is fair to say that liberals and those involved with liberal education too have
a broad epistemological agreement. There is a broad consensus about the nature and function
ofpolitics and at a micro level those liberals involved in teaching do behave and teach in
broadly similar ways in their classrooms. That is to say the way they teach difficult and
controversial topics is based on a common liberal approach, an approach to the topic and to
the pupils, which may not be present in an evangelical Christian (say), or non-liberal
classroom environment.
I think then, that liberal education does not fail as a framework because ofany concerns
about common language or the background to it. It seems only too clear that liberals and
liberal educators have an advanced language with well-developed practices or a form oflife
underlying them. However, because ofthese practices can we go further and say that
liberalism and the liberal approach to education constitute a tradition?
This is a less straightforward question that has already been discussed at some length in
chapter three. Recall Alasdair MacIntyre's central concern is to reaffirm the telos ofman.
As a part ofthis project he identifies practices as goal directed activities rooted in narratives,
which are historical settings or contexts that give the practices their sense. Narratives
themselves are situated within wider inherited social contexts which MacIntyre calls
traditions. In this sense then, is liberalism a tradition, and hence could there be a liberal
education framework?
In his earlier writing it seems that MacIntyre does not consider liberalism as a tradition.
Liberalism encompasses such a range and a breadth ofconceptions ofthe good life that it
seems not to be compatible with a single tradition. Liberalism does not constitute an
inherited context in an appropriate way. Further we have already noted Mulhall's remarks
that internal methodological and conceptual incoherencies, perceived to be at the heart of
liberalism disbar it from being a tradition in After Virtue. Further, Mason's remarks about the
profound disagreements between liberals themselves (e.g. Rawls and Nozick) would indicate
that liberalism does not constitute a single tradition at all.
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? it seems there is something of a change ofheart or at
least a shift of emphasis. When MacIntyre is discussing whether liberalism is a neutral,
independent ground and arguing that it is not he says "that liberalism fails in this respect,
therefore provides the strongest reason that we can actually have for asserting that there is no
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such neutral ground There is instead only practical~rationality~of~this-or-that-tradition
and the justice-of-this-or-that-tradition" (MacIntyre 1988 p346). Note that rationality or
justice ofa particular tradition are contrasted with, indeed exist instead of: liberalism as
characterised as a neutral ground! So MacIntyre seems clear that liberalism understood as a
neutral ground is not a tradition.
But then he seems to muddy the waters by asserting almost straight away that "Liberalism
like all other moral, intellectual and social traditions of any complexity, has its own
problematic internal to it" (ibid). So liberalism is now a tradition, but presumably not the
neutral, independent one considered in MacIntyre's earlier discussions! Macintyre now
suggests that liberalism is characterised by a particular view of the self and ofthe common
good, and in so far as these have developed historically and conceptually, they have a very
plausible claim to be a tradition (cf. MacIntyre 1988 pp 346-8).
So the question ofwhether liberalism is or is not a tradition seems to tum on whether or not
it may be considered as a neutral standpoint. This is ofcourse a controversial question and
one that we have already briefly considered in our discussions ofthe neutrality of the state in
chapters four and seven. Recall Kymlicka's remark that "there's nothing incoherent in saying
that the common good for liberals is to bring about a society governed by a politics ofneutral
concern" (Kymlicka 1989 p78). However for Taylor this is a contradiction in terms; for in
protecting freedom and in particular the freedom of choice for its citizens, the state is most
definitely not neutral!
The main concern here is however educational rather than political and whilst we may
discuss to what extent political liberalism is neutral, and hence whether it constitutes a
tradition, this does not necessarily have any direct bearing on the educational question. That
is to say the neutrality of the state when dealing with its citizens does not necessarily entail
neutrality in an educational setting. Indeed we may recall the earlier discussion of
Ackerman's position in chapter five. The nature of the relationship between the state and
educational provision is a vast and complex one that we cannot consider here, so we must
focus our attention on the question ofwhether liberal education is a tradition.
I think we may say that if liberal education is considered as some neutral ground, almost in
the post-modern sense mentioned above, or on the sense ofMacIntyre's Ajier Virtue then
liberal education does not form a tradition. There are no widely accepted social contexts in
which narrative generally and practice in particular can be grounded. If this is the case then I
think the idea of a liberal framework for education could be readily dismissed, as it would
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have no component of tradition. There may be those who might want to adopt such an
approach to liberal education but I think they would be very rare.
To repeat, MacIntyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? came to regard liberalism not as
a neutral ground, but as a theory based on a particular conception ofthe self, and similarly
whilst those who defend liberal education emphasise choice, they do so within broad bounds.
These bounds include a commitment to dialogue and respect for the voice of the other. They
include the freedom of the individual and the autonomy ofthe self and as such may not be
considered as neutral.
John White discussed this in Education and the Good Lift. He suggests that neutrality as
understood as the state not imposing a particular conception ofthe good life is a good thing,
but goes on to say that for an individual to be able to choose his or her own conception ofthe
good life the state should provide "the necessary conditions for people to lead a life ofwell-
being" (White 1990 p21). White talks ofbuilding a substructure, centred upon autonomy and
including welfare considerations and a moral framework, upon which the superstructure ofa
liberal economy may be built. In this sense the state is not neutralist and indeed White says
that" neutralism is an untenable position; it overlooks the fact that it is tacitly presupposing
the value ofpersonal autonomy" (ibid. p22). With this kind ofunderstanding ofliberal
education in mind then it does seem as though liberal education may be regarded as an
authentic tradition.
Recall, I have argued that a framework must be constituted by, or based upon language,
tradition and community. The relevant linguistic background is in place, and I have
suggested the liberal approach to education almost certainly does constitute a tradition,
although some doubts may be raised about more extreme versions of liberalism. However
this issue is not yet decisive, for community must be considered too.
Note that if liberal education locates individuals within communities and creates community
then the question oftradition is crucial and will decide the matter. On the other hand if
liberal education is neither the product of a particular community, nor forms community in
any sense then the possible doubts about whether the liberal approach to education is a
tradition will become academic; one that I may (in this context) ignore.
Recall Taylor's insistence that our orientation towards the good and our very reason are only
intelligible within a community, because of the essentially dialogical nature ofhuman life.
Our constitution as persons and our ability to grow and develop depends on dialogue and
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hence we are enmeshed in a human background - a community. The question then becomes
does liberalism or liberal education provide that background, that mesh in which humans and
children particularly can develop and grow?
Firstly, can there be dialogue within the putative liberal framework? We have already
considered a linguistic background to liberalism and it would seem dialogue is eminently
possible. It is worth noting the importance that both liberals and communitarians attach to
dialogue and indeed it is a mark of the mature and properly functioning citizen. But recall
(the liberal) Ackerman draws a distinction between citizens generally and children. He
concedes that children are unable to frame complex arguments or enter in to certain
discussions so a certain degree ofpatemalism is not only justified but necessary. In order to
situate a growing child both culturally and psychologically, it is necessary that not
everything be open to questioning. There must be certain givens, which are to be accepted
unconditionally for now, even if open to revision later. The recognition that a child is not a
fully formed citizen necessitates that there be limits to dialogue, that there be certain givens
and so the free dialogue that liberals insist upon is undermined..
Secondly, for dialogue to be rich and fruitful, to be educationally nourishing and ultimately
even to be possible, it must be underpinned by shared values. In particular in the context of a
school, there must be agreement between pupils and between teacher and pupil about certain
things. Liberal educators would agree to this too, but would say there is a sufficient albeit
thin agreement already in place whereas I would want to say that the agreement afforded by
the liberal approach to education is not thick enough. However, it is very difficult to measure
thickness or thinness of agreement and even if we could, how any judgement could then be
made is unclear.
In Values, Virtues and Violence, Graham Haydon writes ofthe public understanding of
morality and says that if it is to be public, this understanding cannot be so rarefied (abstract
in terms ofnorms) that only a handful of trained philosophers have it. But neither can it be so
specifically formulated in terms of rules that it cannot accommodate unusual cases and has
little or nothing that could be described as understanding. Haydon suggests a compromise;
"A trade-offbetween breadth and depth" (Haydon 1999 p102) as he puts it, and suggests
while the language ofvirtues is important, the language ofnorms must be given priority.
Haydon goes on to acknowledge that agreement about broad principles or norms does not
necessarily entail agreement about more precise details or rules. I would agree with this and
acknowledge the need for interpretation and relation to context, but I cannot help feeling that
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in a school environment more specificity is required. That is to say whilst the understanding
ofbroad principles, and the interpretation and recognition of context, are skills that I would
want to see promoted, I think it is legitimate at the same time to seek a thicker, rule
orientated understanding. Schools may be distinguished from society generally in so much as
they are inhabited by young people. What no sensible person would advocate for society,
may well be appropriate in a school setting.
In the end however, the debate about whether the agreement is thick enough, is I think, not
relevant. I think there is a deeper, more fundamental and indeed logical concern. This
concern is that for the liberal, in the great majority of cases, it is individual choice that
confers worth. It seems to me that it is precisely here, that liberalism goes wrong for liberals
cannot have it that dialogue requires shared values and at the same time assert that it is
individual's choice that confers worth. Let us consider this a little more closely.
Firstly it is instructive to distinguish institutions and communities. Institutions are things like
trade-unions, hospitals and specifically schools that have a number of rules (with values
implicit in them) to govern their functioning. Rules about punctuality and time-keeping,
election of representatives, non-violence and listening to another's point ofview for
example. These are rules for the very functioning of the institution and ifthey are not
adhered to the institution would not be able to function. Those who break these kinds of
rules, without extremely good reason, disbar themselves from the institution automatically
On the other hand, communities in addition to rules about their functioning have additional
rules or values that distinguish them as a community, give them a communal identity and
contribute (to a greater or lesser degree) to the identity if the members of that community.
For example a Catholic should not eat meat on a Friday. If this rule is broken then the
functioning ofthe Catholic Church is not threatened, its structures are not undermined; but
the rule is a significant one, although it may not seem so, for it is a reminder of what the
church is about and what sort ofpeople its members should be. In a school perhaps pupils
should rise when a member ofstaff enters a classroom. If this does not happen the
functioning of the school is in no way undermined, but ifit does happen this is an
acknowledgement of the value that the school places upon its teachers, and is constitutive of
the identity ofboth teachers and pupils.
Now consider a set of shared values held by a community as a basis for their language,
morals etc.. These values define the community, exemplify what it is about and contribute to
the identity of its members. Those who accept the values belong to the community, but what
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ofthose who do not accept the values ofthe community? This raises a question ofjudgement
for members ofmany communities do not rigidly adhere to all the values of the community.
Other members may question the values of the community and may be heralds ofchange or
reform; and again the community may have novices or newcomers who are exploring the
values of the community, whilst considering fuller membership. The community must
embrace all ofthese, but at the same time will on occasion have to make the judgement ofan
individual that their degree of sharing is so weak, or perhaps so strained that membership of
the community is untenable. Conversely there are individuals who change and who, upon
reflection, no longer wish to be a member of a particular community themselves, and we
have seen MPs swap party allegiance and churchmen change their ecc1esial allegiance, so we
are not obliged to think solely in terms ofheavy handed communities expelling their
wavering members!
However, it cannot be that we both share our values with a particular group as a community
and admit that these values are a matter of choice, and their worth is established by our
choosing them. The liberal, insisting that a pupil be able to choose his values undermines the
givens and shared values that are a prerequisite for community. It may not be consistently
asserted that there is a philosophical requirement for shared values within a community, both
as a part of its functioning and as part of its self-definition, and that members ofthat
community may choose their own values in these areas.
Even ifa value or set ofvalues was chosen freely by all the members ofthe community, after
a great discussion, say, then once the decision has been taken it becomes normative. It is not
the choosing it that makes it so, but that alternative choices then become irrelevant.
Wittgenstein discusses this at great length in the context of rule following and his philosophy
ofmathematics. It would be a great diversion to follow this point in full, but one example
may illuminate the point.
In his Lectures on the Foundations ofMathematics Wittgenstein discusses John Wisdom (a
pupil ofWittgenstein's) who when first told that 3 x 0 = 0 disagreed, and wanted to say that
3 x 0 = 3. For three cows multiplied by zero are not multiplied at all and are hence still three!
Wittgenstein's point is that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, and it could be
adopted, however as it conflates with a previously adopted rule or grammatical convention
(for multiplying by one) it is ofno use and the community gains nothing by adopting it. (cf
LFM p136). I amnot suggesting that the adoption ofvalues and the adoption of
mathematical rules are exactly analogous, but suggesting that once a value (like a rule) is
adopted, a new or different value that could bechosen, would undermine the whole system.
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Elsewhere Wittgenstein gives another example saying that a chess game could be started by
a black move instead of a white move, and this would be practical, but the game would no
longer be chess.
But a question remains: is a school merely an institution, or is it, must it be a community? If
education includes values education, and I take it that it does, then I have argued that this
requires a framework that is constituted by components of language tradition and
community. Therefore schools should not only be functioning institutions, but should be
communities and have shared values that constitute their identity and contribute to the
identity oftheir members. It is this requirement to teach values and an understanding of
teaching, as in part at least, transmission that is incompatible with the liberal approach to
education.
We might put the same point another way, and at perhaps a deeper level. Is it part ofthe task
of education to form pupils' identities? We might want to be careful what is meant by 'form'
here, but apart from that, it seems fairly uncontroversial that education is about the forming
of individuals - the development of selves. The requirement that education form the self,
combined with a notion ofthe situated self developed in this thesis in chapter VII would lead
to the idea of schools as communities. The school that is not a community; that does not
have a framework of shared values will fail to situate the self, and will not fulfil its
educational purpose as a school.
The understanding of school as community does not mean that all the pupils will be exactly
alike. We have already recognised that the relationship between an individual and its
community will vary, and further we should observe that communities have guests, and
newcomers. People come and go but the requirement of community is that there be a set of
shared values which constitute the community's identity and contribute to the identity of its
members.
This point has obvious practical ramifications in terms of the admissions and exclusions
policies of schools. Firstly, considering admissions and drawing on the distinction we have
already drawn between institutions and communities we may easily say that those who do
not accept the rules and values of the school as an institution should not be admitted.
Admittance of such pupils would undermine the very functioning of the school. Of course
this raises the question ofwhat is to be done with pupils whom no school is prepared to
admit but this is a separate question.
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When admission ofpupils based on the acceptance ofthe values ofthe school as a
community is considered, the question is rather more complicated and is ultimately a matter
ofjudgement. For example, some Catholic schools admit Muslims whilst others will not
admit the Non-Catholic Christian who lives next door to the school. Such examples are
widely reported in the press. Sticking for a moment with the Catholic example the Church is
clear that Catholic schools have a remit to both preserve and maintain the faith, and to spread
the faith and teach it to non-Catholics. Any admission policy then must take the nature of the
local population in to account. The Catholic School at a third world mission station will be
different to a high school in a Catholic part ofEngland such as Liverpool.
The head teacher, admissions team or whoever must attempt to effect a balance between
preserving and maintaining the framework ofthe school, and extending hospitality to those
who have other frameworks. The purpose of the school is relevant too and some may exist to
preserve and sustain a tradition and foster a strong community, whilst some may be to serve
marginalized and deprived children of any framework or none. Again the Catholic Church is
a good example since it has both types of schools in the UK. This is not to say the school's
framework itselfmust be diluted or diminished, but to say flexibility about admissions is
essential, and it is also to recognise that from time to time there will be difficult and
controversial decisions to make, and that head teachers (or whoever) will from time to time
make mistakes.
In recent times we have seen "educational contracts" between schools pupils and their
parents as part of admissions procedures at some schools. In the main the parties agree to
keep the rules ofthe school qua institution, but it needs to be recognised that these are both
value laden and are part of a continuum with the values ofthe school qua community. Some
values may clearly fall in to one area rather than the other, but equally well it may be hard if
not impossible to say exactly where the line is to be drawn. Of course there needs to be
flexibility here, and again the purpose and location ofthe school will have a determining
effect on what might be included in any contract.
The consideration of exclusions is much simpler. Unless there are exceptional circumstances,
those who break the institutional rules of the school, or cannot accept the values of the
school as an institution must be excluded (temporarily or permanently) for the preservation
ofthe functioning of the school. Those who do not accept the values ofthe school as a
community must be considered from the perspective ofthe nature and purpose ofthe school
as discussed above, and the extent to which the individual's rejection of the communal
values ofthe school harms the communal identity ofthe school as a whole.
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It is no criticism ofmy insistence on a framework for values education to say that problems
concerning admission and exclusion ofpupils from schools will remain. I think there are and
probably alwayswill be some difficult questions here and indeed some difficult decisions
that some people will ultimately have to make. In some cases the existence of a framework
may make this easier and in some cases this may make things more difficult, but the
insistence on a framework for values education is ultimately about situating persons and
about the development ofpupils and these other questions are as I suggested ramifications.
The criticism that difficulties about admissions and exclusions remain is really no criticism
at all.
To conclude then I want to recognise that there are difficult considerations and judgements
that have to made in teal life practical situations, and indeed the insistence on a framework
will not solve all of these, but au fond the liberals insistence on the centrality ofchoice, both
as a right and as a worth-conferringaction is mistaken, and must be rejected. Hence, with the
caveats discussed above, I maintain the choice ofan alternatevalue, or alternate values
undermines and splinters communities. I conclude that the liberal approach to education is
not derived from a particular community, and does not form or enhance community either.
Hence liberalism does not meet the condition ofcommunityand hence cannot constitute a
framework in the sense that I have developed.
The following objections might be made. Firstly it may be said that I have misrepresented
liberalism as a position that leaves absolutely everythingto the choice ofthe individual; that
I have made liberalism into a straw man, just to knock him down. The liberal might or
probably would say there are ofcourse certain agreed norms, certain values which are
accepted by all and that my suggestionthat value is conferred solely by choice is misleading.
I think a number ofpoints may be made in reply to this kind ofobjection. Firstly that as I
have suggested there may be a differencebetween liberalism as a political position and
liberalism as an approach to education. Whatever agreement there may be in the political
sphere, it does seem that in the educational realm choice is paramount. Certainly in the
literature the possibility oflicit dissent is emphasised much more than any notion of
agreement and I would say that liberal education is essentially about choice. This question is
important in the context ofmy discussion, for it has a bearing on whether liberal education
constitutesa tradition, and I have suggested that it does not whereas, others may want to say
that it does. However, I am not adamant on the point for it is not crucial. My real objective is
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to argue that liberal education does not constitute a framework, and tradition or not, I think
the argument from consideration of community is a more telling one.
Secondly it may be said that I have characterised the belonging to, or exclusion from a
community in terms that are far too black and white. It has already been noted and accepted
that the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community varies and may
take several different forms. To talk of inclusion and exclusion on the basis ofsharing a
particular set ofvalues is too stark. Further, ofcourse, it has been noted and accepted that we
all belong to a number of overlapping communities and again to draw rigid boundaries is
problematic.
It seems to me that in the abstract (and the political) there may be a difficulty here, but I
think in the concrete situation of education which is my primary concern, the difficulty
largely disappears. Recall each school is to have it own framework, and so whatever other
beliefs one may hold, whatever other communities one may belong to or traditions one may
have inherited the real question will be, to what extent do you agree with the framework for
values at this school. If the agreement is broad, then fine, ifit is not you might be better off
somewhere else. The crucial point is that a conception of a particular school having its own
framework is not compatible with the idea ofa pupil making free choices about all their
beliefs, practices and norms. We cannot have a framework and unfettered choice as this
undermines community itself.
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X New Labour and Faith Schools
In this final chapter I intend to alter the focus from the theoretical to the more practical.
There has been much discussion recently ofNew Labour's initiative to improve education
and in particular to increase the number offaith based schools. The proposals have been
welcomed in some quarters and rejected in others and there has been a variety of opinions
expressed in the press and elsewhere. The publication of Catholic Schools: Mission, Markets
andMorality by Professor Gerald Grace (2002) and the 'Faith Schools: Consensus or
Conflict' conference at the Institute ofEducation in June 2002 have underlined the
pertinence of theory and policy to practice at this time.
In this chapter I intend to explore the government's proposals and the reasoning behind them
as outlined in Schools achieving Success. To consider alternate justifications for faith based
schools that have been publicly aired, and to consider the counter-arguments and the
responses that have been made to them. As I have intimated above it seems that most ofthe
arguments in the political domain tend to be consequentialist, and of an empirical nature and
thus from a philosophical standpoint, hard to evaluate. Additionally there are a number of
complex issues here which overlap and interconnect, but to simply separate tidy philosophy
from the messy situation of everyday life is, I think, something of an evasion and some effort
needs to be made to link theoretical and practical concerns.
The Department for Education and Skills under Secretary of State Estelle Morris published
the white paper: Schools achieving Success on 5 September 2001. The two basic premises
behind the document are firstly, that education has a "dual purpose, offering personal
fulfilment together with the skills and attitudes we need to make a success of our lives"
(DfES 2001 p3). Secondly the document asserts that change is timely because of changes in
the labour market and that "we've come to realise that for most ofus the 'job for life' is a
thing of the past and the opportunities afforded by unskilled jobs are dwindling rapidly"
(ibid.). As a prime consequence of this we cannot tolerate an education system with a "long
tail ofpoor achievement" (ibid. p5) because there is no longer a supply ofunskilled and
semi-skilled jobs. The overall educational standard has to be raised.
To meet this economic demand, the white paper claims that the government's first task in
office was to improve standards of literacy and numeracy in primary schools. The paper
highlights a number of reforms which are underway and are proving successful, and claims
much has been achieved. Given this situation, the challenge for New Labour's second term in
government is to carry these reforms through to the secondary sector. "We are determined to
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finish the job" (P9) they say! Thus it is secondary reform that is the subject ofthe white
paper.
There are a number ofkey proposals in the paper. The first is to ensure high standards for all
by supporting teaching and learning. The second is the implementation of a broader and
more flexible curriculum for 14-19 year olds which has an enhanced component of
vocational education. The third is to promote excellence innovation and diversity and is dealt
with in chapter five of the paper. The fourth concerns government intervention in failing
schools and the fifth relates to increasing the number of teachers and support staff
"Expanding the number ofBeacon schools, faith schools and City Academies" (ibid. p37)
which is part ofthe third general proposal is the most significant as far as we are concerned.
Beacon Schools are those recognised as among the best in the system, and are given
additional resources for their work. The City Academy scheme "means that sponsors from
private, voluntary and faith groups can establish new schools, whose running costs are fully
met by the state", bringing "a distinctive approach to school management and governance"
(ibid. p44). Faith Schools are recognised as having "a significant history as part of the state
education system and play an important role in its diversity" (ibid. p45).
The white paper welcomes "faith schools, with their distinctive character" (P45), into the
maintained sector where there is local agreement. It says "decisions to establish faith schools
should take account ofall sections of the community" (ibid.) but it speaks positively of those
faith schools that were established in the first term of Labour's office. In addition to a large
number ofChristian schools, there were in June 2002 eleven minority faiths and two
minority Christian denominational schools that had been admitted into the state sector since
1997: five Jewish, two Sikh, four Muslim, one Greek Orthodox and one Seventh Day
Adventist. Of course there is also a number ofindependent faith schools and the white paper
recognises their interest in "extending their contribution to the state sector" (ibid.).
It would be a mistake to suppose that faith schools are the only schools that can say they
have a values framework, but in the context ofthis discussion they are most obvious case.
Nevertheless it is important to note that these remarks come within the wider context of
chapter five which declares that the aim is "for every school to create or develop its distinct
mission and ethos" (P38). Schools are strengthened, it declares, by a positive ethos and a
strong sense ofpurpose, which in turn act as a focus for school improvement.
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There are a number of reasons behind this policy. Firstly, "evidence shows that schools with
a distinct identity perform best, with the ethos acting to motivate staff and pupils across a
wide range of subjects and activities, improving teaching and learning" (P38). In other
words, the policy is based on empirical studies, ofwhich there are many, that show or claim
to show, that in faith schools examination results are higher and social harmony or school
discipline is greater. Work concerning Catholic schools in the United States by Coleman &
Hoffer (1982) and by Bryk et al. (1993) claims that results in Catholic schools are
significantly better. They explain this in terms of social capital, a strong sense of community,
a structured environment and the vocational commitment ofteachers. We may assume much
ofthis would also be applicable to other faith schools.
However their research has its critics and Lauder & Hughes (1999) and Goldstein (1993)
suggest that the prior achievement and background (parents) of the pupils profoundly skews
the results. In other words when comparisons are made, like is not compared with like. There
are studies that have tried to 'factor out' external influences to find an effect that is solely
understandable in terms of a faith ethos but these have been unsuccessful, and when relevant
comparisons are made, critics claim, there is found to be no significant difference between
faith and non-faith schools. In the USA Convey concludes, "self-selection prevents a
conclusive answer to whether or not Catholic schools are more effective than public schools"
(Convey 1992 p6). I shall omit any closer analysis of these studies and direct numerical
comparisons as I think that ultimately, there are non-empirical arguments that are more
interesting and more telling.
Secondly the white paper notes that too few pupils stay in education after 16. "We are well
down in the OECD international league tables for pupils staying on in education beyond the
age of 16. 73% ofUK 17-year olds are enrolled in education compared to an OECD average
of82o/o, and participation rates of90% or higher in countries such as France, Germany and
Japan" (DfES 2001 p14). The white paper sees that this must now change, and aims at
expansion in post-16 education. This aim is to be met in part by curriculum change but also
in changing the kind ofplaces that post-If schools are. The paper is committed to diversity
as a way to achieve this and also the partnership of schools with other bodies as we have
already mentioned. Additionally it seems, although it is not clearly stated, that there is an
expectation that pupils are more likely to remain beyond 16 at schools with a strong ethos, or
religious character.
Thirdly we may note that the paper makes reference to Lord Dearing's report to the
Archbishops' Council and recommends "that the Church ofEngland increase significantly
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the number of secondary places it supports" (ibid. p45). This recommendation is welcomed
by the white paper but qualified by the wish that these schools be inclusive and serve the
whole community. "We want faith schools that come in to the maintained sector to add to the
inclusiveness and diversity of the school system and to be ready to work with non-
denominational schools and those of other faiths" (ibid.). This call to inclusivity, often
unpacked in schools' admission policies can cause not only practical problems for schools
themselves, but raises conceptual and ideological difficulties too, as we shall see below.
Having considered the white paper itself let us now consider some ofthe voices of those who
support it. In the House ofCommons debate on faith schools (6 February 2002) Damian
Green (Con.) said his support was based on the "simple pragmatic observation that the
church school is very often the good school" (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p38). He suggested
that the problems at Holy Cross School in Belfast were not essentially school problems but
reflected "wider tensions in Ireland" (ibid.) and he said that the recent Ofsted (Office for
Standards in Education) report showed that church schools scored disproportionately well. It
is worth remarking that this finding is endorsed by A. B. Morris' research published in the
journal Educational Research. In his paper 'Catholic and Other Secondary Schools: an
Analysis ofOfsted Inspection Reports' he concluded, "The superiority of Catholic schools in
respect ofmeasures adopted by Ofsted is very noticeable" (Morris 1998 p189). But again the
caveats considered above apply.
John Selwyn Gummer (Con.) robustly defended the religious content of education as what he
called the "most important part of education" (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p39). He rejected a
belief in a particular kind ofmulticulturalism and multiracialism held by many MPs and
urged a security within faith. His reason was that those who are secure within their own
background find it easier to reach out and accommodate peoples from other backgrounds and
added, "some ofthe greatest proponents of tolerance in intolerant societies have had the
strongest adherence to their faith" (ibid.). He suggested faith schools could often do more
than any other in a community to promote the very tolerance and understanding that we
seek! The Muslim Ibrahim Hewitt echoes these sentiments saying "educating young people
in environments where they feel religiously secure and thus more open to study, gives them
the confidence to interact with the wider community" (TES 30 November 2001 p20).
It should be noted that the Muslim community has been a very strong supporter of faith
schools, that the number ofMuslim schools has steadily increased since the founding of the
Islamia Schools Trust in 1983, and that Muslim schools are often heavily oversubscribed.
Not only do these schools tend to do very well academically, but they have a reputation for
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high moral standards too. Mr Livingstone, when he presented prizes at Islamia's Brondsbury
College for Boys said that "Here in this school you produce children with a moral code and a
clear sense of right and wrong" (ibid. p6.). Finally Muslims point to the tolerance of other
religions enshrined in the Koran. Mr Yuseflslam ofthe Islamia trust has said that, clear
ethos "made us more conscious ofour relationship with other schools in the area, and with
the council and in a broad sense it helped our school integrate" (ibid. p6).
Two other (connected) reasons are often cited in favour of faith-based schools. The first is
that faith based schools better tend to pupils' spiritual needs. They acknowledge the realm of
the spiritual, and they better provide opportunities for engaging in and learning about prayer,
reflection and silence. For the religious person this is undoubtedly a good thing, but he must
recognise that the whole notion of spirituality is a controversial and contested one, and the
problems associated with it, even in the context of a faith school, can be considerable.
Secondly, perhaps as an outer sign of an inner spirituality, it is claimed that faith based
schools can better provide pupils with opportunities for celebration and help them to deal
with grief. The great popularity ofcarnivals, particularly the Notting Hill carnival, and the
national outpouring ofgrief at the deaths of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, and Diana
Princess ofWales in particular point to an urge for common sharing ofcelebration and grief.
(And it is not just royalty, there was great mourning at the death ofthe late Archbishop of
Westminster, Cardinal Basil Hume for example and much grief following the destruction of
the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001.)
The rituals surrounding such celebrations and sadnesses often seem to point to the
transcendent, to a reality beyond the material, and are deeply rooted within communities and
traditions. They cannot just be manufactured or made up as the occasion demands and they
often have a religious or liturgical core. Additionally and curiously, it is regularly observed
that on such occasions many people who would not normally count themselves as religious
have a need to be involved in such rituals. Naturally it may be said that such occasional
rituals are sufficient and do not justify faith-based schooling at all, but this is to drive a
wedge between everyday life and particular celebrations. To me at least this is artificial,
since celebration only really makes sense within a continuity of existence; within a
community and as part of a tradition.
The emphasis of ritual within life is currently unfashionable, and raises some deep and
difficult sociological points with which I am not qualified to deal. However it seems to me
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that this is a particularly strong argument, or at least a strong contribution to a set of
arguments in favour of faith based schools.
The TESIMORI poll also found that of those questioned who were in favour offaith schools,
35% desired children to be educated in the same values and beliefs as their family. 28% cited
good discipline, 27% said religious ethos, 16% good teaching and only 10% said good exam
results. However whereas 25% ofthose polled supported the expansion of faith schools,
almost double (43%) did not, with the remainder neither supporting nor opposing the
expansion (see TES 30 November 2001 p6-7). I quote these numbers as I think they are
interesting, but I do not wish to suggest that the majority must be right because they are the
majority, or even that the majority will tend to hold a correct or most persuasive view. The
arguments themselves and the conclusions to which they point, need to be evaluated,
regardless ofhow popular or unpopular they may be. But what ofthose who oppose the
expansion of faith schools - why do they oppose them?
In the TESIMORI poll some 35% ofthose who oppose faith or church schools do so because
religion should not be a part of education. In addition to the philosophical worries about
indoctrination and the undermining of autonomy {which we considered in chapter six),
opponents offaith schools argue that in the modern scientific world with its emphasis on
rationality, evidence and knowledge; faith and ideological commitment should be given a
new status. Education, they say, should concentrate on verifiable claims and should be
separated from unverifiable claims, or else we may ask why is astrology not on the syllabus?
Hirst is not unique in holding the view that "just as intelligent Christians have come to
recognise that justifiable scientific claims are autonomous and do not, and logically cannot,
rest on religious beliefs, so also it seems to me, justifiable educational principles are
autonomous. That is to say, that any attempt to justify educational principles by an appeal to
religious claims is invalid" (Hirst 1976 pI56). Although this is a powerful claim I think two
points may be made, firstly we have to recognise that no education can be totally objective,
autonomous and value free. The nurturing ofpersons by other persons in a social context
inevitably brings some kind of ideological commitment with it whatever it may be. This
commitment, be it atheist or humanist, is like religion ultimately unverifiable, and
inescapable. Hirst seems to pine for a Utopia which is unobtainable.
Further it is not entirely clear that the religious school justifies its 'educational principles by
an appeal to religious claims'. It may transmit religious claims or support religious claims,
but its educational principles and their justification may come from elsewhere. In particular
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it may be a principle of education to have a number of schools each with its own framework,
including religious schools, and this principle may be justified entirely independently of any
religious claim.
Perhaps those who oppose religion on the grounds that religion should be no part of
education, imagine that religious upbringing and initiation should be done by families and
church groups. This may be so, but there are powerful historical precedents for church
schooling and there are many who say there is no better guide to the present and the future
than the past. The past success of church schools validates their continuing existence and
future expansion. Against this it may be said that our society has changed significantly since
the introduction ofchurch schools in the nineteenth century and continues to change at an
ever faster rate. The heterogeneity of our society at the present time demands a rethink.
The poll found that the second most popular response to the question ofwhy people oppose
faith schools is that they increase divisions within society. Ashok Kumar MP said "this is a
road to segregation, ghettos will emerge" (TES, 30 November 2001 p6). Tony Wright MP
(Lab.) said, "before September 11 it looked like a bad idea, now it looks like a mad idea"
(ibid.). And Frank Dobson MP (Lab.) argued that the new church schools would not be new
foundations, but would replace current community colleges and so the choice for pupils
would be reduced and divisions will increase (cf. The Tablet, 23 February 2002 p38).
Concerning the situation in Northern Ireland to which commentators repeatedly return, the
Humanist Philosophers Group in their publication Religious Schools: the case against write:
"We have clear evidence ... from Northern Ireland, where the separation ofCatholic schools
and Protestant schools has played a significant part in the perpetuation of the sectarian
divide" (P35). Similarly Richard Dawkins, professor ofthe public understanding of science
at Oxford University said "Sectarian Religious schools only serve to promote prejudice,
confusion and division" and "religious violence in Northern Ireland is stoked by segregated
schools" (TES 23 January 2001 pI7).
Apart from all this rhetoric I think two lines of argument may be distinguished, which we
may label as positive (emphasising the good things about common schooling) and negative
(emphasising the bad things about faith schools). The positive argument suggests that pupils
receive a better and more rounded education in a multicultural and multiracial environment.
The argument goes that this is the background from which pupils come and where they live,
and is the world in to which they will go so that is the sort of education they should have. In
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a common education pupils will better learn tolerance and mutual understanding and through
a broadening ofpupils' horizons conflict will be diminished and harmony enhanced.
From all that has gone before it will be no surprise that this is an argument with which I do
not agree. I think this argument totally fails to accommodate the kinds ofthings that human
beings are and the way that their selves are constituted and develop. It fails to recognise that
an integral part ofbeing human is being constituted by certain traditions and belonging to
certain communities. It also ignores the fact that being firmly established in a particular
belief system often enhances an understanding and tolerance ofthose who do not belong to
that system. Finally it seems to me that the empirical claim that mixed education in common
schools leads to more understanding, tolerance and diminished conflict is one for which we
do not have sufficient evidence and indeed some readings ofthe available evidence would
suggest the reverse!
The negative argument for faith schools suggests that separate faith schools contribute to
social division and conflict; that they are a causal factor in racial and religious conflicts that
we have recently witnessed, and that an increase in faith schools will only exacerbate the
current problems. In response to these kinds ofremarks three responses need to be made.
Firstly those who support faith based schools have enquired after the evidence which
supports the claims made by Dawkins and the Humanist Philosophers Group, and have
suggested that the sort of evidence that is required is either inadequate or missing. (The HPG
offer no evidence in support ofthe assertion on page 35 of their pamphlet!) Grace has
remarked that ifDawkins applied the same standards ofacademic rigour to his remarks
about education as he does to evolutionary biology then his assertions could never have been
made!
Secondly, it must be recognised that the situations in Northern Ireland (to which people so
often refer) and more recently in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley are deeply complex and
multi-faceted and comments about schools and schooling must be understood in their
appropriate context. That is to say, it is naive ifnot downright misleading to consider
schooling apart from issues of immigration, poverty and political oppression in these areas.
Those who point to separate schooling in Northern Ireland and suggest it does not work fail
to appreciate the wider context of the conflict and the historical development ofthe situation.
Estelle Morris has remarked that "it is wrong to land on the head offaith schools all of
society's concerns about segregated communities" (TES, 30 January 2001 p l) and Grace
quotes from the Government's 1973 white paper: Northern Ireland Constitutional proposals.
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"To make the education system itself the scapegoat for all the ills ofNorthem Ireland would
obscure problems whose origins are of a much more complex character" (P7).
Additionally it is worth briefly noting that The Guardian (25 June 2002 p2) refers to some
recent research which suggests that pre-school children have sectarian prejudices acquired
from their relatives and where they live. If this is the case it is hard to see how separate faith
schools can be held responsible for their attitudes. Of course it may be said that separate
schooling only serves to reinforce these prejudices, but this is speculation for which there is
currently insufficient evidence.
Thirdly, it is appropriate to distinguish policies and practices in faith-based schools. It may
well be that certain faith-based schools do not live up to the high standards we might expect.
However considering policies oflove, peace, harmony and reconciliation that feature
prominently in the mission statements of all types offaith schools it is hard to see how, as a
matter ofpolicy, such schools could contribute towards division and hatred. It must be
remembered that the arguments here for frameworks and faith-based schools are policy
arguments and are no guarantee in themselves, that in practice things will not go wrong.
It is worth noting the point made by Prof Tony Gallagher at the Institute ofEducation's faith
schools conference that all ofthose who oppose separate schooling in Northern Ireland argue
for more integrated and connected provision. They do not argue for secular provision and in
the Province all schools including integrated schools see themselves as faith schools!
Two final points that are commonly made against faith schools need to be considered. The
first is that faith schools engage in 'selection by the back door' and the second concerns
issues offunding and the claim that faith-based schools should not be funded from the
common purse.
On the question of selection it is pointed out that there are more applicants to faith based
schools than there are places. Therefore faith-based schools are able to select their pupils and
no wonder exam results are improved and behaviour enhanced! Critics say pupils are getting
a privileged education at public expense and further the population of common schools is
thereby depressed in various ways as a disproportionate number ofable pupils have been
pre-selected for faith schools. Additionally there have been documented cases ofparents and
pupils adopting religious belief and attending religious worship in order to be eligible for a
particular faith-based school. Many see this as morally reprehensible.
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We shall consider this in more detail when we look at questions of inclusivity. However it
may be briefly observed that an increase in the number of faith based schools should
alleviate the problem, as the number of applicants will less exceed the number ofplaces
(assuming the number of applicants to be fixed). Fewer pupils who want a faith-based
education will be turned down and so there will be less selection. Additionally there is a
significant number of Catholic schools in inner city areas that cater specifically for the
poorest and most marginalised in society. Again I do not want to examine all the figures here
but in so far as faith schools exercise 'an option for the poor' alongside more affluent middle
class schools, the charges of selection are surely diminished? Indeed some American
researchers have recognised the "important contribution to the common good ofAmerican
society" made by Catholic schools in deprived areas that are no longer predominantly
Catholic (cf Grace 2002 p85).
I think the question of funding is distinct from many ofthe questions above. The above
questions consider whether faith-based schooling is a good thing (educationally) for
individuals and for society. The question ofwho pays for it is a largely separate issue, and
not a part ofmy discussion. Furthermore it is necessary to distinguish the question of
whether the state should pay for any faith-based schooling? And whether if the state funds
some faith-based schools it should fund all that apply and meet the appropriate educational
criteria?
The classical liberal answer to the first question is that the state should not fund faith-based
schooling and this is the situation in present day France and the USA. The simple argument
is that it would be wrong for the state to fund something from which certain people were
excluded on account of their religious belief Briefly there are two kinds ofreply to this. The
state could fund religious schools of all desired types so that each and every pupils who
wished to go to a faith-based schools could, but this is generally considered to be practically
impossible. Alternatively it is argued that parents have a fundamental right to be able to send
their children to a faith-based school of their choosing. This is a highly controversial claim
that we do not have the opportunity to evaluate here, and personally whilst I feel parents
probably do have a right within bounds to choose the type of their children's education, I do
not think this entails that the state should fund it.
On the second question, it is argued that if the state is willing to fund some state based
schools, then it should fund all faith-based schools that apply, so long as they meet certain
educational standards. This is the debate that is being argued at the present time, with
Muslims and other groups arguing that if the state funds Christian and Jewish schools, it
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should fund Muslim and other religious schools too. Two points are relevant I think. The
first is that there is a general feeling that a line needs to be drawn somewhere to exclude
certain religions or sects which are generally considered extreme, but there is no clarity
about where the line should be drawn. Secondly it seems relevant to me that like it or not,
Britain has a constitution that links the Church (of England) to the State. Now many think
the Church ofEngland should be disestablished, and many others point to the heterogeneous
nature of contemporary society, but the fact remains that at the present time Christianity has
a constitutionally privileged place. I think this is relevant to the discussion. Whilst I have
sympathy with arguments about constitutional change, here is not the place to rehearse them.
Finally in the light of all the above arguments for and against faith-based schools, it is
appropriate to consider proposals that try to affect a compromise, or pursue a middle way.
What of the demand that faith based schools must be inclusive? This can mean that a faith-
based school must accept a pupil of any faith or none if it has surplus places, or more
strongly that any faith-based school must accept a certain proportion ofpupils who are not of
the faith of the school.
In particular Lord Dearing's report to the Archbishops on Church of England schools
stressed that Church ofEngland schools should be distinctively Christian and yet inclusive
and this is a point that the Archbishop of Canterbury himself has echoed. This is formalised
in Schools Achieving Success: "we want these [Church ofEngland secondary] schools to be
inclusive and welcome the recommendations that Church ofEngland schools should serve
the whole community not confining admission to Anglicans" (DfES 2001 p45). In practice at
the present time, about 20% ofpupils in Catholic schools are non-Catholic and many Church
ofEngland primary schools are open to all comers. There is a distinction however to be
drawn between primary schools which on account of their small size and small catchment
areas are generally 'open' and faith-based secondary schools which tend to have a much
tighter admissions policy. The reasons behind this are connected to the facts that faith-based
secondary schools are numerically fewer, they have much larger catchment areas, and pupils
can be expected to travel further to them.
Considering the legal position: the law currently defends the right of faith schools to select
entirely from that faith, such that local families ofother faiths or none may be excluded from
that school. Estelle Morris has agreed "that the right of a church school to admit by faith
necessarily excluded others of a different faith. But in the balance of rights and freedoms
between "giving the person living next to the Catholic school the right to go there no matter
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what" and "the right ofthe Church to select by faith", she had come down on the side of the
second" (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p39).
In the debate in the Commons on 6 February 2002 Frank Dobson (Lab.) tabled an
amendment to the Education Bill that would give the local education authorities the power to
compel a school to accept 25% oftheir pupils from other faiths or none. He argued for this
on the grounds that non-inclusive faith based schools brought inclusive faith-based schools
into disrepute. There is no empirical evidence for this, and charges ofdisrepute hardly seem
like grounds for changing the law! He also suggested that (exclusive) faith based schools
contributed to a divided society and cited Northern Ireland. These are issues we have already
considered.
A number ofcounter-arguments were advanced, which went beyond the scope of inclusivity
and again most ofwhich we have considered. Crucially it was argued that faith based
schools have the right to exclude those who do not share the faith ofthe school, to protect
their ethos and integrity. Having said that, many MPs wished to encourage faith based
schools to be inclusive, but did not want to make this a point oflaw and this is a position
with which I am wholly sympathetic. Dobson's amendment was defeated by 405 votes to 87
(cf. Tablet 23 February 2002 pp37-40).
At the Institute ofEducation's Faith Schools' conference Ian Terry, an Anglican clergyman
suggested that inclusivity was central to Anglicanism and related this to the adoption of
programmes that promote justice in the widest sense. Terry went on to make the point that
Anglicans have a vision of God as inclusive, and whilst he did not suggest this claim is
particular to Anglican Christians, he did suggest that it was because ofthe very nature ofthe
Godhead, that Church ofEngland schools should adopt inclusive policies. He suggested that
inclusivity was based on a balance ofpreserving a faith and welcoming others, and he said
the putting of this policy into practice would be crucial to the future of Church ofEngland
schools.
In the context ofthe call for balance, there has been some discussion ofwhat percentage of
pupils not of the faith, a faith-based school might admit before it loses its distinctive nature.
Some have suggested 10% others 25% and so on, whilst others have suggested it is not the
composition ofthe pupil body that is important but more the teachers and the values ofthe
school that essentially define it. Particular problems have faced those dealing with
admissions in oversubscribed faith-based schools, where the tasks of serving those of the
faith, remaining inclusive and exercising an option for the poor have come in to conflict.
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I think it would be an error to try to give general solutions to these types ofproblems or to
make provision in law. I think schools need to be seen as part of a wider social context and
faith-based schools should have additional connections to the local church, mosque or
temple. Depending on the context, governors of schools and those responsible for admissions
need to formulate and implement local inclusivity policies for faith-based schools.
Finally, many who oppose faith-based schools entirely have suggested the debate about
inc1usivity is a smokescreen and a facade ofpolitical correctness, designed to obfuscate the
central issue. They say that inclusive or not, faith-based schools are not an appropriate
vehicle for state funded education in a modem pluralist society and historical precedent is no
longer a valid guide. It need hardly be said that this is not a view that I am in agreement with
and I think the details of the 'smokescreen argument' have already been dealt with. I think
influences of faith still go very deep, and I think a crucial part of education is initiating
pupils in to a particular framework (language, tradition and community) ofwhich faiths are
particularly good exemplars.
To conclude, I want to make three points. Firstly the recent debate both in academic circles
and in political circles suggests that the question offrameworks and faith-based schools is a
highly relevant one today, and is not simply a philosophical curio that nobody in their right
mind would consider. I thinkthat as technology increases and people travel and
communicate more and more, questions ofwho we are and how we belong are increasingly
being asked, and these cannot be disassociated from questions about the nature and function
of schools.
Secondly, I should probably nail my colours to the mast and say I am largely in favour ofthe
educational policies of the current New Labour government in so far as they relate to the
expansion of faith-based schools. However, I think particular care needs to be taken to
ensure there is adequate and fair provision for non-Christians who wish to be educated in
faith based schools and I think issues of inclusivity need to be carefully considered in
particular local situations. I am also in favour of the proposals to encourage non-faith-based
schools to develop a strong ethos and community spirit. There is nothing in my argument to
suggest the frameworks for which I have been arguing must be religious, it is just that
religious frameworks are easyto conceive and have a high profile in current debate.
Thirdly and :finally, having expressed a broad agreement with New Labour's policies I wish
to distance myself, quite profoundly, from the arguments they put forward to justify them. Of
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course I am in favour of increasing educational standards in schools and I want citizens to
have fulfilling and rewarding work lives, but I do not think this is what is essentially
constitutive ofhuman life. I am also profoundly sceptical about the way and the extent to
which statistical evidence is used to 'justify' the New Labour position. For me, it is much
more important to consider what is essentially constitutive ofbeing a human person. In my
analysis human persons belong to one or more linguistic families. They are constituted by
tradition, particularly in respect oftheir rational and moral lives. And they belong to
communities, which give them stability and belonging, which in turn give them certain rights
and oblige them to certain responsibilities. It is this understanding ofwhat it is to be a human
person that lies beneath the surface ofthe whole ofthis argument that values education needs
a framework, based on language, tradition and community.
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